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INTRODUCTION 
Increased requirements for safety and efficiency as well as 
increased availability of reliable and inexpensive computer 
technology has resulted in a trend of more and more computers 
being employed in flight management. However, this trend by no 
means indicates that human operators will disappear from aircraft 
cockpits. Instead, it means that the roles of the pilot, 
copilot, and flight engineer will evolve to include increased 
responsibilities for monitoring and supervising the various 
computer—based systems employed in the aircraft. 
While this assessment of the future roles of the members of 
the flight crew is fairly easy to accept, it is certainly not 
straightforward to decide how various flight tasks should be 
allocated among humans and computers. Futher, it is not clear 
how humans and computers should communicate regarding the process 
by which their tasks are performed and the products that result. 
This report discusses progress of a research program whose 
overall objectives include providing at least partial answers to 
some of the questions surrounding these issues. 
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THE COMPUTER-AIDED COCKPIT 
After several years of investigation of various aiding 
techniques, it was decided to take an overall, "top-down" view of 
the problem. Thus far, an article has been written [Hammer and 
Rouse, 1982] that describes the advanced cockpit, and based on 
this article is an initial programming project that is designed 
to "follow" the flight crew and aircraft through various flight 
phases, procedures, and procedure steps. 
The data being used to develop and test this program comes 
from an experiment under a previous grant (NSG 2119). In this 
experiment, two-person crews flew twin-engine aircraft 
simulator under normal, emergency, and double emergency 
situations [Rouse, et al., 1982]. The data for a flight is 
stream of elements of the aircraft state that were recorded at 
any significant change and are accompanied by timestamps. 
The program reads this data stream, stores it in a database, 
and interprets it in terms of a hierarchical, procedural model of 
flight. This model is a tree with a top node labeled "flight." 
Beneath the flight node are nodes representing the various phases 
of flight: preflight, taxi, postflight, etc. Beneath each phase 
node are the procedure nodes, which correspond to flight crew 
procedures such as engine run-up, pre-takeoff checklist, etc. At 
the lowest level are procedure steps (e.g., setting mixtures, 
propellers, and throttles). 
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The hierarchical, procedural model, as described so far, is 
static. The dynamic element, which observes the aircraft state 
database, uses routines that are unique to every node. 
Currently, three routines are used and each determines whether 
the node: (1) can be done (feasibility), (2) is being done (the 
flight crew's current action), or (3) has been finished (is now 
complete or has been completed since last checked). Each node 
routine can be a completely general program, though the typical 
program statements test current and recent past values in the 
database and examine the status of nearby nodes (at a higher or 
lower level of detail) in the tree. Tracking the flight consists 
of invoking these routines to determine the state of each node. 
The current status of this program is that the hierarchical 
structure is done and that node routines are being coded. When 
completed, the program will be tested and refined using one half 
the data runs collected in the previous experiment. The 
remaining one half of the data will be used to validate the 
program. 
Concurrently with the above software efforts, work has 
progressed on redesign of the Center's DC-8 simulator. Most of 
the conventional instrumentation has been removed from the 
pilots' panels and, at this point in time, a single CRT installed 
in the left panel. Some Apple II-generated displays have been 
used for demonstration purposes. Current plans involve expanding 
to multiple CRTs driven by a VAX-11/780. 
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STUDIES OF HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING 
All of the computer aiding schemes that have been devised 
throughout the course of this grant have focused on human 
decision making and problem solving. The design of such aids 
should be based on knowledge of human behavior in decision making 
and problem solving situations. This section reviews current 
efforts aimed at increasing knowledge in this area. 
On of the difficult aspects of problem solving in the 
aircraft domain is the time-varying nature of problems in dynamic 
systems. The situation is also made difficult by the fact that 
the crew must keep the aircraft flying while also trying to solve 
the problem of interest. Very little research has been done in 
the area of humans , abilities to coordinate problem solving with 
ongoing operations. Nevertheless, at least one major aircraft 
accident has been attributed to precisely this problem [NTSB, 
1973]. 
To 	investigate 	human 	problem 	solving 	in 	dynamic 
environments, a simulation called PLANT (Production Levels and 
Network Troubleshooting) was developed. PLANT requires subjects 
to configure and bring a system up to normal operating conditions 
and subsequently monitor these conditions. During both the 
transition and steady-state operations, failures can occur and 
subjects must diagnose these failures while also maintaining 
operations. 	In 1981, under a previous grant (NSG-2119), two 
experiments were conducted using PLANT. 	The most important 
result was that subjects appeared to focus on failures to the 
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detriment of overall operations [Rouse and Morris, 1981a,b]. 
During the current reporting period, two efforts have been 
completed and one initiated in this area. First, PLANT was 
extended to be more realistic and was reprogrammed to utilize the 
color graphics of an Apple II computer. The changes made to 
increase realism included higher-fidelity second-order state 
equations for each pair of tanks, a safety system that could 
"trip" valves and pumps, and both valve and pump failures. 
An experiment was performed to evaluate human performance 
using this more realistic PLANT [Fath, 1982]. The independent 
variables included network size (9 cr 25 tanks), dynamics (slow 
or fast response), and failure rate (low or high). The results 
showed that performance Was systematically affected by these 
variables. These results also indicated that two changes were 
needed: 1) the penalty for ignoring failures was not substantial 
enough, 2) the fast dynamics were very difficult to control over 
a long period of time.  These conclusions are resulting in 
changes of PLANT for the next experiment (see below). 
The second effort completed in this area during the current 
reporting period was an initial attempt effort to model human 
behavior in controlling PLANT [Reidy, 1982]. Two models were 
developed, one for the older version of PLANT and one for the 
newer version of PLANT. The models are descriptive in the sense 
that they were limited to using human-like strategies, but are 
also normative in the sense that their parameters were adjusted 
to achieve the best performance possible for the strategy chosen. 
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This procedure was used to allow evaluation of human performance 
relative to a realistic optimal. 
Results of this evaluation indicated that the more difficult 
levels of the independent variables (e.g., larger networks or 
faster dynamics) were more troublesome for subjects than for the 
models. In particular, the earlier notion [Rouse and Morris, 
1981a,b] that an increased frequency of failures causes subjects 
to decrease production more than necessary was supported. 
Further, as was found experimentally for subjects [Fath, 1982], 
the faster dynamics were difficult for the model to maintain 
within limits for any extended period of time. 
The main purpose of the above two efforts was to assure that 
PLANT was a reasonable experimental environment in the sense that 
experimental manipulations of PLANTIs parameters (e.g., network 
size, tank sizes, pipe sizes and lengths, etc.) would provide a 
range of realistic problem solving situations that are suitable 
for investigating fundamental issues related to human problem 
solving in dynamic systems. 
While the issue of coordinating problem 	solving 	and 
operations motivated the developments reported in this section, 
the research has now come to focus on a more specific issue. 
Namely, how much does an operator need to know about his system 
in order to be able to cope successfully with failures? Further, 
does the answer to this question depend on the nature of the 
failures (i.e., familiar vs. unfamiliar failures)? This issue 
is the focus of an experiment that has been planned and will soon 
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begin [Morris, 1982, Morris and Rouse, 1982]. 
For this experiment, subjects will be trained with one of 
three types of instructions. One set of instructions (minimal) 
will simply explain the goal and the set of alternatives 
available for achieving this goal. Another set of instructions 
(procedures) will provide written procedures, similar to those 
used in aircraft, for dealing with the types of events that will 
occur during training. The third set of instructions 
(principles) will explain the physical nature of PLANT in terms 
of a set of heuristics (e.g., flow rate is proportional to 
pressure differences) and use these heuristics to indicate why 
procedures work and their limits of applicability. 
After training ? subjects will operate PLANT in situations 
involving both familiar failures (i.e., those practiced during 
training) and unfamiliar failures which they were told could 
occur but in fact they never experienced during training. It is 
hypothesized that the procedures group may be somewhat better 
than the principles group for familiar failures, but the 
principles group will be very much better than the procedures 
group for unfamiliar failures. The minimal group, which will 
mainly serve as a control group, is expected to perform poorly 
relative to the other two groups for both familiar and unfamiliar 
failures. 
If the above hypotheses are supported by the experimental 
results, the most important implications for this project in 
terms of computer aiding will be related to the level of 
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understanding the human must have about how the aiding works in 
order to assume control when the unusual occurs. It is planned 
that this issue of the relationship between understanding and 
aiding will be greatly refined, and hopefully at least partially 
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INTRODUCTION 
Increased requirements for safety and efficiency as well as 
increased availability of reliable and inexpensive computer 
technology has resulted in a trend of more and more computers 
being employed in flight management. However, this trend by no 
means indicates that human operators will disappear from aircraft 
cockpits. Instead, it means that the roles of the pilot, 
copilot, and flight engineer will evolve to include increased 
responsibilities for monitoring and supervising the various 
computer-based systems employed in the aircraft. 
While this assessment of the future roles of the members of 
the flight crew is fairly easy to accept. it is certainly not 
straightforward to decide how various flight tasks should be 
allocated among humans and computers. Futher, it is not clear 
how humans and computers should communicate regarding the process 
by which their tasks are performed and the products that result. 
This report discusses progress of a research program whose 
overall objectives include providing at least partial answers to 
some of the questions surrounding these issues. 
The following two sections discuss two project areas which 
are currently being pursued in this program of research: 1) the 
intelligent cockpit and 2) studies of human problem solving. The 
first area involves an investigation of the use of advanced 
software engineering mehtods (e.g., from artificial intelligence) 
to aid aircraft crews in procedure selection and execution. The 
second area is focused on human problem solving in dynamic 
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environments as affected by the human's level of knowledge of 
system operations. Both of these efforts are producing results 
that are planned to be tested further in the Center's new 
full-scale simulation facility. Progress on developing this 
facility is discussed in the final section of this progress 
report. 
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THE INTELLIGENT COCKPIT 
The error-detecting capability of the procedural model of 
flight is discussed in this section. The computer program, input 
data, results, and future plans are presented. 
The Computer Program  
The computer program matches the dynamic aircraft state with 
a script. 	A script is a sequence of actions (termed elements) 
that are expected to occur in a particular situation. 	The 
aircraft script contains four levels. 	At the top level is a 
single element for the entire flight. 	Beneath it are several 
elements 	for different phases of flight (e.g., preflight, 
takeoff). Beneath each phase element are the procedures 
contained in that phase (e.g., preflight checklist, starting 
engines, engine run-up). Beneath each procedure element are the 
steps of the procedure (e.g., engage left starter). 
Each element, regardless of its level in the hierarchy, is 
represented uniformly. Included in this representation are three 
rules that determine when the element can possibly be executed, 
is done with execution, or has aborted its execution. These 
rules typically check the current simulator state. The computer 
program tracks the flight by evaluating the three rules in the 
elements of the script. For example, the element "engage left 
starter" has a done rule that examines the simulator state 
variable that is connected to the left starter. When the starter 
is engaged, this corresponding step in the procedure is marked 
done. 
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The . Input Data 
The input data are from a previous experiment [Rouse, Rouse, 
and Hammer 1982]. A Link GAT-II simulator (twin piston engine, 
general aviation) was interfaced to a PDP-11/40. 	Approximately 
75 signals were recorded. 	The simulated flight was direct 
between two airports. The simulator was flown IFR. ATC provided 
headings for all takeoffs and landings. Data from thirty-six 
flights is available; sixteen normal, sixteen emergency, and 
four double emergency. Testing has thus far been limited to the 
normal flights. 
The program is being tested by equally and randomly dividing 
these flights into derivation and validation data. The program 
is developed on the derivation data so that it is able to find 
all of the errors previously reported in [Rouse and Rouse, 1983]. 
The program will be held fixed during runs with the validation 
data. 
Results 
For the seven flights in the derivation data, the program 
found all errors that had been previously found. Some examples 
of these errors are omitted procedures, inappropriate activation 
of various lights and anti-icing equipment, and lowering the 
landing gear while airspeed was too high. Furthermore, the 
program identified what appear to be several additional errors. 
Since some of these errors may be a matter of pilot preference. 
These questions will be resolved by consulting subject matter 
experts. 
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Though the program's detection of errors is an easily 
measured goal, it is really a by-product. The principal goal is 
to keep the program's internal procedural model in agreement with 
what the flight crew and the aircraft are doing. Eventually, 
this will be measured by the latency between the actual event and 
the time when the model was so updated. Short latency is 
necessary if the procedural model is to be of any value as an 
online decision aid. For example, the model will be of little 
use if it could only detect some errors 30 seconds after they 
were committed. 
Future plans 
There are two goals to be pursued in the near future. 	The 
most immediate goal is to analyze the remaining validation data. 
Second, the program script will be enlarged for emergency 
procedures, and flights with emergencies will be analyzed for 
errors. Emergency situations are, of course, a more important 
area for aiding flight crew decision making. 
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STUDIES OF HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING 
The topic of human problem solving and decision making with 
respect to dynamic systems continues to be of interest to this 
research group. The current question under investigation is 
this: How much and what kind of system-relevant information does 
the human operator need in order to control the system 
effectively and correct problem situations when they occur? This 
question is being investigated in the context of a dynamic 
simulation called PLANT (Eroduction Levels And Eetwork 
Troubleshooting), which was discussed in earlier reports. 
The human PLANT operator is required to configure and bring 
the system up to normal operating conditions, monitor the system 
for malfunctions, and take steps to correct and recover from 
failures if any should occur. The results of experimental 
efforts using PLANT have thus far indicated that the PLANT 
environment is a reasonable one for presenting problem solving 
situations suitable for investigation of human problem solving 
behavior in dynamic systems. 
In the current experiment, the parameters of the PLANT 
(e.g., tank and pipe sizes, network size, etc.) are held constant 
within and across subjects. The major variables of interest do 
not involve the effects of system characteristics upon operator 
performance (as was the case in previous experiments), but are 
rather concerned with the nature and extent of system-relevant 
knowledge that operators have, and the relationships between this 
knowledge and performance. Experimental subjects control a 
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relatively "slow" PLANT (in that the dynamics of the system are 
such that responses to control actions tend to be "sluggish"), 
with 9 tanks in the system. 
In an effort to manipulate the PLANT-relevant knowledge that 
subjects have, instructions to subjects are varied in a 
between-groups design. One group receives a minimal set of 
instructions, which merely informs them of the goals of PLANT 
operation, the types of failures which may occur, and the command 
options available to them as operators. Another group is 
provided information about the behavior of the system in terms of 
dynamic relationships (principles), in addition to the minimal 
instructions. A third group is provided both the minimal 
instructions and a set of operational heuristics and procedures, 
which are designed to help the operator achieve the goals of 
PLANT operation. Finally, a fourth group is provided with all of 
the PLANT information described here. The system-relevant 
knowledge a subject actually possesses is evaluated with a 
multiple-choice test administered at the end of the last 
experimental session. 
Following a training period, all subjects operate the PLANT 
in situations involving both familiar failures (i.e., those 
experienced during training) and unfamiliar failures (i.e., 
failures which they are told may happen but which never occur 
during training). It is hypothesized that those groups receiving 
either principles or procedures will perform equally well in 
familiar situations, but that the groups receiving principles 
will be better than those groups without dynamics in unfamiliar 
situations. The group receiving only minimal instructions is 
expected to perform less well than the other groups in both 
familiar and unfamiliar situations. 
As this report is written, approximately half of the data 
have been collected, with groups 1 and 4 (minimal and principles 
+ procedures) completed. A preliminary analysis of the data 
yields interesting results. 
The most obvious difference between the two groups completed 
thus far has been their performance on the multiple-choice test 
administered at the end of the experiment. The group receiving 
minimal instructions scored an average of 65% correct, as opposed 
to a mean correct of 84% achieved by the full (principles + 
procedures) instruction group. This difference was statistically 
significant (jig < .01). The difference in test scores is not 
surprising, in light of the fact that the test was designed 
specifically to test knowledge gained from the instructions 
provided. It is noteworthy, however, that the scores do not 
reflect what might have been expected if PLANT-relevant knowledge 
were obtained only from the written instructions. For instance, 
the group receiving minimal instructions might have been expected 
to answer slightly more than 35% of the test questions correctly. 
whereas the group receiving full instructions should have been 
able to respond correctly to almost all of the questions. 
Obviously the minimal instruction group learned a great deal 
about PLANT via experience with the system; apparently the full 
instruction group did not learn all that the instructions 
contained. 
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A number of other dependent variables have been examined, 
which may be broadly classified as either "global" measures or 
"fine-grained" measures. The global measures indicate how well 
subjects were able to achieve the goals emphasized in the 
instructions: to produce as much as possible, and keep safety 
system trips at a minimum. Fine-grained measures might be called 
"process" measures, in that they reveal information about the 
behaviors exhibited by subjects as they attempted to achieve 
their goals. 
Two of the global measures are of interest: 	production 
achieved, and frequency of safety system trips. There was no 
difference between the two groups in the amount of production 
achieved. Although the full instruction group produced 
approximately 5% more, this difference was not statistically 
significant; there was, however, greater variability between 
subjects in the minimal instruction group. Significant 
differences in production were found to be related to the 
familiarity of the failures encountered, with production during 
familiar situations exceeding production under unfamiliar 
circumstances by approximately 8%. The two groups did differ 
significantly in the number of safety system trips which occurred 
during their production runs; whereas the groups were able to 
achieve approximately the 	same production. the minimal 
instruction group had 60% more trips than did the 	full 
instruction group (416.9 vs. 260.4). 
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The fine-grained measures paint a clearer picture of the 
differences between the two groups. In general, the control 
performance of the minimal instruction group was less "optimal" 
and less consistent than that of the full instruction group. For 
example, the minimal instruction group kept fewer valves open on 
the average (even though both groups were told that the PLANT was 
capable of producing more product if all valves were open), and 
had greater differences in fluid levels within the system. 
It is interesting to note the differences between the two 
groups in their response to unfamiliar situations. One of the 
unfamiliar situations was apparently so evident to both groups 
that its occurrence had no effect upon performance. The other 
unfamiliar situation was more subtle, though, and had an 
interesting effect upon subjects' control performance. Whereas 
both groups were fairly consistent across all situations in the 
average amount of output that was specified, there were 
differences in the specified inputs. The full instruction 
group's response to the unfamiliar situation was to slightly 
reduce the amount of fluid input into the system, with no change 
in the variability of inputs specified. The minimal instruction 
group reacted in just the opposite manner: the average amount of 
input was greatly increased, as was the variability of input 
specifications. In other words, the full instruction group did 
not dramatically change their control strategy, but became 
slightly more conservative; the minimal instruction group faced 
with the unfamiliar situation maintained system output but was 
forced to adopt a "bang-bang" approach to system input in order 
rage _LI 
to maintain an acceptable level of fluid within the system. 
It should be noted that there were no differences between 
groups in their detection of both familiar and unfamiliar 
failures. The average time to repair familiar failures was 
approximately equal for the two groups, and there was no 
difference in detection of the unfamiliar failures. It is also 
interesting to note that there was often a significant effect of 
session upon the dependent variables analyzed. At the end of the 
experiment the performance of both groups was still improving; 
at this stage in the analysis, it appears that the improvement of 
the two groups was essentially parallel, with both groups 
improving at the same rate. 
Data collection in the current experiment is expected to 
continue until mid-May, at which time the four groups described 
will have been completed. At that time it should be possible to 
more fully describe the effects of instructions and system 
knowledge upon performance. The observations reported here will 
be reexamined in light of the new data, and more definite 
conclusions will be drawn. 
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FLIGHT SIMULATOR FACILITY 
A DC-8 simulator is being modernized to provide a realistic 
testbed 	for experiments in decision aiding. 	The original 
electromechanical instrumentation was removed and high 
resolution, color CRT monitors with alphanumeric keyboards are 
being installed in place. Existing flight dynamics software is 
being modified to run on the Center's VAX-11/780. 
Two high resolution 13" color monitors will be installed, 
one each directly in front of the pilot and copilot. These 
monitors will display graphical information simulating an HSI and 
ADI. They will be driven, at least initially, by two existing 
Apple II microcomputers. 
Two 9" b/w monitors will be installed between the color 
monitors. These b/w monitors will display both text and low 
resolution graphics, such as procedure checklists and engine 
instruments. They will be driven by a composite video signal 
tapped from inside an existing computer terminal. 
Two 5" b/w monitors will be installed in the pedestal. 	Due 
to their small size, they will be used for menus. They will be 
driven by signals tapped from computer terminals. The keyboards 
in conjunction with the 5" monitors will be the primary pilot 
interface with the computer system. 
The type of keyboard to be installed was originally used in 
the experiments run on the Link GAT-II simulator at the 
University of Illinois. It is relatively small (4.5 by 9 inches) 
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and has 60 keys--enough for all A-Z, 0-9, and some dedicated 
function keys. 
Flight dynamics and display software have been obtained from 
NASA. This software was developed by Lockheed-Georgia under 
contract to NASA. It runs on VAX and SEL processors with Ikonaa  
graphics. This package will be modified to produce a DC-8 flight 
dynamics simulation and a display system capable of working with 
simpler Apple II graphics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Increased requirements for safety and efficiency as well as 
increased availability of reliable and inexpensive computer 
technology has resulted in a trend of more and more computers 
being employed in flight management. However, this trend by no 
means indicates that human operators will disappear from aircraft 
cockpits. Instead, it means that the roles of the pilot, 
copilot, and flight engineer will evolve to include increased 
responsibilities for monitoring and supervising the various 
computer-based systems employed in the aircraft. 
While this assessment of the future roles of the members of 
the flight crew is fairly easy to accept. it is certainly not 
straightforward to decide how various flight tasks should be 
allocated among humans and computers. Futher, it is not clear 
how humans and computers should communicate regarding the process 
by which their tasks are performed and the products that result. 
This report discusses progress of a research program whose 
overall objectives include providing at least partial answers to 
some of the questions surrounding these issues. 
The following two sections discuss two project areas which 
are currently being pursued in this program of research: 1) the 
intelligent cockpit and 2) studies of human problem solving. The 
first area involves an investigation of the use of advanced 
software engineering mehtods (e.g., from artificial intelligence) 
to aid aircraft crews in procedure selection and execution. The 
second area is focused on human problem solving in dynamic 
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environments as affected by the human's level of knowledge of 
system operations. Both of these efforts are producing results 
that are planned to be tested further in the Center's new 
full-scale simulation facility. Progress on developing this 
facility is discussed in the final section of this progress 
report. 
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THE INTELLIGENT COCKPIT 
4 
	 The error-detecting capability of the procedural model of 
flight is discussed in this section. The computer program, input 
data, results, and future plans are presented. 
The, Computer Program 
The computer program matches the dynamic aircraft state with 
a script. 	A script is a sequence of actions (termed elements) 
that are expected to occur in a particular situation. 	The 
aircraft script contains four levels. 	At the top level is a 
single element for the entire flight. 	Beneath it are several 
elements 	for different phases of flight (e.g., preflight, 
takeoff). Beneath each phase element are the procedures 
contained in that phase (e.g., preflight checklist, starting 
engines, engine run-up). Beneath each procedure element are the 
steps of the procedure (e.g., engage left starter). 
Each element, regardless of its level in the hierarchy, is 
represented uniformly. Included in this representation are three 
rules that determine when the element can possibly be executed, 
is done with execution, or has aborted its execution. These 
rules typically check the current simulator state. The computer 
program tracks the flight by evaluating the three rules in the 
elements of the script. For example, the element "engage left 
starter" has a done rule that examines the simulator state 
variable that is connected to the left starter. When the starter 
is engaged, this corresponding step in the procedure is marked 
done. 
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The Input Data 
The input data are from a previous experiment [Rouse, Rouse, 
and Hammer 1982]. A Link GAT-II simulator (twin piston engine, 
general aviation) was interfaced to a PDP-11/40. 	Approximately 
75 signals were recorded. 	The simulated flight was direct 
between two airports. The simulator was flown IFR. ATC provided 
headings for all takeoffs and landings. Data from thirty-six 
flights is available; sixteen normal, sixteen emergency, and 
four double emergency. Testing has thus far been limited to the 
normal flights. 
The program is being tested by equally and randomly dividing 
these flights into derivation and validation data. The program 
is developed on the derivation data so that it is able to find 
all of the errors previously reported in [Rouse and Rouse, 19831. 
The program will be held fixed during runs with the validation 
data. 
Results  
For the seven flights in the derivation data, the program 
found all errors that had been previously found. Some examples 
of these errors are omitted procedures, inappropriate activation 
of various lights and anti-icing equipment, and lowering the 
landing gear while airspeed was too high. Furthermore, the 
program identified what appear to be several additional errors. 
Since some of these errors may be a matter of pilot preference. 
These questions will be resolved by consulting subject matter 
experts. 
Page 5 
Though the program's detection of errors is an easily 
measured goal, it is really a by-product. The principal goal is 
to keep the program's internal procedural model in agreement with 
what the flight crew and the aircraft are doing. Eventually, 
this will be measured by the latency between the actual event and 
the time when the model was so updated. Short latency is 
necessary if the procedural model is to be of any value as an 
online decision aid. For example, the model will be of little 
use if it could only detect some errors 30 seconds after they 
were committed. 
Future Plans 
There are two goals to be pursued in the near future. 	The 
most immediate goal is to analyze the remaining validation data. 
Second, the program script will be enlarged for emergency 
procedures, and flights with emergencies will be analyzed for 
errors. Emergency situations are, of course, a more important 
area for aiding flight crew decision making. 
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STUDIES OF HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING 
The topic of human problem solving and decision making with 
respect to dynamic systems continues to be of interest to this 
research group. The current question under investigation is 
this: How much and what kind of system-relevant information does 
the human operator need in order to control the system 
effectively and correct problem situations when they occur? This 
question is being investigated in the context of a dynamic 
simulation called PLANT (Eroduction Levels And lietwork 
Troubleshooting), which was discussed in earlier reports. 
The human PLANT operator is required to configure and bring 
the system up to normal operating conditions, monitor the system 
for malfunctions, and take steps to correct and recover from 
failures if any should occur. The results of experimental 
efforts using PLANT have thus far indicated that the PLANT 
environment is a reasonable one for presenting problem solving 
situations suitable for investigation of human problem solving 
behavior in dynamic systems. 
In the current experiment, the parameters of the PLANT 
(e.g., tank and pipe sizes, network size, etc.) are held constant 
within and across subjects. The major variables of interest do 
not involve the effects of system characteristics upon operator 
performance (as was the case in previous experiments), but are 
rather concerned with the nature and extent of system-relevant 
knowledge that operators have, and the relationships between this 
knowledge and performance. Experimental subjects control a 
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relatively "slow" PLANT (in that the dynamics of the system are 
such that responses to control actions tend to be "sluggish"), 
with 9 tanks in the system. 
In an effort to manipulate the PLANT-relevant knowledge that 
subjects have, instructions to subjects are varied in a 
between-groups design. One group receives a minimal set of 
instructions, which merely informs them of the goals of PLANT 
operation, the types of failures which may occur, and the command 
options available to them as operators. Another group is 
provided information about the behavior of the system in terms of 
dynamic relationships (principles), in addition to the minimal 
instructions. A third group is provided both the minimal 
instructions and a set of operational heuristics and procedures, 
which are designed to help the operator achieve the goals of 
PLANT operation. Finally, a fourth group is provided with all of 
the PLANT information described here. The system-relevant 
knowledge a subject actually possesses is evaluated with a 
multiple-choice test administered at the end of the last 
experimental session. 
Following a training period, all subjects operate the PLANT 
in situations involving both familiar failures (i.e., those 
experienced during training) and unfamiliar failures (i.e., 
failures which they are told may happen but which never occur 
during training). It is hypothesized that those groups receiving 
either principles or procedures will perform equally well in 
familiar situations, but that the groups receiving principles 
will be better than those groups without dynamics in unfamiliar 
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situations. The group receiving only minimal instructions is 
expected to perform less well than the other groups in both 
familiar and unfamiliar situations. 
As this report is written, approximately half of the data 
have been collected, with groups 1 and 4 (minimal and principles 
+ procedures) completed. A preliminary analysis of the data 
yields interesting results. 
The most obvious difference between the two groups completed 
thus far has been their performance on the multiple-choice test 
administered at the end of the experiment. The group receiving 
minimal instructions scored an average of 65% correct, as opposed 
to a mean correct of 84% achieved by the full (principles + 
procedures) instruction group. This difference was statistically 
significant (9 < .01). The difference in test scores is not 
surprising, in light of the fact that the test was designed 
specifically to test knowledge gained from the instructions 
provided. It is noteworthy, however, that the scores do not 
reflect what might have been expected if PLANT-relevant knowledge 
were obtained only from the written instructions. For instance, 
the group receiving minimal instructions might have been expected 
to answer slightly more than 35% of the test questions correctly, 
whereas the group receiving full instructions should have been 
able to respond correctly to almost all of the questions. 
Obviously the minimal instruction group learned a great deal 
about PLANT via experience with the system; apparently the full 
instruction group did not learn all that the instructions 
contained. 
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A number of other dependent variables have been examined, 
which may be broadly classified as either "global" measures or 
"fine-grained" measures. The global measures indicate how well 
subjects were able to achieve the goals emphasized in the 
instructions: to produce as much as possible, and keep safety 
system trips at a minimum. Fine-grained measures might be called 
"process" measures, in that they reveal information about the 
behaviors exhibited by subjects as they attempted to achieve 
their goals. 
Two of the global measures are of interest: 	production 
achieved, and frequency of safety system trips. There was no 
difference between the two groups in the amount of production 
achieved. Although the full instruction group produced 
approximately 5% more, this difference was not statistically 
significant; there was, however, greater variability between 
subjects in the minimal instruction group. Significant 
differences in production were found to be related to the 
familiarity of the failures encountered, with production during 
familiar situations exceeding production under unfamiliar 
circumstances by approximately 8%. The two groups did differ 
significantly in the number of safety system trips which occurred 
during their production runs; whereas the groups were able to 
achieve approximately the same production, the minimal 
instruction group had 60% more trips than did the full 
instruction group (416.9 vs. 260.4). 
The fine-grained measures paint a clearer picture of the 
differences between the two groups. In general, the control 
performance of the minimal instruction group was less "optimal" 
and less consistent than that of the full instruction group. For 
example, the minimal instruction group kept fewer valves open on 
the average (even though both groups were told that the PLANT was 
capable of producing more product if all valves were open), and 
had greater differences in fluid levels within the system. 
It is interesting to note the differences between the two 
groups in their response to unfamiliar situations. One of the 
unfamiliar situations was apparently so evident to both groups 
that its occurrence had no effect upon performance. The other 
unfamiliar situation was more subtle, though, and had an 
interesting effect upon subjects' control performance. Whereas 
both groups were fairly consistent across all situations in the 
average 	amount of output that was specified, there were 
differences in the specified inputs. 	The full instruction 
group's response to the unfamiliar situation was to slightly 
reduce the amount of fluid input into the system, with no change 
in the variability of inputs specified. The minimal instruction 
group reacted in just the opposite manner: the average amount of 
input was greatly increased, as was the variability of input 
specifications. In other words, the full instruction group did 
not dramatically change their control strategy, but became 
slightly more conservative; the minimal instruction group faced 
with the unfamiliar situation maintained system output but was 
forced to adopt a "bang-bang" approach to system input in order 
to maintain an acceptable level of fluid within the system. 
It should be noted that there were no differences between 
groups in their detection of both familiar and unfamiliar 
failures. The average time to repair familiar failures was 
approximately equal for the two groups, and there was no 
difference in detection of the unfamiliar failures. It is also 
interesting to note that there was often a significant effect of 
session upon the dependent variables analyzed. At the end of the 
experiment the performance of both groups was still improving; 
at this stage in the analysis, it appears that the improvement of 
the two groups was essentially parallel, with both groups 
improving at the same rate. 
Data collection in the current experiment is expected to 
continue until mid-May, at which time the four groups described 
will have been completed. At that time it should be possible to 
more fully describe the effects of instructions and system 
knowledge upon performance. The observations reported here will 
be reexamined in light of the new data, and more definite 
conclusions will be drawn. 
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FLIGHT SIMULATOR FACILITY 
A DC-8 simulator is being modernized to provide a realistic 
testbed 	for experiments in decision aiding. 	The original 
electromechanical instrumentation was removed and high 
resolution, color CRT monitors with alphanumeric keyboards are 
being installed in place. Existing flight dynamics software is 
being modified to run on the Center's VAX-11/780. 
Two high resolution 13" color monitors will be installed, 
one each directly in front of the pilot and copilot. These 
monitors will display graphical information simulating an HSI and 
ADI. They will be driven, at least initially, by two existing 
Apple II microcomputers. 
Two 9" b/w monitors will be installed between the color 
monitors. These b/w monitors will display both text and low 
resolution graphics, such as procedure checklists and engine 
instruments. They will be driven by a composite video signal 
tapped from inside an existing computer terminal. 
Two 5" b/w monitors will be installed in the pedestal. 	Due 
to their small size, they will be used for menus. They will be 
driven by signals tapped from computer terminals. The keyboards 
in conjunction with the 5" monitors will be the primary pilot 
interface with the computer system. 
The type of keyboard to be installed was originally used in 
the experiments run on the Link GAT-II simulator at the 
University of Illinois. It is relatively small (4.5 by 9 inches) 
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and has 60 keys--enough for all A-Z, 0-9, and some dedicated 
function keys. 
Flight dynamics and display software have been obtained from 
NASA. This software was developed by Lockheed-Georgia under 
contract to NASA. It runs on VAX and SEL processors with Ikonas 
graphics. This package will be modified to produce a DC-8 flight 
dynamics simulation and a display system capable of working with 
simpler Apple II graphics. 
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Increased requirements for safety and efficiency as well as 
increased availability of reliable and inexpensive computer 
technology has resulted in a trend of more and more computers 
being employed in flight management. However, this trend by no 
means indicates that human operators will disappear from aircraft 
cockpits. Instead, it means that the roles of the pilot, 
copilot, and flight engineer will evolve to include increased 
responsibilities for monitoring and supervising the various 
computer-based systems employed in the aircraft_ 
While this assessment of the future roles of the members of 
the flight crew is fairly easy to accept, it is certainly not 
straightforward to decide how various flight tasks should be 
allocated among humans and computers. Further, it is not clear 
how humans and computers should communicate regarding the process 
by which their tasks are performed and the products that result. 
This report discusses progress of a research program whose 
overall objectives include providing at least partial answers to 
some of the questions surrounding these issues. 
The following two sections discuss two project areas which 
are currently being pursued in this program of research: 1) the 
intelligent cockpit and 2) studies of human problem solving. The 
first area involves an investigation of the use of advanced 
software engineering methods (e.g., from artificial intelligence) 
to aid aircraft crews in procedure selection and execution. The 
second area is focused on human problem solving in dynamic 
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environments as affected by the human's level of knowledge of 
system operations. Both of these efforts are producing results 
that are planned to be tested further in the Center's new 
full-scale simulation facility. Progress on developing this 
facility - is discussed in the third and final section of this 
progress report. 
THE INTELLIGENT COCKPIT 
This project is a direct descendent of work by the authors 
on human-computer interaction in the cockpit dating back to 1975. 
As this research has evolved, the modeling and analysis methods 
that have emerged have enabled consideration of increasingly 
complex domains. For example, two of the more recent sets of 
studies considered pilot (and crew) problem solving in 
full-mission simulation studies [Rouse et al., 1982; 	Johannsen 
and Rouse, 1983]. 
The perspectives provided by these years of research have 
resulted in an integrated computer aiding concept which the 
authors have termed the "intelligent cockpit." The overall 
outline of this concept is outlined in Hammer and Rouse [1982]. 
The basic idea is to use advanced software engineering methods 
(e.g., from artificial intelligence) and models of human decision 
making and problem solving to produce a computer-based aid that 
"understands" what is going on in the cockpit and can provide 
assistance accordingly. 
This very ambitious project is being pursued in an 
incremental manner. The first increment is an intelligent flight 
management aid that understands the nature of procedures and can 
monitor their execution. 	The paper by John Hammer in the 
Appendix of this report summarizes this work. 	The results 
reported in this paper prove the soundness of the concepts; the 
next stage will be to implement this idea in the Center's 
simulator to allow full-scale testing. 
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STUDIES OF HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING 
In order to support domain-oriented projects such as the 
intelligent cockpit. it is necessary to increase our basic 
understanding of human decision making and problem solving. This 
has been a main tenet of this program of research since its 
inception and continues to be a guiding principle. 
The latest efforts in the area of basic studies of human 
problem solving have focused on the question of what humans need 
to know about a dynamic process in order to be able to deal 
successfully with unfamiliar and unanticipated events. The paper 
by Nancy Morris in the Appendix of this report summarizes the 
results of a study that compared knowledge of operating 
procedures and physical principles in a process control task. 
One of the most interesting results was that knowledge of 
physical principles, as assessed via a written test, did not 
result in improved performance- Of the many important issues 
that this raises, two of particular note are the nature of 
training (e.g., "what" vs. "how") and the appropriate forms for 
different types of knowledge. 
FLIGHT SIMULATION SOFTWARE 
The progress report for the last reporting period discussed 
the hardware modifications planned for the Center's DC-8 
simulator in order to create an advanced cockpit simulator. This 
section focuses on software developments. 
Software has been developed to produce a B-747 flight 
simulation on the Center's Vax 11/780. At this point in time, it 
employs simplified dynamics to simulate the motion of an aircraft 
and only a few of the essential subsystems. Despite this 
simplicity, the software meets our overall need to provide pilots 
with a reasonably realistic environment for the purpose of 
investigating their problem solving behavior in various 
situations. 
The program allows the pilot to activate the control 
surfaces of the jet aircraft, adjust engine thrust, and tune 
navigational radio equipment. The program responds to commands 
by adjusting aircraft attitude to match the control surfaces and 
updating the instrument panel display as the trajectory of the 
aircraft evolves through space. 
An instrument panel was designed to display information that 
comes from the flight simulation. This information is composed 
of current aircraft attitude, positions of switches, flight 
situation, and navigational environment. Included are pitch. 
altitude. engine thrust, compass, fuel, landing gear, brake. VOR 
system, stall warning, VLF OMEGA, ILS, VHF channel, etc. This 
brief panel gives the pilot all the basic flight information he 
needs during the three primary mission phases (i.e., takeoff, 
navigation, and landing) using standard flight procedures and 
radio facilities. 
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Although the pilot completely controls the motion of the 
jet, wind forces that vary with altitude can influence the 
flight. An analytical combination of jet and wind motion yields 
the true position of the jet relative to the earth's surface- 
This simulation software, however, is still incomplete. The 
current interface--keyboard and screen--are suitable for software 
development but will have to change to use the simulator displays 
and controls. The existing single instrument panel must be 
rearranged into several different CRT's. The flight control will 
be executed by a pilot who will be sitting down in a full scale 
aircraft cockpit facility and using a control stick and a flight 
deck of high fidelity. 
Also, more subsystems will be involved to cover all 
information that would be necessary for a realistic problem 
solving environment. Among these subsystems are the engines 
(giving engine pressure ratio. fuel flow. exhaust gas 
temperature, etc.), hydraulic system, autopilot, fuel. CDTI. etc. 
With all these subsystems, it is believed that the flight 
simulator will be an appropriate base for studies of aiding 
problem solving. 
APPENDIX 
AN INTELLIGENT FLIGHT MANAGEMENT AID FOR PROCEDURE EXECUTION 
John M. Hammer 
Center for Man-Machine Systems Research 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, Georgia 30332 
ABSTRACT 
A computer program is described which contains a model of 
the procedures used in the operation of a twin engine aircraft. 
This program, by comparing the model to the aircraft state, can 
determine when a procedure (or checklist) should be or is invoked 
and when each step (detectable by a change in the aircraft state) 
is completed. 	Thus, the program tracks the flight crew's 
procedure execution through changes in the aircraft state. 	Data 
was used for evaluation from an earlier experiment on a Link 
GAT-II simulator. The program was able to identify practically 
all of the errors identified by hand as well as locate some that 
had been missed by human judges. It is felt that this model 
could signficantly aid flight crews. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A computer program for detecting pilot error is described. 
This program observes pilot actions through the aircraft controls 
and state. These actions are compared to those of a procedure 
script, which can be considered a prescriptive model of the 
procedural aspects of flight. A pilot error, then, is a 
discrepancy between the pilot actions and the script. The 
program is capable of detecting omitted, incorrect, or 
out-of-order steps as well as certain irrelevant actions. 
This procedural aid is part of a larger research thrust 
known as the intelligent cockpit. Its goals are to demonstrate 
concepts for a system capable of intelligent decision-aiding in 
flight management. 	For example, Hammer and Rouse 11982] have 
identified a number of levels at which aiding could occur. 	At 
the lowest level, computerized warning, calculation, and display 
control could, if implemented properly, improve the human factors 
of the cockpit. 	Most flight deck automation is concerned with 
this level [Wiener and Curry 19801. 	At a second level, the 
computer could check that certain conditions were met and infer 
the intentions of the flight crew. For example, the system 
described later checks pilot actions against a prescribed plan 
and infers what procedure the crew should be following. At the 
highest level, the computer could compensate for and advise the 
pilot. Compensation could mean taking over some task that had 
been allocated to the pilot or correcting for pilot error. 
Advice could take the form of a natural language dialogue on some 
cooperative human-computer problem solving. Both of these forms 
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of aiding are beyond the current state of the art. 
Problem Statement  
Currently, pilot error (that goes undetected by the pilot) 
is found by humans who examine simulator traces (as above) or 
cockpit voice recordings. It would be better to detect these 
errors seconds after they occurred while there was still time to 
correct them. This was the goal of the research reported here. 
Software was written to implement a model of procedure execution 
during flight. The model is continually updated (steps noted 
done, procedures invoked and finished) during the flight so as to 
keep it close to what the flight crew is doing. The model could 
be used as an aid since it has some understanding of when a 
procedure is to be used and what its execution entails. To 
evaluate the model, it was tested on earlier simulator flights 
with previously indentified errors. The figure of merit was the 
number of these errors that the model could locate. 
The remainder of this article contains sections on previous 
work on procedural error, programming methodologies for 
procedural aiding, the pilot's procedures, the internal program 
organization of the aid, evaluations of the aid, and conclusions. 
PREVIOUS WORK 
Humans occasionally err when following procedures. 	The 
forms of error have frequently been observed to be steps not 
executed, done out-of-order, done incompletely, or done at the 
wrong time. 	The same is true of whole procedures, which are 
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sometimes incorrectly selected for execution. 	Some theories 
[Norman 1981] and many classification schemes [Rasmussen 1979] 
[Monan 1979] [van Eekhout and Rouse 1981] have been put forth, 
and are reviewed in Rouse and Rouse [1983]. The theories and 
classification schemes will not be reviewed here, since the goal 
is to build an aid for reducing error, not to explain it. 
The remainder of this literature review contains two parts: 
one on other aids for reducing procedural error, and a second on 
a line of research leading directly to this research. 
Goodstein [1979] has proposed a computerized procedure 
display system. Its design was based on the belief that the 
operator executes procedures with some goal in mind -- changing 
the system via procedures from one state to another. 
Consequently, the system explicitly displays this hierarchy. The 
procedure environment is also enriched by including 
preconditions, constraints, and warnings along with the procedure 
text. 
The proposed system was to be implemented with three 
displays. The first would display the sequence of procedures to 
be followed. Included in this would be the status of various 
procedures (e.g., on hold or waiting for the plant to respond). 
The second display would contain the text of a single procedure 
along with supplemental preconditions, constraints, and warnings. 
The third display is for support. It might display the relevant 
plant status so that the operator would not have to walk away 
from the displays just to read an instrument. While this 
Page 5 
proposed three display system would seem to be an improvement 
over current practice, it does not appear to have been evaluated 
with human operators. 
Colley [1982] and Seeman et al. [1982] are in the process 
of developing a computerized procedure support system for nuclear 
power plant operators. The system compares the current plant 
state to a set of desirable, or safe, plant states. A procedure 
is then generated by the computer to transform the plant to the 
nearest safe state. A practical advantage of automatic procedure 
generation is that a potentially larger set of procedures could 
be available than would from hardcopy. 	For the latter, the 
system designers cannot afford to 	create every possible 
procedure. 	If a computer could derive the procedures from some 
general principles, automatic generation could represent 
considerable improvement. 
The current system can produce procedures for an eighteen 
component lubrication system. 	The procedures are generated 
dynamically; 	i.e., after each operator action, the system 
regenerates an appropriate procedure. 	Thus, if the operator 
errs, an appropriate change will appear in the procedure text. 
The development effort should be viewed as an attempt to produce 
a methodology for procedure generation. It has not yet been 
tested on operators. 
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A 	BacIcground Work Leading Directly, to this Study 
This section discusses a sequence of studies that lead to 
the work presented in this article. 	Rouse and Rouse (1980) 
studied displays for procedures in an abstract scenario. 	Three 
displays were used: 	a traditional hardcopy, a practically 
identical softcopy (displayed on a CRT screen), and a cued 
softcopy that dimmed a procedure step when it had been completed. 
To simulate the distractions faced by pilots, an arithmetic side 
task was added. The experimental results showed the cued 
softcopy display to be significantly faster and to cause fewer 
errors than the other two displays. 
In a second, similar experiment conducted in a realistic 
environment, Rouse, Rouse, and Hammer £19821 studied hardcopy and 
cued procedure displays in a Link GAT-II twin engine aircraft 
simulator. Their experiment will be rather carefully described 
because the data from it was reanalyzed for the research reported 
here. 
The aircraft simulator was configured as a Piper Aztec F. A 
PDP-ll/40 minicomputer was interfaced to the simulator and 
recorded timestamped changes of the aircraft state. The record 
of a flight, termed a simulator trace, consisted of a sequen\e of 
triples, where each triple contained a time, a signal, and a 
signal value. A signal was recorded only at a significant 
change, which usually was a deviation of ±10% from its previously 
recorded value. (It is this data that was analyzed in the 
research reported here.) Also interfaced was a special purpose 
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keyboard that controlled the CRT procedure display, one level of 
an independent, display variable. The other level was a 
traditional, printed hardcopy procedure. 
Subjects flew in normal, emergency, and double emergency 
flights. The eight subjects were all instrument- and twin 
engine-rated pilots with the exception of one who had 70 hours of 
twin engine simulator time and was judged to have been equal to 
the others. Subjects flew in 3 flight scenarios. The normal  
flight was a departure, climb to 2000 feet, direct cruise to 
another airport, descend, and land. The emergent' flight was a 
single engine failure after the aircraft climbed and through 2000 
feet. The double emergency failure consisted of a single engine 
failure at the same point plus a gear extension failure during 
the single engine pre-landing procedure. 
The data analysis showed that the hardcopy procedure was 19% 
faster than the CRT display (statistically significant at 
p<.025). The CRT display produced 7.5 times fewer errors of the 
kind that could possibly be affected by display (p<.025). 
A finer grained analysis of the experimental data from the 
above experiment appears in [Rouse and Rouse, 1983]. Forty-three 
errors were classified as occurring during hypothesis check, goal 
choice, procedure choice, or procedure execution. Errors were 
also classified as incorrect or unnecessary across all of these 
four categories. Displays were found to have a significant 
effect on errors that were categorized as wrong or incorrect. No 




The most appropriate programming methodology depends on the 
type of problem to be solved. This is true even though all 
methodologies are theoretically equal, since humans may find 
certain programs easier to express in one methodology than 
another. Though many methodologies exist, only two will be 
discussed here: conventional von Neumann programming [Backus 
19781 and symbolic programming. 
Conventional programming is often represented by the typical 
FORTRAN, BASIC, COBOL, PL/I, and Pascal program. Each 
computational step has one or more input values (or vectors) and 
produces a single output value (or vector). The values are 
usually numbers or characters. Such a methodology is best suited 
for numeric or data processing tasks such as aircraft simulator 
dynamics or implementing the lowest level of aiding: warning, 
calculation, and display control. 
Symbolic computation, done primarily in Lisp or perhaps 
Prolog, is better suited to higher levels of aiding because the 
problem the human solves is itself symbolic. In other words, an 
aid should use symbolic computing to solve symbolic problems. 





	 A rule-based system (RBS) [Waterman and Hayes-Roth, 1978] is 
one form of symbolic computation often used for an expert system, 
• a program capable of rivaling human perforthance in a small but 
complex problem domain. Some examples of expert systems are: 
1. MYCIN [Shortliffe, 1976] - selects antimicrobial therapy 
for infections. 
2. DENDRAL [Buchanan et al., 1969] - 	analyzes mass 
spectroscopy data to reconstruct the original molecule 
from its constituents. 
3. PONTIUS-0 [Goldstein and Grimson, 1977] is a system that 
achieves attitude instrument flight. 
4. Wesson [1977] has produced a program to perform the 
enroute ATC function with performance (under real world 
conditions) as good as a human controller. 
The structure of a RBS contains two principal parts: 
working memory and rules. For flight management, working memory 
can be assumed to contain the entire state of the aircraft (e.g. 
airspeed, altitude, pitch, roll, engine variables, electrical 
variables) as well as additional temporary memory. A rule 
contains two parts: a situation (such as altitude decreasing or 
airspeed > Vx) and an action (such as a procedure or storing some 
value in working memory). The following example shows possible 
rules for the pilot's handling engine failure during takeoff: 
Page 10 





1. 	airspeed < Vmc 	 close throttles 
stop on runway 
2. Vmc < airspeed < Vx 
3. VMC < airspeed < Vx 
and sufficient runway 
4. Vx < airspeed 
abort flight 
close throttles 
stop on runway 
accelerate to Vx 
maintain control and speed 
clean up aircraft 
climb 
secure engine 
land as soon as possible 
The rules operate as follows. If the airspeed _< VMC when 
one engine fails (the aircraft is in contact with the runway), 
the situation of rule 1 applies, and the flight is aborted as per 
the action of rule 1. Rule 3 gives a further example of how 
rules are invoked. If Rule 3 is applied, airspeed will be 
increased to at least Vx, at which time Rule 4 applies. Thus, 
one rule may transfer control to another rule either by a change 
in the aircraft state as in this example or in temporary memory 
(not illustrated). 
In the system discussed here, rules are used primarily for 
their ability to recognize situations. In other words, rules 
detect pilot actions and changes in the aircraft state (e.g., 
landing gear up) that indicate a new mode of operation (e.g., 
from on the ground to airborne). The rules, however, are not 
self-organized; they are held together by scripts. 
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Scribts 
The script [Schank and Abelson 1977], the final programming 
methodology discussed here, is a form of symbolic computation 
like rule-based systems. Where a RBS' recognizes specific 
situations and invokes the corresponding actions, a script 
describes the expected actors and actions in some situation. The 
script is a construct similar to the frame [Minsky, 1975] and to 
schema or template [Bartlett, 1932]. 
As an example of how the script concept might apply, 
consider a script for landing an airplane. The landing script 
provides the desired aircraft configuration -- engine settings, 
flaps, gear -- and their changes over time. Some of these will 
be dependent on the airport, and hence the landing script will 
have airport-dependent parameters. In addition, the landing 
script will indicate the scripts most likely to be activated next 
-- taxi, go-around, travel to an alternate airport, etc. 
The power of scripts comes both from their rich description 
of actions and from the ability to determine which script is 
really active. The original application of scripts was 
understanding natural language (e.g., English). In spoken 
language, the speaker will, in the interest of economy, omit many 
details that the listener can infer. A script provides 
background for the computer so that it might draw some of the 
same inferences that a human would. To determine the next active 




In a similar way, scripts can be used to infer what the 
flight crew is doing. The various controls and switch settings, 
sensed by the computer, can be viewed as a stream of details that 
partially conveys the flight crew's current thinking. By using 
scripts, the computer should be able to infer the full details in 
much the same way as it is used to understand natural language. 
In fact, one can envision an "advanced" intelligent cockpit where 
the computer would use the crew's conversation as one of its data 
sources. Though this may seem far-fetched, it will be 
demonstrated later that some errors could only be detected by 
this means. 
PROCEDURES 
Because the procedures pilots followed are central to this 
work, an example is given in Figure 1 of a typical procedure. 
Some aspects of these procedures will now be given. First, note 
that most steps are quite simple, e.g., steps 1 and 2; and the 
program senses their completion by a simple examination of the 
simulator state. Second, some steps cannot be sensed because the 
required signals are not available to the computer. An example 
is step 14; instrument vacuum was not recorded. Such steps are 
ignored by the program (deleted from the internal model at 
startup). Third, some steps call for the pilot to check a sensor 
reading. The program can check the sensor, but it cannot be sure 
the pilot has done so if the sensor reading is acceptable. Steps 
10 through 13 are an example. Fourth, sensing some conditions 
may be difficult because the changes were not logged in the 
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simulator trace because they were too small. For example, step 7 
requires a 175 rpm drop, which is about 8% of the existing 2300 
rpm. This change was unlikely to have been recorded in this 
data. Thus, the program can observe the magneto grounding but 
not its effect on engine rpm. This same problem also occurs when 
the pilot fine tunes the engines (leans mixture, changes 
propeller), as these changes are typically too small to be 
recorded. Of course, the problem of unavailable data would not 
be a problem in a real aircraft or in simulator data collection 
with a high sampling rate. 
Some aspects of the simulator and aircraft in general make 
the sensing of steps more complex than it would first appear. 
First, some changes require time to occur. For example, in step 
5, the propeller feather switch, which is discrete, may precede 
by a second the actual change of the propeller. A second 
difficulty is properly sensing temporary states. Two steps in 
the shutdown procedure, not shown, are an example. One is a 
momentary interruption of the magnetos and the other is a 
complete shutdown to stop the engines. Sensing the former 
requires that the transitions from ON to OFF to ON be observed 
within a short time frame. If this were not done, the program 
might misinterpret some other change to the magnetos. 
INTERNAL PROGRAM STRUCTURE 
The internal program structure will first be described in 
terms of a single procedure step. 	Next, the hierarchical 
organization of steps, procedures, and 	flight 	phases 	is 
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described. 	Finally, the control structure, which interprets the 
steps, procedures, and phases, is described. 
The first data structure is the aircraft database, which 
contains roughly seventy discrete and continuous signals. Each 
input record contains three items: a timestamp, a signal number, 
and a signal value*. As the input is read, new values are 
inserted in the database. 	Old values are 	not, 	however, 
immediately forgotten. Instead, they are retained if they are 
less than 6 minutes old or less than 100 in number so that the 
program may inspect earlier states. 
The second data structure is the internal model of the 
procedures used by the crew. An individual procedure step (and 
other entities to be , discussed later) is represented by the 
Pascal record shown in Figure 2. NAME is a text string that is 
used for humans to read. CAN_EXEC, DONE_EXEC, and ABORT EXEC are 
rules (expressions that evaluate either true or false) that 
determine whether a step's STATE is considered UNSTARTED, 
IN PROGRESS, DONE, or ABORTED according to the transition diagram 
shown in Figure 3. For example, for step 1 of the engine start 
procedure, the DONE_EXEC rule would check to see that both right 
and left mixture controls are currently at the full-rich setting. 
ALLOWED et alia are sets of signals that can or cannot 
change during the execution of this step. These sets are used to 
detect actions that should not occur. When a simulator state 
change is read, these sets are examined to determine if the 
*Other inputs -- keyboard entries, flight observer signals, etc. 
-- were ignored. 
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change is allowed. Only steps that are IN_PROGRESS are examined. 
Six sets were found necessary to detect pilot error. Normally, 
the program examines ALLOWED and DISALLOWED to determine the 
allowability of the signal. In engine-out emergency procedures, 
steps often refer to controls on the operative or inoperative 
engine. Thus, four more sets are necessary for the product of 
operative/inoperative with allowed/disallowed. 
Procedure 'Step Hierarchy 
Up to here, procedure steps have been described without 
mentioning their surrounding context. In fact, there is a 
hierarchy of four levels, with procedure steps at the lowest 
level. A number of steps are collected under a single procedure. 
One or more procedures are collected under a phase (e.g., 
pre-flight, takeoff), and all phases are collected under a single 
entity FLIGHT. Figure 4 illustrates the hierarchy. Each circle 
in Figure 4 corresponds to one script record as shown in Figure 
2. Thus, all levels are represented uniformly. PARENT and COMP 
fields are used to represent the hierarchy. 
The checkoff of procedures and phases is handled just as it 
is for procedure steps. There is some structure imposed on this 
process by the hierarchy, however. Only when a procedure STATE 
is IN_PROGRESS will its procedure steps (its subcompbnents) be 
examined for transitions to new states. Further, when a 
procedure is DONE or ABORTED, its steps are not examined for 
transition. The structure imposes a preferred order of 
left-to-right on the execution of sub-scripts beneath a given 
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script. The program expects execution in this order, but is 
capable of following any order. The program continually examines 
the DONE rules of all steps beneath an INLPROGRESS procedure. 
The changing of the simulator state causes the rules to evaluate 
true in the order that the steps are completed. 
The hierarchy also controls testing for allowed changes. 
First, only IN_PROGRESS steps, procedures, and phases are 
examined. All of the IN_PROGRESS steps are tested to determine 
if the signal is in one of the sets. If not, the same tests are 
made of IN_PROGRESS procedures, and, if necessary, of the 
IN_PROGRESS phases. 
eaency  Daemon Procedures and Substitute Procedures  
For the normal flight, the procedural hierarchy works well. 
During an emergency, flight operations are less structured. For 
example, a single engine-out emergency can happen any time the 
engines are running and the aircraft is airborne. Consequently, 
the procedure(s) for this situation must be available when the 
situation demands. Such procedures are termed daemong, and they 
were stored in a data structure separate from the normal 
procedures. The CAN EXEC fields of these daemons look for the 
situations in which they are relevant. 
A second modification for 	emergency procedures was 
substitute procedures. For example, in an engine-out emergency, 
the regular pre-landing procedure is replaced with a single 
engine pre-landing procedure. Substitute procedures were 
implemented by a pointer from the normal to the substitute. 
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EVALUATION AND RESULTS 
The program was evaluated twice. The first time only normal 
procedures and normal flights were used. The program was then 
enhanced for the second evaluation, which used emergency and 
double emergency flights. The results for each evaluation are 
presented separately below. 
Evaluation One  
The program was first evaluated by developing the program on 
a derivation set of data and then running it unmodified on a 
validation set. The data was taken from normal flights and 
normal segments of emergency flights from the experiment of 
[Rouse, Rouse, and Hammer, 1982]. Flights were assigned randomly 
to derivation and validation data sets. As stated earlier, the 
objective was for the program to identify all of the errors found 
by Rouse and Rouse [1983]. 
The derivation data contained eight errors; 	as shown in 
Table 1 the program was able to locate seven of them positively 
and give an ambiguous indication of the eighth. This one error 
was omission of the cruise procedure and was originally located 
by examination of verbal transcripts. From the aircraft data 
recorded during the flight, the following can be determined. Of 
the three steps in the cruise procedure, the cowl flaps were 
definitely closed, the mixture might have been leaned [the 
necessary change might not have been enough for the computer to 
record), and the reduction in engine power was probably done, 
although one sensor reading required for the program to determine 
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this was not available. It may be that the pilot executed the 
procedure without using its display or performing the callouts. 
The validation data contained twelve errors. 	Eight errors 
were detected outright. 	Two errors were missed because a step 
was done incompletely and out-of-order. The program is designed 
to catch either of these errors individually; however, if both 
kinds of error are present in one step, the program will 
categorize it as done incompletely. Of the remaining two errors, 
one was turning a switch on, then off, then on, which was its 
intended state. The program simply checked off the step that 
required the switch to be on. At that time, the program did not 
test for conditions to be maintained. For the second evaluation, 
this shortcoming was fixed by the allowed field. The step that 
corresponds to, say, a switch change also ALLOWS that switch to 
change. When the step is checked off (i.e., DONE), its ALLOW 
field will no longer be checked. Since no other step will ALLOW 
the change, it would be detected if it occurs 
The remaining error was an irrelevant action that would have 
been detected had it happened during an identified phase of the 
flight. Unfortunately, it happened between phases. Ideally, 
phases should overlap slightly so that the program has some phase 
to test the action. In the second evaluation, this shortcoming 
was fixed by having the ending of one phase force the next phase 
to begin. 
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The two types of error caught by the program are the 
following. One additional omitted procedure (besides the one 
mentioned earlier) was detected. Nine inappropriate actions were 
detected; 	most of these were activation of lights, etc. that 
were inappropriate at the times they occurred. 	Two instances 
were detected of lowering the landing gear at airspeeds higher 
than the maximum. Three instances were detected of not setting a 
control to the proper point. This included landing with partial 
instead of full flaps and not fully testing the ailerons before 
takeoff. 
It might be expected that the program would find new errors 
that had been missed in the earlier investigation. It did not. 
While the program did turn up several cases of steps 
out-of-order, they were not really errors. For example, the step 
of retracting the flaps required so much time that the following 
step -- a discrete switch change -- could be completed while 
waiting for the flaps to retract. No new, substantial errors 
were found by the program. 
Evaluation Two  
The same methodology of derivation and validation data was 
used in the second evaluation. The results are shown in Table 2. 
The one error the program did not detect was execution of 
two procedures when only one was needed (normal pre-landing and 
single engine pre-landing). The only detectable difference 
between these two is a single step -- the setting of the cowl 
flaps. At the time the procedure was invoked, the cowl flaps 
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were in the position (one-half) that a step of the procedure 
requested they be. This step was immediately made DONE. Later, 
the pilot closed the flaps. The program, due to a simple bug in 
an ALLOW field, accepted this change. Eventually, the single 
engine pre-landing procedure was finished. The pilot then went 
through the normal pre-landing checklist, which resulted in no 
changes save for a different cowl flap setting. This change was 
detected as incorrect. If the simple bug were corrected, the 
program would not accept the first cowl flap change. 
In addition to errors, the program identified several 
anomalies in pilot behavior. The most frequent was steps 
executed out-of-order. Expert opinion of these specific 
situations was that no error occurred. For example, the landing 
lights, navigation lights, and rotating beacon may be shut off in 
any order (once the propellers have stopped spinning) even though 
the procedure lists a specific order for them to be done. 
These anomalies could be used for two kinds of improvements. 
The first would be to improve the program. In the above example, 
it would be better to express the ordering requirements 
semantically (e.g., engine off precedes beacon off) rather than 
by ordering. The second improvement could be to the procedures 
themselves. For example, flaps may not be extended above certain 
airspeeds. This restriction is not written in the Aztec 
procedures even though a similar restriction is written for 
landing gear, which is the step preceding flap extension. Such 




A model of procedure execution has been implemented in a 
computer program. It was tested on aircraft simulator data and 
was able to find practically all of the already known errors plus 
locate some new ones. While this serves as a practical test of 
the methodology, the implications of its aiding ability are more 
significant. 
Using the model as an aid would have two benefits. 	The 
first, and most obvious, would be to detect and eliminate a great 
number of procedural errors. Perhaps surprisingly, this 
improvement comes with no additional pilot workload. A correctly 
functioning procedural aid would not need to communicate with the 
pilot except when an error was made. 
The second benefit of the model would be display control. 
The 	latest generation aircraft are fitted with electronic 
displays that presumably could or do display procedures. 	The 
computer model of procedure execution could well be used to 
select and control displays, which might also result in an 
additional reduction in pilot workload. 
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full high rpm 
3. Throttles 	 set 2300 rpm 
4. Propellers 	 exercise 300 rpm max drop 
5. Propellers 	 feather check 500 rpm max drop 
6. Magnetos 	 check 
7. 175 rpm max drop 
8. 50 rpm max differential 
9. Engine gauges 	 check 
10. oil pressure 
11. oil temperature 
12. cylinder head temperature 
13. ammeter 
14. vacuum 
15. Throttles 	 set 1000 rpm 
























: set of signal; 
: array[1..30] of Uscript; 
: Uscript; 
: Uscript; 
Figure 2. 	Script fields. 
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Figure 3. 	STATE transitions 
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C FLIGHT ) 
PRE-FLIGHT POSTFLIGHT 
INSPECTION 
     
SHUTDOWN 
1 II 
Figure 4. 	Hierarchy of steps, procedures, phases, and FLIGHT. 
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Refound Missed Undetectable 	New 
Derivation 
	
7 	0 	1 	 0 
Validation 
	
8 	4 	0 	 0 
Table 1. 	Normal flight error analysis. 
Refound errors were found by Rouse, Rouse, and Hammer and by the 
program. Missed errors were found by the original investigators 
but not by the program. Undetectable errors were found by the 
original investigators using source of data (i.e., cockpit tape 
recordings) that were not available to the program. New errors 
were found by the program but not by the original investigators. 
Refound Missed Undetectable 	New 
Derivation 
	
6 	0 	4 	 3 
Validation 
	
9 	1 	4 	 5 
Table 2. 	Emergency flight error analysis. 
THE EFFECTS OF TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE UPON 
HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING IN A PROCESS CONTROL TASK 
Nancy M. Morris and William B. Rouse 
Center for Man-Machine Systems Research 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, Georgia 30332 
ABSTRACT 
The question of what the operator of a dynamic system needs 
to know was investigated in an experiment using PLANT. a generic 
simulation of a dynamic production process. Knowledge of PLANT 
was manipulated via different types of instruction, so that four 
different groups were created: 1) Minimal instructions only; 
2) Minimal instructions + guidelines for operation (Procedures); 
3) Minimal instructions + dynamic relationships (Principles); 
4) Minimal instructions + Procedures + Principles. Subjects 
controlled PLANT in a variety of situations which required 
maintaining 	production while also diagnosing familiar and 
unfamiliar failures. Despite the fact that these manipulations 
resulted in differences in subjects' knowledge as assessed via a 
written test at the end of the experiment, instructions had no 
effect upon achievement of the primary goal of production, or 
upon subjects' ability to diagnose unfamiliar failures. However, 
those groups receiving Procedures controlled the system in a more 
stable manner. Possible reasons for the failure to find an 
effect of Principles are presented, and the implications of these 
results for operator training and aiding are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The role of operators of engineering systems, such as 
aircraft. ships, or process plants, has changed greatly in recent 
years and continues to change. Much of this change has been 
precipitated by advances in automatic control of systems. As the 
responsibility for control is shifted to computers, the operator 
becomes less a controller and more a monitor and, if necessary, a 
problem solver El]. As a result, the operator of an 
automatically controlled system is called upon to exercise quite 
different skills from those required of the operator of a 
manually controlled system. Beyond some minimal level, 
psychomotor ability becomes less essential, and greater emphasis 
is placed upon the use of cognitive skills such as reasoning, 
pattern matching, and problem solving. 
Realizing this, a variety of individuals concerned with 
system design and operator training have argued that one should 
"consider the cognitive processes of the operator" when dealing 
with design and training issues (e.g., [2], [3]13. Few people 
would dispute this idea, because the assertion that the 
operator's needs and capabilities should be considered seems to 
be a reasonable one. However, further development of the concept 
as stated here is required if it is to be practically useful. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, theorists and researchers in 
the fields of psychology and artificial intelligence as well as 
within the domain of process control have discussed human 
cognition in a variety of problem situations. A number of models 
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of reasoning and decision making have been offered, employing 
such concepts as schemas, scripts, heuristics, etc. (e.g., [4], 
[5], [6]). The general opinion is that, when faced with a 
problem, the human uses some understanding mechanisms which 
govern the situation in making decisions. 
A construct which appears in many writings is that of the 
"mental model" of the process (e.g., [7], [8], [9], [101, [111, 
[12]). Although, unfortunately, the term has sometimes been 
employed rather loosely, the mental model has generally been used 
as a representation of knowledge of a system and its relationship 
with the environment. A number of functions have been attributed 
to the mental model, including guiding information seeking [111, 
[13], [14], aiding in pattern recognition [15], [16], and 
anticipating future system states [17]. 
One of the most articulate discussions of the relationships 
between mental models and problem solving in operation of 
engineering systems has been provided by Rasmussen [181. In 
ordinary, familiar circumstances, the human operator appears to 
rely upon available heuristics and rules of operation. In other 
words, the operator's behavior is rule-based. However, in 
unusual situations for which rules do not apply, the human 
operator must reason at a knowledge-based level, using an 
understanding of the functioning of the system to determine an 
appropriate course of action. Thus, different mental models may 
be more or less appropriate, depending upon the situation. 
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From a practical perspective, the idea of considering 
operator cognitive processes and the notion that multi-level 
reasoning may be required have attracted the interest of those 
concerned with system design and the training of operators [191. 
Practitioners have found, however, that the manner in which 
system designs and training programs should be structured so as 
to incorporate these ideas is not at all straightforward. 	For 
example, it has been suggested that one should strive .to support 
the operator's reasoning and decision making process by providing 
information that enhances the operator's model [161, [201. 
translating this suggestion into a specific course of action is 
not an easy task. 
Speculation has been directed at the nature of the mental 
model associated with good performance. As a result of this 
speculation, it has been assumed both implicitly and explicitly 
that an important part of the mental model is a representation of 
the dynamics of the system. Some educators have further stated 
that such a representation (i.e., a "thorough understanding of 
the dynamics of the system") is a requisite if the operator is to 
be effective (e.g., [21]). Based upon this assumption, training 
programs may be aimed at providing the operator with the 
appropriate mental model. usually via instruction in the theory 
upon which the system is based and perhaps some experience with 
simulators. Often the further assumption that such instruction 
will lead to satisfactory performance is made. 
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Unfortunately, although these approaches may be intuitively 
appealing, there appears to be little in the way of empirical 
support to guide the practitioner's efforts. For example, there 
is lttle or no conclusive evidence that providing operators with 
information about theoretical aspects of system functioning 
enables them to be better operators. In fact. in research in 
which subjects were given instruction in the theoretical basis of 
system functioning there was no apparent advantage to having been 
given such information [91, [22], [233, [24]. It is quite 
possible that being able to control the system is not directly 
related to an explicit knowledge of system dynamics. 
Alternatively, it is- conceivable that effective control behavior. 
may be related to having an understanding of system dynamics, but 
that this understanding may be in the form of a "process feel" 
and may not be obtained via verbal instruction. At any rate, in 
spite of the lack of support for the practice. there is continued 
emphasis on instructing operators in the theoretical basis of 
system functioning. 
The experiment reported in this paper was designed to 
investigate the question of what the operator of a dynamic system 
needs to know in order to be effective. In particular, the value 
of two different types of knowledge--knowledge of how to control 
the system, and knowledge of how the system works--was explored. 
The general approach was to manipulate system—relevant knowledge 
via instructions, and examine the effects of this knowledge upon 
performance. 
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A PROCESS CONTROL TASK 
This research was conducted in the context of PLANT, a 
computerdriven generic simulation of a dynamic production 
process. A graphic display for a sample PLANT problem is shown 
in Figure 1, and the information display which accompanies the 
graphic display is shown in Figure 2. A general description of 
PLANT is presented here. Interested readers are referred to [251 
for further details about the simulation. 
Referring to Figure 1, in this system there are nine tanks, 
some of which are currently connected by open valves (represented 
by lines between tanks). Fluid enters the PLANT system at the 
left and exits at the right as finished product. In general, the 
PLANT operator's task is to supervise the flow of fluid through 
the series of tanks interconnected by pumps, valves, and pipes so 
as to produce an unspecified product. The operator may open and 
close valves, adjust system input and output, check flows between 
tanks, and order repairs of various PLANT components, in order to 
achieve the primary goal of maximizing production. 
Each operator action, such as opening a valve or adjusting 
input, requires one time unit or iteration. PLANT is not updated 
automatically in real time, but rather is at steady-state between 
commands and is thus self-paced. Although it is possible for 
PLANT to run in a forced-paced mode and periodically update 
automatically (e.g., once every four seconds), the decision was 
made to employ the self-paced mode of updating because of the 
long response times characteristic of real processes. 
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As in real systems, although maximizing production is the 
primary goal of PLANT operation. the "physical" limitations of 
the system (such as tank or valve capacity or reliability of 
system components) require that the PLANT operator be concerned 
with secondary goals as well. Among these secondary goals are 
stabilization of the system, and detection, diagnosis, and 
compensation for system failures. Stability is required because 
of the dynamic characteristics of the system* and the fact that 
PLANT valves do not have infinite capacity. Should the operator 
fail to maintain stability, the PLANT safety system inter7enes in 
order to protect the system from damage due to unsafe op ,2rating 
practices. The safety system operates by automatically closing 
valves (i.e., "tripping" them) and/or stopping system input or 
output if flows or fluid levels exceed desired ranges. 
Possible PLANT failures include valve 	failures, 	pump 
failures, tank ruptures, and failure of the safety system. Valve 
and pump failures are fairly common, and involve a stoppage of 
flow between connected tanks. While flow is stopped, the display 
remains unchanged and, therefore, the failed valve or pump 
appears to be working. Detection and diagnosis of a valve or 
pump failure may be accomplished by noting a difference in 
observed and expected fluid levels in tanks, and checking flows 
through the suspected valve(s). Repair involves sending a 
"repair crew" to the site of the failure for a period of 5-10 
*Each pair of connected tanks is modeled as a second-order system 
with rate of flow and its derivative as state variables and 
transition matrix determined by pipe and tank cross-sectional 
areas, pipe lengths. and fluid characteristics. See [261 for a 
derivation of the state equations. 
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iterations. 
Tank ruptures and failure of the safety system are extremely 
rare by design, and may occur only once during a subject's 
experience with the system. As a result, these failures provide 
a means for studying operator problem solving in unfamiliar 
situations. A tank rupture must be inferred from noting a loss 
of resources from the system, and occupies the repair crew for 15 
iterations, during which the tank is drained and "patched". 
The nature of the failure of the safety system failure is 
much less predictable due to the range of possible safety system 
actions; it may be manifest by a number of different symptoms, 
and may be intermittent. For example. failure of the safety 
system could result in arbitrary "tripping" that should not be 
difficult to detect if one understands the way in which the 
safety system works. Thus, detection and diagnosis of a safety 
system failure requires that the operator have some knowledge of 
the functioning of the safety system and the underlying dynamics 
of the process, because safety system actions are directly 
related to PLANT dynamics. During repair, the safety system is 
deactivated for 20 iterations and the operator is responsible for 
PLANT safety. 
With respect to the PLANT environment, it is possible to 
identify different types of knowledge about PLANT which the 
operator might have. At a minimum, he might know that he is 
controlling a process, his goal is to maximize production, and 
that various control options are available. At another level, 
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the 	PLANT 	operator 	may 	know 	"what to do" in certain 
situations--i.e., he may have a set of procedures or rules which, 
when followed, enable adequate control of the system. Finally, 
it is possible for the operator to have a knowledge of the way in 
which PLANT "works", including an understanding of the underlying 
process dynamics and relationships between components. 
In the research described in the following section, an 
attempt was made to "create" operators with these different types 
of knowledge by providing naive subjects with differing 
instructions. These operators were then placed in familiar and 
unfamiliar situations in order to provide them opportunities to 
use the information they were given. During the planning and 
conduct of this research. the following outcomes were expected. 
First, it was anticipated that those operators with a set of 
procedures for controlling PLANT would be better in ordinary or 
familiar situations than those without such information. Second, 
it was predicted that those persons with an understanding of 




Junior and senior undergraduates at Georgia Institute of 
Technology served as paid volunteer subjects. All 32 were 
industrial and systems engineering majors, and had completed 
courses in physics, dynamics, and higher level mathematics. 
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It is important to note here that, although the use of 
students as subjects is often considered to compromise 
credibility in applied research. this subject population was 
well-suited to the questions at hand. This is due to the fact 
that operators in many systems (e.g., nuclear power plants) are 
required to complete a training program which is technically 
equivalent to that required for a bachelor's degree in 
engineering. Therefore, it is argued that these students had 
educational backgrounds comparable to actual operator trainees in 
some domains. 
Experimental Materials  
Four sets of written instructions relevant to PLANT were 
used in the experiment: Minimal instructions, Principles. 
Procedures, and Relationships Between Principles and Procedures. 
The format for the first three was similar, in that each 
consisted of text interspersed with "self-test" questions and 
accompanied by. 1-2 page summaries of important concepts. The 
fourth set, Relationships, differed, as it was designed to be 
inserted into Procedures for an experimental group which was 
instructed using both Procedures and Principles. These 
instructions were designed to represent the types of knowledge 
about PLANT discussed earlier. (The complete - sets of 
instructional materials appear in Morris' thesis (U.) 
Minimal instructions were directed at what questions: 	what 
kind of system is it, what 	tho goal of operation, - what can 
happen, etc. As such, Minimal in tractions consisted_ of an 
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introduction to the concept of a process plant, and a discussion 
of the goals of PLANT operation, operational constraints, 
possible malfunctions, and command options available. Self-test 
questions in the Minimal instructions were directed at insuring 
an understanding of the basics of PLANT operation (such as 
opening valves and adjusting input and output) and the nature of 
the PLANT safety system and possible PLANT malfunctions. 
Procedures told the PLANT operator hew the system should be 
controlled, in both general and more specific terms. _First, 
there were three heuristics useful for general control of PLANT 
(e.g., "keep all valves open"). The Procedures also included a 
set of six more specific sequences of control actions (i.e., 
procedures in the formal sense) appropriate for use in a number 
of undesirable PLANT states (e.g., "output column too low"). 
These "specific sequences" were not as specific as the procedures 
used in aviation, but were more like "guidelines", discussing 
appropriate types of control actions rather than specific 
commands to be entered. The majority of the self-test questions 
required the subjects to determine which procedure was applicable 
in a depicted PLANT state (i.e., "Which procedure would you 
choose in this situation?"). 
These procedures were the product of numerous discussions 
between the authors. each of whom had considerable experience in 
controlling PLANT and had developed his/her own strategy for 
doing so. 	Procedures were evaluated for their "reasonableness" 
by actually using them to control the process; 	in instances 
where alternative procedures had been generated, the sequence of 
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steps leading to the best performance (i.e., the most production 
and fewest valve trips) was selected.* 
Principles included a presentation of an approximation of 
the state equations governing PLANT dynamics, and a verbal 
interpretation of the equations in terms of observable dynamic 
relationships. In short, the Principles indirectly contained 
information as to why 7LANT should be controlled in a certain 
manner. In writing the Principles, an effort was made to make 
them as meaningful and relevant to PLANT operation as _possible. 
Discussion of abstract theory was avoided, and mathematical 
expressions were always limited to simple algebraic expressions 
and accompanied by a discussion of their meaning and importance 
to PLANT functioning. For example. the instructions stated that 
the PLANT was "sluggish", that flows tended to "oscillate over 
time", and that input into a tank was "shared" by the valves 
leading from it. Self-test questions required the subject to 
apply the written information to the solution of problems (e.g., 
"If tank B had a level of 75 and tank F had a level of 63 when 
valve BF was opened, what would be your estimate of the initial 
flow rate for valve BF?"). 
Relationships Batyeen Principles ailul Procedures were more 
directly related to the "whys" of PLANT operation. In 
Relationships, the rationale behind the information in the 
*Throughout this paper, reference . is made both to the set of 
procedural instructions and to operational procedures found in 
these instructions. 	To avoid confusion. references to the 
instruction set begin with an upper-case letter (i.e., 
Procedures), whereas "procedures" refers to specific sequences of 
steps found in the procedural instructions. 
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Procedures was presented in terms of concepts discussed in the 
Principles. Generally, subjects were informed, "You should (do 
this) because (the PLANT works this way)". As noted earlier, 
Relationships was inserted in Procedures for an experimental 
group which was instructed using both Procedures and Principles. 
	
Two multiple-choice tests of the information 	in 	the 
instructions were also used. 	Test 1 contained 22 items, all 
related to information in the Minimal instructions. 	Test 2 
consisted of 54 items. with approximately one third devoted to 
each of the major types of 	instruction 	(i.e., 	Minimal, 
Principles, and Procedures). Minimal questions on Test 2 were 
virtually identical to those on Test 1, with minor modifications. 
When creating procedural and principle questions, an effort was 
made to avoid asking questions which would be impossible to 
answer correctly without having been explicitly told the answer 
in instructions. For example, alternative answers often 
consisted of a range of numbers rather than specific values. 
FageijaWar.A.1 Method 
Subjects served in a total of 12 sessions each. with the 
average length of each session being approximately 60 to 75 
minutes. With the exception of sessions 10 and 12 (which were 
counterbalanced), the order of presentation of PLANT production 
runs was identical for all subjects. The first eight sessions 
were training sessions, in which subjects received written and 
oral instructions and controlled PLANT in a variety of situations 
for varying lengths of time. Material presented in instructions 
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was repeatedly reviewed during training sessions, and all of 
subjects' questions were answered, if possible. in a manner 
appropriate to a particular subject's experimental condition. 
The last four sessions were experimental sessions, and were 
identical in terms of initial PLANT configuration and length of 
production run. Sessions 9 and 11 were "familiar" runs, in that 
all failures which occurred were failures which the subjects had 
experienced before (i.e., valve and pump failures). Sessions 10 
and 12 were "unfamiliar" runs, each involving a malfunction which 
had been discussed in instructional materials but which had never 
occurred in a subject's experience (i.e., tank rupture and safety 
system failure). The type of unfamiliar failure which occurred 
was counterbalanced across subjects and within instructional 
groups (described later). No instructions from the experimenter 
were provided during the last four sessions, and no questions 
from subjects were answered. 
All subjects were presented with the Minimal instructions at 
the beginning of session 1, and were allowed to read them with 
the understanding that they would always have access to written 
materials when controlling PLANT. Following an oral review of 
the instructions with the experimenter, they were allowed to 
control PLANT for approximately one hour. During their first 
production run, they were encouraged to try all commands to make 
sure they understood how they worked. 
4 
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Session 2 consisted of a brief review of commands and 
another one-hour production run. Test 1 was administered at the 
end of session 2. Since it was intended primarily as a vehicle 
for discussion, all correct and incorrect answers were discussed 
with subjects and important points were emphasized. Sessions 3 
through 7 were "problem" runs, with subjects assuming control of 
the PLANT in a variety of unstable situations. These problems 
were created by the experimenter, and represented situations for 
which specific procedures were applicable. Sessions 8 through 12 
were "normal" runs once more; as in sessions 1 and 2, no 
problems existed when the subject began controlling the PLANT. 
Test 2 was administered at the end of session 12. 
Differentiation of experimental groups began in session 3. 
At the beginning of session 3, two groups of eight subjects each 
(groups B and D) were given Principles, and a third group (group 
C) was given Procedures. The remaining eight subjects (group A) 
were given no further written instructions. At the beginning of 
session 5, subjects in group D were also given Procedures, with 
Relationships Between Principles and Procedures inserted at the 
appropriate point. 
To summarize, group A received Minimal instructions; 	group 
B received Minimal instructions and Principles; group C received 
Minimal instructions and Procedures; 	group D received all 
instructions. 	These four groups may be viewed as cells in a 
2 x 2 factorial design, with each group receiving Procedures or 
no Procedures, and Principles or no Principles. 
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A number of measures of subjects' performance were recorded. 
In addition to the obvious performance measure of production, 
several intermediate measures were noted as indications of how 
"elegantly" subjects achieved their goal. Among these were the 
number of automatic valve trips, number of limit alarms (i.e., 
tank levels too high or too low), number of valves open per 
iteration, number of observations made prior to repairing 
failure, variability of fluid levels both within and between 
columns, and frequencies of various commands. 
RESULTS 
Analysis of variance was used as the primary statistical 
tool for data analysis. Performance measures were used as 
dependent variables in three-way analyses with two between-groups 
factors (Principles and Procedures) and one within-groups factor 
or repeated measure (session). The following results are 
presented to provide an overview of the experimental findings. A 
more in-depth analysis of the results of this research may be 
found in 
When production achieved was used as the dependent variable 
in the analysis, there was no effect of either Procedures or 
Principles. The interaction also failed to reach significance. 
Of all the other performance measures, there were three which 
revealed significant differences related to instructions. These 
were the average number of automatic valve trips, average number 
of valves open at any point in time, and variance of fluid levels 
(i.e., tank heights) within the system. 
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All of the significant effects upon these variables were 
those of Procedures. Subjects provided Procedures (i.e., groups 
C and D) generally experienced fewer automatic valve trips (.94 
vs. .66 per iteration, 2 = .0343), kept more valves open (15.79 
vs. 14.58, p = .0074), and had less variance in tank heights 
(15.92 vs. 21.59, 2 = .0251) than did those subjects who did not 
receive Procedures (i.e., groups A and B). None of the main 
effects of Principles nor any of the Principles x Procedures 
interactions reached significance. 
With regard to the unfamiliar failures, there was no 
difference in groups' ability to detect and repair the tank 
rupture or safety system failure. Only one person (from group D) 
did not repair the tank rupture, and approximately half in each 
instruction group repaired the safety system. Subjects were 
classified according to whether or not they repaired the failure 
of the safety system and the analysis of variance was repeated. 
(This classification is denoted by "fix-nofix" in the following 
discussion.) When differences in the variables noted above were 
analyzed in this manner, the following significant effects were 
noted. 
First, those subjects who were able to determine that the 
safety system had failed generally produced more regardless of 
session, than did those who did not make an appropriate diagnosis 
(321.3 vs. 298.7 units per iteration, 2 = .0303). Furthermore, 
"fxt!rs" generally had fewer automatic valve trips (.68 vs. .94 
per iteration. P = .0100), more valves open (15.64 vs. 14.68, 
c = .C128), and less variance in tank heights (15.92 vs. 21.59, 
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p = .0001). 
With respect to two of these variables. trips and height 
variance, the interaction of Procedures and fix-nofix was also 
significant (.12 = .0031 and p = .0061, respectively). Analysis of 
the simple main effects of these interactions revealed that the 
differences were among those subjects who did not repair the 
safety system. In other words. those persons who repaired the 
safety system were equivalent in terms of trips and height 
variance. regardless of whether or not they had been given 
Procedures. Among those persons who did not repair the safety 
system, however, those people who were not given Procedures had 
more valve trips (1.30 vs. 0.65) and height variance (28.32 vs. 
16.15) than those who received Procedures. 
Differences in performance on Test 2 were also identified 
via analysis of variance. When overall scores were compared, 
there were significant main effects both of Procedures and 
Principles (p = .0008 and p = .001, respectively). Groups 
receiving Procedures scored higher than those receiving no 
Procedures (80.44% vs. 	70.94%), and Principles groups scored 
higher than those not receiving Principles (80.09% vs. 	71.30%). 
The interaction of Procedures and Principles was not 
statistically significant. 
Comparing scores on test sections (i.e., questions related 
to Minimal instructions, Procedures, and Principles), the 
interactions of Procedures x section (p = .0128) and Principles x 
section (p = .0008) were significant. Analysis of simple main 
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effects revealed that subjects receiving Procedures answered more 
procedural questions correctly than those who did not receive 
Procedures (82.53% vs. 61.33%), and subjects given Principles 
correctly answered more questions related to system dynamics 
(72.13% vs. 48.07%). 
Correlations between all dependent measures were computed, 
and a subset of these correlations may be found in Table 1. The 
results of the analyses presented earlier clearly demonstrate the 
existence of some strong relationships between variables. These 
correlations are offered as a mechanism for integrating the more 
detailed results into an overall picture, which is discussed in 
the following section. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Interpretation 2, 1. Results  
There are three observations which may be made relative to 
the information presented in Table 1. First, the significant 
correlations between production, trips, number of open valves, 
and variance in tank heights are noteworthy because they provide 
support for the information found in Procedures. The main 
thrusts of these guidelines were aimed at keeping all valves open 
and controlling differences in tank heights. Judging from the 
relationships of height variance, etc. to overall production, 
these emphases were well-founded. The point is necessarily made 
because it is unreasonable to exFcct operators to follow rules 




	 Second, the high correlations between number of valve trips, 
number of valves open. and variance in tank heights reflect 
characteristics of PLANT and provide justification for the 
treatment of these variables as alternative measures of a single 
construct. Thus, a "stable" PLANT is one in which most valves 
are open, there are few valve trips, and there is little variance 
in tank heights. The concept of PLANT stability is utilized in 
the following paragraphs when differences in control performance 
are discussed. 
Third, perhaps the most important observation to be made 
from an examination of Table 1 is that the relationship between 
PLANT performance and Test 2 performance was not very strong. 
The highest correlation between PLANT production and any measure 
of Test 2 performance was .19, which was not significant. Of all 
the correlations between Test 2 and PLANT performance. only the 
relationship between number of open valves and score on the 
procedural section of Test 2 achieved significance. 
Between group variations 	on Test 	2 	indicate 	that 
manipulation of instructions relative to PLANT was at least 
moderately successful in establishing different groups with 
respect to PLANT-relevant knowledge. In fact, the pattern of 
test results obtained is exactly as one might predict would occur 
if the manipulation were successful. It is also interesting to 
note that, since the interaction of Principles and Procedures was 
not significant, the effect of providing more than one set of 
instructions was approximately additive. 
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In contrast to the results on Test 2, instructions were not 
as clearly reflected in PLANT performance. For example. 
instructions had no effect upon how much subjects were able to 
produce. Regardless of instructions, groups were able to achieve 
comparable production scores. Although production was comparable 
across groups, those groups receiving Procedures (groups C and D) 
controlled PLANT in a more stable manner than did the groups 
without Procedures (groups A and B). The provision of Principles 
did not seem to improve subjects' control behavior under normal 
circumstances. 
Variations in instructions had no effect upon whether or not 
subject was able to correctly diagnose the unfamiliar failure 
of the safety system. Judging from the analysis of the 
Procedures x fix-nofix interaction, a stable system was 
apparently a necessary prerequisite to finding this malfunction. 
This is not surprising, since there would be a greater contrast 
between "normal" and "abnormal" in such a system. However, it is 
also apparent that having a stable system was not a sufficient 
condition for the location of the safety system failure. 
Procedures enabled subjects to have a more stable system, but 
only half of those subjects receiving Procedures repaired the 
safety system. 
Restatement of Experimental Hypotheses  
Now, consider the results of this experiment in light of the 
experimental hypotheses stated earlier. To reiterate, the first 
hypothesis was that those groups receiving Procedures (i.e., 
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groups C and D) would be better at controlling PLANT in ordinary 
circumstances than those not provided Procedures (i.e., groups A 
and B). The data obtained in this research support this 
hypothesis. Although there were no differences between groups in 
overall production achieved, subjects in groups C and D generally 
controlled PLANT in a more stable manner, and were more 
consistent with each other with respect to most dependent 
measures. This evidence indicates (to no great surprise) that 
proceduralization may indeed be a means of providing operators 
with an effective strategy, and thus supports the common practice 
of providing operators with procedures. 
The second hypothesis was that persons with an understanding 
of the dynamics of PLANT as described in Principles (i.e., groups 
B and D, or at least group D) would perform better in unusual 
circumstances in which available procedures were not applicable. 
The results reported here provide absolutely no support for this 
hypothesis. As reported earlier, only one person failed to 
repair the unfamiliar tank rupture, and approximately half of the 
subjects in each instruction group repaired the failed safety 
system. In retrospect, all subjects had been told in the Minimal 
instructions how to detect a tank rupture, so this failure to 
note a difference between groups in repair of the tank rupture is 
not too surprising; however, the pattern of results obtained 
with the safety system failure was not expected, and is difficult 
to explain. 
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The provision of Principles did not insure that subjects 
would be able to deal with the unfamiliar safety system failure. 
Neither did Principles appear to be useful in ordinary 
situations, as group B was no better than group A in controlling 
PLANT. In light of the performance on Test 2, it may be stated 
that this does not reflect a failure on the part of subjects to 
learn the material. Nor does it appear that this failure to find 
an effect may be attributed merely to failure to achieve the 
traditionally accepted significance level of .05. In all cases, 
measured differences due to an effect of Principles were small, 
and the probabilities of these differences being due to chance 
were quite large. 
Him not Pr„inciples?  
There are two questions which immediately come to mind when 
considering the failure to find support for the second 
hypothesis. The first is this: Why did Principles fail to help? 
It is necessary to address this question because of prevailing 
opinion as to the value of such a knowledge--the Principles 
should have helped. In fact, this attitude is so firmly held 
that some may even be led to discount the results reported here, 
because "everyone knows that you need to understand how a system 
works in order to control it". 
In considering this question of why the provision of 
Principles did not lead to better performance, it is important to 
note th,_:z these results do not appear to represent an isolated 
case. --- .1ther, they are in agreement with the results of other 
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research in which knowledge of theory was found to have little or 
no relationship to task performance [9], [22], [231, [24], [271. 
In fact, a survey of relevant literature failed to reveal any 
reports in which a statistically significant advantage of such 
knowledge was reported, although many authors stated or implied 
that there was such an advantage. 
One approach to explaining these results might te to argue 
that the effects of knowledge of theoretical principles may be 
indirect and subtle. and thus not directly measurable. _Indeed, a 
number of pore subtle effects seem feasible, though a detailed 
examination of this data fails to support them. For example, a 
general understanding of the functioning of a system may serve as 
a frame of reference from which procedures may be more meaningful 
and better understood. Understanding how the system works may 
have a motivational effect upon operators. Although such 
knowledge may not be useful to a group of operators as a whole, 
some individuals may find this information extremely useful. 
An additional explanation for this consistent failure to 
find an advandaqe of theoretical instruction may be in terms of 
different types of knowledge. The results of this research 
suggest that knowledge of a system may be represented in more 
than one form, and that any given person's knowledge may consist 
of multiple representations. Thus, knowledge of "facts", as 
measured by a verbal test, and knowledge of how to control a 
system, as manifest by adequate control performance, may not be 
strongly related and may be embodied in different forms and thus 
expressed in different ways. The low correlations between Test 2 
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scores and PLANT performance measures are consistent with this 
interpretation. 
If this is the case, then the impact of Principles may have 
been minimal because the information was not in a form that was 
directly usable by subjects (i.e., was not directly related to 
what they should be able to do- as opposed to what they should 
know). Rather, in order to apply the information appropriately, 
the operator first had to go through a deductive process. Either 
people did not attempt to do so, or did try but could not 
determine an a ppropriate course of action. In the absence of 
successful reasoning, the Principles could not be useful. 
Alternatives to Principles  
The second question which arises when considering these 
results is this: If telling operators how the system works does 
not insure that they will be able to deal with unanticipated 
events, then what can be done to provide such assurance? This 
reflects a pressing need in industry, because it is precisely for 
the purpose of handling unforeseen situations that human 
operators are employed. Accordingly, an attempt will be made to 
address this issue here. 
It is appropriate to recall the concept of multiple levels 
of reasoning discussed earlier. People commonly engage in 
rule-based behavior when controlling familiar systems under 
normal conditions, but should resort to knowledge-based behavior 
in unusual circumstances. using an understanding of the way the 
system works to determine what should be done. Therefore, if a 
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person has a knowledge base sufficient to support knowledge-based 
reasoning, this information should be used in unfamiliar 
situations. Although this seems to be a reasonable description 
of what should occur, the indications from. this research are that 
this describes the ideal and not what actually takes place. As 
we have seen, knowledge and opportunity do not guarantee that 
people will engage in knowledge-based reasoning and reach an 
appropriate conclusion. 
It seems that certain conditions must be met for a-person to 
solve an unfamiliar problem successfully. First, he or she must 
have an adequate knowledge base. Second, it must be apparent 
that available rules do not apply and that reasoning about the 
problem is required. Third, the person must be able to use the 
information in the knowledge base appropriately to reach a 
conclusion. 
The nature of this "adequate" knowledge base was the primary 
question pursued in this research. and the partial answer 
obtained was less than one might suppose". Some subjects from 
groups A and C found the safety system failure, and were 
generally quite good at controlling PLANT, yet could not answer 
questions on Test 2 about PLANT functioning. While it cannot be 
stated that these persons had no ideas of how PLANT works, it can 
be said that their knowledge of PLANT was at least less detailed 
than the information contained in Principles. Therefore, it 
appears that the importance of a detailed theoretical knowledge 
of a L:y2tem to an operator's control behavior has been 
overer:Iii:3sized in training, and this emphasis should be reduced. 
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Therefore, it may be necessary to provide the operator some 
assistance at the time of the unanticipated event, possibly 
online. One form of assistance could be to adequately inform the 
operator that an unusual condition existed. Other authors have 
indicated that it might also be necessary to help him to pinpoint 
the location of the problem. Finally, it could be necessary to 
guide the operator in his reasoning process, to increase the 
likelihood that an appropriate conclusion will be reached. 
Research in the areas of decision making and decision aiding is 
moving in the direction espoused in this paragraph [28]. 
However, any existing operator support systems of the type 
envisioned here are mainly in the conceptual stage and little 
evaluative data is available. 
Summary  
In summary, the question of what an operator needs to know 
is extremely important to those responsible for operator 
training. Traditionally, operators have been required to learn a 
great deal about the theoretical aspects of system functioning, 
in the hopes of insuring that they can deal with unanticipated 
events. Available research evidence suggest that this emphasis 
on the importance of theoretical knowledge of the system is 
disproportionate to the actual value of such knowledge, and that 
more attention should be devoted 	to providing operators 
assistance during abnormal conditions. 	In other words, less 
emphasis should be placed on answering the question of "what does 
the operator need to know?" and more on the questions of "What 
should operators be able to do?" and "How can we hei them to use 
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the knoWledge they haVe?" 
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Figure 1. Sample graphic PLANT display. 
Time = 183 
Avg. Height = 64.33 
Resources = 52,110 
Limit Alarms: abcdefghi 
Your Action = 
Total Production = 	88476.0 
Current Input = 540.0 pi = 180.0 
Current Output = 540.0 po = 180.0 
Time 	Action 	Message 
182 	rpc 	Repair crew dispatched to pump c 





Figure 2. PLANT information display. 
Table 1 
Correlations Between Dependent Measures 
PRODa TRIPS




NOPEN .673* -.706* 
VAR 	-.574* 	.967* -.768* 
FIX 	-.429* 	.141 -.234 	.219 
TEST2 	.191 -.200 	.313 -.258 	.107 
SECT1 -.021 	.261 -.189 	.268 -.100 	.148 
SECT2 .190 -.238 	.366* -.292 	.225 	.860* .040 
SECT3 .105 -.161 	.157 -.197 -.056 	.661* -.022 	.225 
a
PROD = average production/iteration. 
b
TRIPS = number of automatic valve trips/iteration. 
c
NOPEN = average number of valves open/iteration. 
d
VAR = variance of tank heights in PLANT. 
e
FIX = average time to diagnose valve and pump failures. 
(TEST2 = overall score on Test 2. 
gr. 0ECT1, SECT2, SECT3 = scores (% correct) on subsections of 
Test 2; SECT1 = minimal questions, SECT2 = procedural 
questions, SECT3 = principles questions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Increased requirements for safety and efficiency as well as 
increased availability of reliable and inexpensive computer 
technology has resulted in a trend of more and more computers 
being employed in flight management. However, this trend by no 
means indicates that human operators will disappear from aircraft 
cockpits. Instead, it means that the roles of the pilot, 
copilot, and flight engineer will evolve to include increased 
responsibilities for monitoring and supervising the various 
computer-based systems employed in the aircraft. 
While this assessment of the future roles of the members of 
the flight crew is fairly easy to accept, it is certainly not 
straightforward to decide how various flight tasks should be 
allocated among humans and computers. Further, it is not clear 
how humans and computers should communicate regarding the process 
by which their tasks are performed and the products that result. 
This report discusses progress of a research program whose 
overall objectives include providing at least partial answers to 
some of the questions surrounding these issues. 
The following two sections discuss two project areas which 
are currently being pursued in this program of research: 1) the 
intelligent cockpit and 2) studies of human problem solving. The 
first area involves an investigation of the use of advanced 
software engineering methods (e.g., from artificial intelligence) 
to aid aircraft crews in procedure selection and execution. The 
second area is focused on human problem solving in dynamic 
environments, particularly in terms of alternative approaches to 
training and aiding. Both of these efforts are producing results 
that are planned to be tested further in the Center's evolving 
full-scope flight simulation facility. Progress on developing 
this facility is discussed in the section on the intelligent 
cockpit. 
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THE INTELLIGENT COCKPIT 
Previous work includes a computer program which locates 
human errors in following procedural checklists. This program 
contains an artificial intelligence based model (scripts) of 
checklist execution. 	This internal model is kept current with 
the aircraft state and the flight crew activities. 	Errors are 
detected from discrepancies between the model and the flight 
crew's actions. The program was evaluated on data from an 
earlier experiment on a link GAT-II simulator. The program was 
able to identify practically all known errors plus several 
additional ones. 
SECOND GENERATION INTELLIGENT COCKPIT 
The capabilities of the existing script-based aid will be 
expanded into two areas: script power and qualitative models. 
Script power itself can take two forms. First, the intelligent 
cockpit should always be following the same checklist as the 
flight crew. In other words, it should look at the same cues 
that an expert observer would. This has not been extensively 
tested in the existing program. 
A qualitative model based on physics primitives (force, 
friction, rotating masses, heat) would offer two new capabilities 
to the intelligent cockpit. The first is to offer explaining 
power to script checklists. The current scripts are limited to 
knowing what is to be done. There is no knowledge about what 
Page 2 
happens when, say, a particular checklist step is omitted. A 
qualitative model would be an appropriate way to represent 
improved script semantics. 
Ultimately, these aiding concepts are to be tested in the 
Center's full-scope flight simulator. One experiment that is 
envisioned is to test the procedural aiding in an online 
environment. 	The current program, it should be recalled, 
analyzes data from completed simulator runs. 	The principal 
thrust of this experiment would be to evaluate different aiding 
strategies. In other words, once a procedural error is found, 
what strategy should be used to alert the flight crew. 
SIMULATION SOFTWARE 
The Center's full-scope flight simulator is being revamped 
for realistic experiments with computer-based decision aids. 
Three major tasks must be accomplished before experimental work 
can be done. First, simulation software must be written to mimic 
flight dynamics and navigation. Second, the existing controls 
must be located and interfaced to the simulation software. 
Third, the outputs from the simulation must be displayed on the 
new CRT-based flight deck. Wan Yoon has primary responsibility 
for these software developments. 
An initial version of the flight simulation software is now 
running on the VAX 11/780. This software is being extended to 
include the following features. An autopilot that operates in 
both manual and command mode has recently been completed. The 
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current task is to enhance the engine model from a simple 
throttle to thrust relationship to one that simulates thrust, 
engine pressure ratio, exhaust gas temperature, N1, N2, and full 
flow. The effects of air density, temperature, and airspeed will 
also be modeled. 
A second set of enhancements will be necessary to use the 
program in experiments. Flight data must be recorded in a disk 
file and be replayed for offline analysis and debugging. The 
program must be modified to take inputs from the A/D converter 
and produce outputs for the displays. (The current version has 
simple terminal input and output.) 
SIMULATOR HARDWARE 
The most pressing task in the entire simulator project is to 
get the simulator hardware ready. Edward Brown has primary 
responsibility for this task. The current areas of concentration 
are the pedestal, yoke, and flight instruments. The basic tasks 
for the first two areas are to dissemble, locate sensors, and 
rewire/reassemble. Fortunately, more sensors have been found 
than was originally expected. The missing ones, typically an 
assembly sensing a number of controls, must be located from other 
sources or constructed in house. 
The flight instruments are going to be provided on CRT 
displays. 	The hardware effort in this area is to mount the 
displays 	in 	the 	existing 	framework 	that 	once 	held 
electromechanical gauges. 	Of the equipment needed, one CRT and 
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two keyboards have arrived. Four CRTs and the A/D conversion 
equipment have been ordered. 
The status of these initial three areas is as follows. 	The 
pedestal and yoke has been disassembled. The sensor arrangements 
are understood, and when the missing sensor boxes are located, 
reassembly can begin. The flight instrument panel work can begin 
when the above is finished and the displays arrive. 
The time schedule for demonstrating the simulator is as 
follows. An initial demonstration will be made during the summer 
of 1984. Flight instruments, engine displays, and limited 
navigation abilities will operate. A second demonstration in the 
fall of 1984 will feature more complete navigation, data entry 
and simulation utilization of navigation and center of gravity, 
utilization of numerous discrete switches, and simulation of 
various failures in engine, hydraulic, power generation, and 
similar systems. 
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STUDIES OF HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING 
In order to support domain-oriented projects such as the 
intelligent cockpit, it is necessary to increase our basic 
understanding of human decision making and problem solving. This 
has been a main tenet of this program of research since its 
inception and continues to be a guiding principle. 
The latest efforts in the area of basic studies of human 
problem solving have focused on two topics. The first is the use 
of a model of human problem solving (KARL) as a means for online 
training and aiding in PLANT. The second topic is the 
development of identification methods for rule-based models. 
A MODEL-BASED APPROACH TO ONLINE TRAINING AND AIDING 
The results of Nancy Morris' Ph.D. 	thesis, which were 
summarized in the last report, indicated that subjects who 
operated PLANT were not always aware of when to apply the 
knowledge that they gained during training. The results of 
Annette Knaeuper's M.S. thesis, supported under an Office of 
Naval Research grant, illustrated systematic inconsistencies 
between what subjects knew and said they would do, and what they 
actually did. This assessment was made by developing a 
rule-based model of problem solving (KARL) that essentially 
received the same instructions as subjects. Comparing the 
model's choices of actions to those of subjects uncovered the 
inconsistencies. 
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These conclusions were further supported by the recent M.S. 
thesis of Teresa Mann. She performed a fine-grained analysis of 
subjects' compliance with PLANT's procedures. An interesting 
conclusion was that the group with the most training, including 
basic principles of PLANT operation, appeared to follow the 
procedures least. In general, subjects did not follow procedures 
to the extent that their training would have led one to expect. 
It may have been that subjects did not always know when 
procedures were applicable. 
Online Training and Aiding 
The fact that KARL could be used to analyze the sequence of 
subjects' actions led to the idea of using KARL as an online 
"coach" for both training and aiding. During this reporting 
period, KARL has been modified (under ONR support) to operate in 
this manner and an experiment with PLANT has been planned (under 
NASA support) to evaluate the concept. 
KARL provides three types of online assistance. First, KARL 
provides a context-specific situation assessment as well as a 
recommended procedure (i.e., none required, normal tuning, 
particular procedure applicable, and none applicable). KARL also 
provides performance monitoring by assessing the consistency of 
subjects' actions relative to applicable procedures and providing 
context-specific feedback and explanations. Finally, KARL 
provides 	performance 	feedback 	by 	informing 	subjects if 
instability problems are improving, excessive, or extreme. 
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Experimental Plan 
To evaluate the use of KARL in this manner, a group of eight 
subjects will be run as a fifth group in the original 
experimental design of Nancy Morris. This group will receive the 
Procedures and Principles training developed by Morris (group D 
in the original design) as well as online assistance via KARL. 
Situation assessment and performance feedback will 	be 
provided during sessions five through twelve. However, 
performance monitoring will only be provided during sessions five 
through eight. This will allow a determination of whether or not 
consistency is maintained by subjects once monitoring by KARL 
ceases. A 13th and final experimental session will be performed 
without any assistance from KARL to assess whether or not 
performance degrades without any aiding. 
The plan is for this experiment to be performed in April. 
IDENTIFICATION METHODS FOR RULE-BASED MODELS 
Rule-based models have served well as explanations of 
problem solving and, as implemented in KARL, have shown 
performance similar to human subjects. One difficulty with this 
approach, however, has been the tedious and subjective process of 
manually identifying rules. A methodology is now being refined 
for algorithmically identifying relations in data in a form 
compatable with these models. Mike Lewis is performing this 
research in conjunction with his Ph.D. thesis in psychology. 
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Any inference from observations requires 	some model, 
explicit or implicit. Linear models such as analysis of variance 
or regression have proved the most popular for data analysis. In 
these models the dependent variable is treated as an amalgam of 
effects contributed by the independent variables. When the 
dependent variable is continuous powerful tools are available 
which disentangle these influences. While sufficing to describe 
many observed relations, others appear to be of a qualitatively 
different form. In events such as crystal formation or catalytic 
reactions the characteristic of greatest interest is a quantum 
change in state attributable to a synthesis of variables. For 
such relations a more suitable description would be specification 
of conditions under which this change occurs. This specification 
may be considered a rule, as it assigns an action (change in 
state) to a range of conditions. 
In problem solving a subject commonly has a variety of 
available actions. His task lies in choosing a sequence 
consonant with some goal. The saliency of variables will often 
depend on their context. For example, functioning headlights may 
be a useful cue in diagnosing an electrical fault yet be 
irrelevant to fixing a flat tire. This dependence on context and 
qualitative differences among responses are hallmarks of 
synthetic relations in which the event depends on the coincidence 
of values rather then individually contributed effects. 
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If a response may be to be controlled by context, an 
appropriate model must identify the relation between contexts and 
responses rather than the influence of particular variables. The 
context of an observation is defined by the values of its 
variables which are coordinates locating it in an event space. 
Context dependent relations can be expressed directly in terms of 
these n-tuples. The multidimensional set of independent 
variables used by linear models can be replaced by a single 
unordered context dimension with constituent variables serving to 
identify its values. Description of the observations in more 
parsimonious and general form requires identification of regions 
of this event space for which this effect of context is 
equivalent. Partitioning the event space into such regions 
results in a set of situation-action rules describing 
consistencies in behavior. 
For example: If pilots were observed to maneuver only when 
an intruder was 'too-near' horizontally and vertically three 
rules of this type would result. 
1. horizontal distance is too-near & 
vertical distance is too near -> maneuver 
2. horizontal distance is near or far & 
vertical distance is too-near, 
or near, or far -> No maneuver 
3. horizontal distance is too-near,near,or far 
& vertical distance is near or far -> No maneuver 
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Identification of such rules presents a combinatorial problem of 
finding regions associated with particular responses. In this 
example there are 18 possible observations (i.e., 3 horizontal 
distances x 3 vertical distances x 2 responses), which may be 
described by 68 possible rules. As the size of the problem 
increases these numbers rapidly become intractable. In the case 
of four explanatory variables and a dependent variable each 
taking on ten values there are one million possible observations 
and between 10**8 (ordinal domains) and 10**17 (nominal domains) 
possible rules. Applicable statistical methods would require 
ennumeration of hypotheses (rules) and evidential weighting for 
observations. 
Fortunately alternative nonstochastic methods have been 
developed. Over the past fifteen years researchers in "machine 
learning" have experimented with methods based on the predicate 
calculus which draw consistent generalizations from sets of 
examples. The most familiar of these is Winston's (1970) "Blocks 
World" program. These generalization procedures are of two basic 
types: those which find the most general expression which 
discriminates between positive and negative instances and those 
which find the most specfic expression covering a set of positive 
examples. Some programs such as INDUCE 3 (Michalski,1980), and 
MetaDendral (Mitche11,1977), employ both approaches. 
A further distinction lies in the acceptable representation 
of observations. 	Conventional methods of analysis and some 
pattern generalization approaches are limited to 	attribute 
spaces. 	In an attribute space context is defined by global 
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properties of the observations which can be represented as 
measurements. Pattern generalization is not in principle 
restricted to such spaces. If we were to describe rooms in an 
attribute space we might arrive at the expression: room={ 
(walls>2),(ceiling=1),(floor=1)1. In this case we could not tell 
a room from a stage or some random assembledge of room parts. A 
structural representation allows description of relations : 
room={ Joined(wall(x),wall(y)) and On-top(wall(x),floor) and 
On-top(ceiling,wall(x))}. 	In this example the 	description, 
On-top(wall(x),floor) 	represents 	a 	generalization 	of the 
observation, On-top(wall(1),floor) 	and 	On-top(wall(2),floor) 
and... In principle elementary structural relations such as 
On-top(wall(1),floor) can always be represented as attributes, 
however, generalization among them cannot be performed. In 
complex domains such as problem solving this sort of data 
reduction may be crucial. 
For example, In the PLANT simulation there are multiple 
columns of tanks. A good rule for locating a failed valve is to 
find an increasing level in the tank on its left accompanied by a 
decreasing level in the tank on its right. Finding this rule 
requires simultaneous generalization of structural relations 
(column-left, column-right) and attributes (increasing-level, 
decreasing-level). 
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Interpretation Qi Rules  
While the rules produced by generalization programs bear a 
formal resemblence to production systems models of cognitive 
processes the two should be distinguished. Theory based models 
such as KARL make strong assumptions about the ways in which 
decisions are made (control structures). These models attempt to 
describe not only what a person does but how he does it. If 
accurate, fitting such models will provide insight into human 
capacities and limitations and be generalizable to other tasks. 
Despite the rubric of "machine 	intelligence" 	pattern 
generalization algorithms are as purely computational as least 
squares. The rules abstracted embody only consistencies among 
contexts and responses. A production system composed of such 
rules emulates rather than models the cognitive processes of a 
person performing the task. 
There are, however, connections between the two types of 
rule. Markov(1955) has demonstrated that any realizable 
algorithm can be re-expressed as an equivalent (in behavior) set 
of production rules without control structure. This property may 
be used to reduce algorithms of differing structure to comparable 
form. Pattern generalization can be used to identify behavioral 
'algorithms' at this lowest common denominator providing a metric 
for comparing cognitive models and observations. 
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In data analysis the property of 	emmulation, 	alone, 
suffices. By describing associations between contexts and 
decisions rather than performance summaries, contexts producing 
anomalous decisions are readily identified. As with 
identification of interactions in linear models the resolution 
with which rules may be specified is dependent on the extent to 
which combinatorial possibilities are represented in the 
observations. Differences in behavior attributable to a 
manipulated variable are indicated by its appearance on the 
condition side of a rule. These differences may be of two types. 
If a rule employs different variables it may be interpreted in 
terms of a shift in the saliency of cues (change in rules). 
Differences in ranges of values may be attributed to changes in 
perceptual precision. 
Evaluating Rules  
Since identification of "rules" is based 	on 	logical 
consistency rather than stochastic considerations the 
inconsistencies of actual observations may cause difficulties. 
The discriminant procedures are typically limited to rules which 
exclude negative examples while the nondiscriminant methods lack 
a means of detecting abberations. This problem of bias reduction 
can be ameliorated by aggregating observations. Inconsistencies 
in responding to a context may be resolved by entering the modal 
response or a new category formed by the disjunction or the most 
prevalent responses. In the earlier example disjunction of the 
response might have resulted in a rule such as: 
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horizontal distance is near & Vertical distance is too-near 
-> maneuver or No maneuver. 
In this case consistent inaction has been observed only when the 
intruder was not "too-near" in either dimension and consistent 
maneuvering only when both were "too-near". The inclusion of a 
disjunctive response allows specification of conditions under 
which no single response is consistenly produced. 	This becomes 
important 	when there are a number of consistently chosen 
alternatives which form a proper subset of responses available. 
While identifying consistent relations in 	observations 
pattern generalization lacks the inferential machinery available 
to parametric identification. Once identified, however, the 
system of rules may be evaluated in a parametric model. If the 
system of rules and responses are self contained, inconsistencies 
observed can be attributed to disturbances from outside of this 
system and are therefore independent of the contexts identified 
by the model. If response categories are treated as a logit 
vector the rules specify the cells within a contingency table 
associated with consistent responding. A chi-square test of 
independence for the entire table consisting of contexts and 
responses provides a test for a null hoypthesis of no effects. A 
subsequent test of quasi-independence for the incomplete table 
excluding the cells specified by the rules provides a 
goodness-of-fit test of the rule model. 
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Additional statistics are, available 	to 	evaluate 	the 
performance of rules relative to the variation among 
observations. Goodman and Kruskal's Proportional Reduction in 
Error (lambda) statistic measures and supplies confidence 
intervals for the relative improvement in prediction attributable 
to a rule. A second measure, t, (Margolin and Light,1974) may be 
used to find the proportion of variance explained by a rule or 
rule set and test its significance. 
Induce 1 
A pattern generalization program, 	INDUCE 	3 	(Hoff,et 
al.,1983),has been obtained for use in rule identification. 
INDUCE 3 finds discriminant or characteristic generalizations of 
examples. It is suitable for both attribute only and attribute 
plus structure event spaces. 
As with other predicate calculus based 	generalization 
programs, INDUCE performs structural generalizations using graph 
search. By representing observations as a directed graph with 
labeled edges the generalization problem becomes one of finding a 
maximal common subgraph among examples. Two mechanisms for 
generalization are immediately available as a result of this 
device. If at least one of a node's edges is not common among 
examples, the node is absent from the common subgraph and its 
condition is dropped from the generalization. Matching subgraphs 
involving same type nodes (walls in the room example) provides a 
"turning constants into variables" facility, forall 
x(On-top(ceiling,wall(x))). 	This generalization method is less 
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well suited for dealing with attributes which can be affected 
only by dropping their condition. 
INDUCE overcomes this deficiency by incorporating a second 
algorithm for attribute generalization. 	In INDUCE structural 
generalizations ignoring attributes are 	initially 	obtained 
through 	graph matching. 	The resulting generalizations are 
appended to the examples as attributes. 	The Aq algorithm, 
operating in an event space similar to that described earlier, 
produces consistent structural plus attribute generalizations by 
• finding the intersection of positive examples with the complement 
of the negative examples. 
Data analysis using pattern generalization is made possible 
by the efficiency of this algorithm. The methods based solely on 
graph matching must process examples serially, frequently 
backtracking to mend inconsistencies. The Aq algorithm achieves 
economy by considering the constraints imposed by the examples 
simultaneously. An added advantage of this algorithm is its 
ability to generalize through internal 	disjunction 	(i.e., 
horizontal=too-near 	or near), and to uncover consistencies 
involving combinations of structures and attributes. 
CDTI 
As an initial step, these techniques are being applied to a 
single decision task which can be adequately represented by 
attributes alone. Data from an experiment conducted by Palmer 
(1983) investigating the effects of information quality and 
intruder characteristics in the use of a cockpit traffic display 
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is being re-analyzed. 
Sixteen pilots "flew" simulated encounters under three 
display conditions. Pilots were instructed to maintain a steady 
course, using the autopilot unless they received a threat 
advisory. , In response to the threat they were to maneuver to 
maintain a horizontal separation of greater than 1.5 nm and a 
vertical separation in excess of 500 ft. They were advised that 
an appropriate strategy was to maneuver so that the intruder 
would pass further away but in the same orientation at the point 
of closest approach. 
In the least informative condition the display protrayed the 
relative positions of the ownship and the intruder along with 
tags showing their altitudes. The predictive display provided 
ground referenced predictors showing predicted positions of the 
ownship and intruder as well as a tag showing the intruders 
projectd altitude at time of closest approach. In the third 
condition noise was introduced into the predictive display 
Examples from an initial analysis using only programmed 
horizontal miss and intruder vertical velocity measurements to 
define the contexts may be used to illustrate the technique. In 
these generalizations pilot responses were examined in terms of 
both single response dimensions and combinations of dimensions. 
In both treatments of the response a strong link was found 
between a constant intruder altitude and a vertically away 
maneuver. When the response combination, vertical-away, no 
horizontal action, is generalized the rule below results: 
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Intruder vertical velocity is constant 
-> vertical-away/horizontal-inaction 
This rule correctly matches 155 of the 768 events while resulting 
in 38 errors. This corresponds to 13% of the variation in the 
responses and is significant at the .01 level. 
When response dimensions were considered independently a 
somewhat different version indicating an influence of the 
displays was found: 
Display is predictor or predictor+noise & programmed 
horizontal separation is not 1 nm & intruder vertical velocity 
is zero or 1000 ft/sec -> vertical-away 
This rule correctly matches 115 of the 768 events producing 15 
errors. 	In the encounters presented in the study, non-zero 
vertical velocities usually resulted in reversal of the 
aircrafts' relative vertical orientation at the point of closest 
approach. This would make a vertically away response appropriate 
primarily for intruders approaching at a constant vertical 
velocity. The second rule expressing this strategy is restricted 
to pilots using predictive displays. Pilots flying without the 
data tag showing intruder altitude at point of closest approach 
were observed to take the same action under a variety of 
inappropriate circumstances. 
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These rules illustrate an instance in which the difference 
between conditions cannot be attributed to strategy since in the 
constant altitude encounter all pilots consistently maneuvered in 
accordance with their instructions. Despite their utilization of 
the proper strategy, pilots flying without the data tag showing 
intruder altitude at point of closest approach failed to estimate 
that quantity reliably when the intruder's altitude was changing. 
A second example shows advantages for predictive displays in 
avoiding unneccesary maneuvers. 
Display is predictor or predictor+noise & 
programmed horizontal miss is 2 nm 
-> vertical inaction/horizontal-inaction 
This rule correctly matches 33 events while erring in 	3 
instances. Use of this rule results in a 6% reduction of error 
in describing the observations and accounts for 3% of their 
variation. Under these conditions the intruder will pass well 
beyond the 1.5 nm at which a maneuver might be required. In this 
case interpretation becomes equivocal. It is not clear whether 
pilots lacking predictive displays fail to recognize the benign 
nature of these encounters or have adopted a generalized strategy 
of maneuvering in all encounters. 
Another rule indicates other ambiguities which may occur if 
rules are interpreted solely on the basis of their "performance". 
Programmed horizontal separation is less than 2 nm & 
passing position will intercept or is in front & 
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intruder vertical velocity is non zero 
-> horizontal-toward/vertical-inaction 
This rule correctly matches 122 events but is in error for 118 
others. None the less it results in a 15% reduction in error and 
accounts for a significant 5% of the variation in the responses. 
An explanation lies in the nature of the 	encounters 
described. 	Under the avoidance instructions neither horizontal 
direction is preferred when trajectories are 	intersecting. 
Similarly the choice of a vertical or combination of horizontal 
and vertical maneuvers might be equally acceptable. For the 
intruder passing in front at an angle which is not obtuse, 
however, the vertical-toward maneuver is preferred as it will 
cause the intruder to pass further in front. This rule indicates 
that in a substantial (16%) number of encounters the 
horizontal-toward/vertical-inaction response was chosen when it 
was a preferred response or one of a number of appropriate 
responses. If disjunctive response alternatives had been 
available this paradox of simultaneous high predictability and 
error rate might be resolved. 
Future Plans 
More exhaustive analysis of the CDTI 	data 	employing 
additional variables is planned. The data from the PLANT 
simulation described earlier in this report will be used to 
examine the effectiveness of these rule identification techniques 
in dynamic decision making in an attribute plus structure space. 
In addition to greater complexity the nature of the task presents 
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difficulties of theoretical 	interest. 	Changes 	in 	goals 
represented by situation-situation rule control structures are 
widely employed in problem solving research. For a pattern 
generalization algorithm identification of these rules is an 
unobserved state problem. The use of states supplied by KARL or 
collection of verbal protocols are being considered to confront 
this problem. The appropriateness of a single response under 
disparate conditions represents an additional difficulty when 
operating in an attribute plus structure space due to the 
heuristic nature of INDUCE's graph matching algorithm. Solutions 
to these problems will be examined in this research. 
It is hoped this research will result in the availablility 
of rule-based methods for analyzing behavioral data and help 
establish closer ties between normative rule-based models and 
experimental data. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Increased requirements for safety and efficiency as well as increased 
availability of reliable and inexpensive computer technology have resulted 
in a trend of more and more computers being employed in flight management. 
However, this trend by no means indicates that human operators will 
disappear from aircraft cockpits. Instead, it means that the roles of the 
pilot, copilot, and flight engineer will evolve to include increased 
responsibilities for monitoring and supervising the various computer-based 
systems employed in the aircraft. 
While this assessment of the future roles of the members of the flight 
crew is fairly easy to accept, it is certainly not straightforward to decide 
how various flight tasks should be allocated among humans and computers. 
Further, it is not clear how humans and computers should communicate 
regarding the process by which their tasks are performed and the products 
that result. This report discusses progress of a research program whose 
overall objectives include providing at least partial answers to some of the 
questions surrounding these issues. 
The following two sections discuss two project areas which are 
currently being pursued in this program of research: 1) the intelligent 
cockpit and 2) studies of human problem solving. The first area involves an 
investigation of the use of advanced software engineering methods (e.g., 
from artificial intelligence) to aid aircraft crews in procedure selection 
and execution. The second area is focused on human problem solving in 
dynamic environments, particularly in terms of identification of rule-based 
models and alternative approaches to training and aiding. Both of these 
efforts are producing results that are planned to be tested further in the 
Center's evolving full-scope flight simulation facility. Progress on 
developing this facility is discussed in the section on the intelligent 
cockpit. 
THE INTELLIGENT COCKPIT 
Design goals for the intelligent aid are in the following section. 
A review of progress in developing the DC8 flight simulator is in the 
second section. 
GOALS FOR ANALYSIS OF DATA IN THE INTELLIGENT COCKPIT PROGRAM 
The Problem  
The data are a large, rich state vector of the aircraft. The 
intelligent aid is to monitor this data to watch for pilot checklist 
error and unsafe conditions either present or future. 
The current approach to monitoring has been to divide the flight 
into phases according to rules that examine the data past and present. 
It is possible to be more specific about a phase than about the whole 
flight. Thus, it is possible to apply pre-programmed checks as 
appropriate to that phase. While this approach has merits, there are 
design limits to what can be preprogrammed. In other words, this 
approach works only for the situations the designer anticipates. In 
particular, this approach can be made to look quite good in a controlled 
experiment where the intelligent aid has been programmed to aid on those 
situations the pilot will encounter. Our approach to demonstrating 
intelligent aid concepts is to build something that at face value will 
handle a wide variety of situations. If, due to complexity, a complete 
aid cannot be constructed, we would prefer an in-depth aid for a 
particular problem (e.g., electrical malfunctions). We reject an aid 
that is able to catch a few problems of all kinds but which appears 
inadequate for complete coverage. 
External Goals  
The external goals are the visible product that an observer or pilot 
would see when the program is running. The following are planned. 
1. The program will drive two displays. The first will be the 
experimenter — system designer display. It will be used for 
program debugging, etc. The second will be a display for the 
pilot. It will be created even if there is no pilot to observe 
it (e.g., off line simulator data). This generality will allow 
the aid to be incorporated into the DC8 flight simulator without 
substantial reworking. It will also allow subjective pilot 
evaluation before being placed in the simulator. 
2. The pilot's display will feature the following. Procedures will 
automatically be selected for display by the aid. When the aid 
detects an error, the procedure display will be changed, perhaps 
by highlighting. 
3. The display will alert the pilot to aircraft operation outside 
the normal regime at the present time and in the future. 
Internal Goals  
The internal goals describe how the program is organized. Some of 
these supplement the external goals; some are not apparent from that 
vantage point. 
1. The program will understand the procedure in terms of a model of 
the aircraft. This model will be used to predict the future 
states of the aircraft. The program will understand the effect 
of procedural errors, not just know how to detect them as was 
the case in the earlier version of the program. 
2. To the maximum extent possible, the program will generally apply 
to all commercial transport aircraft. This will facilitate 
changing from NASA's B727 to our DC8. 
3. Existing scripts will be enhanced and will represent more than a 
procedure checklist. The script will be active whenever the 
aircraft is in the appropriate state. While the aircraft is in 
the script, constraints on safe flight will be constantly 
monitored. 
4. The program's goal will be to avoid aborting the flight plan. 
This goal is made up of a number of subgoals which are by 
aircraft subsystem. For example, to avoid aborting the flight 





Each of these areas can in turn be broken down into finer 
problems 
propulsion failure 
over stress engines 
engine ice up 
engine stall 
engine oil pressure 
engine explosion and airframe/airfoil damage 
etc. 
To be systematic, it would be important to enumerate as many 
forms of failures as possible. Organizing them by subsystems 
would tend to keep the designer from missing a failure mode. 
To restrict the aid program to a manageable size, it may be 
necessary to aid only a subset of the potential failures (e.g., 
only electrical problems). This would, however, demonstrate the 
approach's generality, and it would be clear how to generalize 
to the entire aircraft. 
5. The program will be coded as a rule-based system in LISP. As we 
have stated before, the problem of intelligent aiding is 
principally a symbolic problem. In addition, the debugging 
tools for LISP are far superior to those of other languages. 
Also, there is a practical advantage to the use of LISP. If the 
simulator code or the intelligent aid should end up consuming 
too much of the VAX's capability, it should be possible to move 
the LISP aid code to a LISP machine. This should be 
considerably cheaper than other VAX. 
6. The program must make some predictions about the aircraft's 
future. This is necessary to check for safe, future states. 
Representing and manipulating the passage of time is a 
recognized problem in artificial intelligence. Hopefully, some 
contribution can be made to this area. 
Conclusion  
The proposed new aid will have an improved understanding of the 
aircraft and consequently the ability to alert the pilot to present and 
future dangers. The aid will also be useable on both the 8727 and the 
DC8. 
SIMULATOR DEVELOPMENT 
Simulator Hardware  
Most of the switches and controls (overhead panels and flight 
controls) have wires connected that go outside the cockpit and are 
waiting to be connected to the AID converter. A few engine controls and 
the elevator controls must have sensors designed and installed before 
being wired. 
All of the CRT displays have been mounted in the flight deck. A 
cowling must be added to enclose one of the CRT's forward of the 
pedestal. Both this cowling and a force feel system for the control yoke 
are being designed and built in the GTRI shop. The custom keyboards have 
been designed and are currently being fabricated. A force feel system 
for the pedals is installed and undergoing final adjustment. 
Simulation Software  
The simulation software currently supports high fidelity engines, 
flight dynamics, radio navigation and an autopilot. Hydraulic, 
electrical, and fuel systems are not being simulated in any but the most 
elementary ways in this version of the simulator. The remaining work on 
the simulation software is to integrate it with the display software and 
to modify the takeoff routines to use flight dynamics. Some minor 
modifications (coefficient changes and term changes) are being made to 
the flight dynamics to make it perform as a commercial transport. 
Display Software  
There are three displays to be produced for in the simulator: the 
flight instruments, the engine status, and the navigation/autopilot/ 
communication display. The engine status display is being programmed 
now; it is fairly simple. The navigation/autopilot/communication display 
specifications have been worked out and will be programmed after the 
engine display is completed. 
The flight instrument display is by far the most complicated 
display. The original plans were to use an Apple II to drive the color 
displays. It appears this will not work because the Apple is not fast 
enough. The following simple analysis shows how this was determined. 
The ADI must be updated frequently; at a minimum, updating this display 
requires drawing of 11 or 12 lines. Timing estimates show the Apple 
(using Pascal) can erase an old line and draw a new line in .02 + 
.0002*pixels seconds. Thus, the ADI graphics can be redrawn about once 
every .250 seconds. In practice, the Apple II will be much slower than 
this, since it would have to make computations, receive VAX input, and 
display all of the flight instruments, not just the ADI. Thus, a 4 Hz 
ADI bandwidth is quite optimistic with regard to Apple II capabilities, 
but it is insufficient with respect to the pilot's needs. It is our 
understanding that a 6 to 8 Hz bandwidth is necessary for realistic 
control. 
While it may well be possible to write an assembly language program 
to make the Apple perform as desired, it would be expensive from a labor 
standpoint. Consequently, alternative graphics devices are being 
investigated. Currently, the specifications for this graphics device are 
that it have a high speed, parallel interface to the VAX and a display 
list. The parallel interface is necessary to update the display quickly. 
A display list is necessary so that all the dynamic elements on the 
screen can be changed in real-time. 
It has also become apparent that seven more terminal ports will be 
necessary to drive the simulator displays. Three of these ports will be 
for output, three for input, and at least one will be needed by the 
experimenter to control the simulation. We would prefer to add more 
ports rather than take away from those we already have. Fortunately, 
ports cost only $200 each in groups of sixteen. 
HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING 
As noted in the Introduction, research in this area is focusing on: 
1) identification of rule-based models and, 2) alternative approaches to 
training and aiding. Both of these efforts are oriented toward human 
problem solving in dynamic environments including aviation and process 
control. 
Mike Lewis, in conjunction with his Ph.D. thesis, is pursuing 
identification of rule-based models. The goal is to lessen the usual 
substantial subjectivity in the formulation of rule-based models by 
developing and testing algorithmic approaches. In this report, Mike 
discusses his use of such approaches for analysis of the CDTI data of Ev 
Palmer and his colleagues. 
During the past three years, a portion of the efforts in problem 
solving have been focused on process control. Using a simulation called 
PLANT, Nancy Morris investigated the effects of types of knowledge on 
human performance. Annette Knaeuper developed a rule-based model of 
human problem solving in PLANT. In comparing the behavior of this model 
with that of humans, Annette found that humans often did not follow their 
instructions, namely, PLANT operating procedures. This led to the idea 
of using the rule-based model for online aiding and training of 
operators. Annette and Nancy performed an initial empirical evaluation 
of this concept, the results of which are discussed in this report. 
IDENTIFICATION OF RULE-BASED MODELS 
Charles M. Lewis 
INTRODUCTION 
Researchers investigating pilots using cockpit displays of traffic 
information (CDTI) (Palmer et al., 1980 and Smith et al., 1982) have found 
choice of control action to depend upon individual differences as well as 
encounter or display characteristics. In the development of the CDTI it is 
important that both generalized strategies shared by all pilots and 
idiosyncratic choices of the few be understood. As the CDTI will likely be 
used in conjunction with a collision avoidance system (CAS) it is important 
to gauge the influence of the display on pilot maneuvers so that advisories 
can be formed which are both consonant with pilot strategy and avoid 
conflicts among strategies. The radar assisted collisions discussed by 
Curry (1972) demonstrate the danger of introducing such technology without 
consideration of operator strategies. 
While established policy capturing methods exist for examining the 
influence of variables on decisions, they fail to elucidate what the 
influenced policy actually was. The present work employs pattern 
generalization techniques to identify a production system of rules 
capturing the consistencies in observed behavior. A production rule 
consists of two parts, a set of conditions and an action. If the 
conditions are satisfied the rule's action is performed. If conditions are 
expressed using propositional logic, descriptions are restricted to 
attributes (global properties of an object). Measurements commonly used in 
science such as height, weight, or velocity are of this type. In such 
cases the conditional part of the rule defines a region of the attribute 
space within which the rule is true (responses are of the type specified in 
the action part of the rule). This representation proves convenient for 
visualizing set theoretic relations among rules. 
While this formulation of pattern generalization is similar in 
approach to discriminant analysis there are some important distinctions: 
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1. A rule describes an enclosed region of the event space rather than 
a partition dividing the space into two parts. 
2. More than one rule may be needed to describe a response if regions 
in which it occurs are separated. 
3. Rules may vary both in generality (size of region) and selectivity 
(accuracy of discrimination). 
This report describes an application of pattern generalization to 
identification of pilot strategies. 
wri DATA 
Data from an experiment by Palmer (1983) investigating the effects of 
information quality and intruder characteristics in the use of a cockpit 
display of traffic information instrument has been reanalyzed using pattern 
generalization techniques. 
In this experiment Sixteen pilots "flew" sixteen programmed encounters 
under three display conditions. Pilots were instructed to maintain a 
steady course, using the autopilot unless they received a threat advisory. 
In response to the threat they were to maneuver to maintain a horizontal 
separation of greater than 1.5 nm and a vertical separation in excess of 
500-- ft. They were advised that an appropriate strategy was to maneuver so 
that the intruder would pass further away but in the same orientation at 
the point of closest approach. 
In the least informative condition the display portrayed the relative 
positions of the ownship and the intruder along with tags showing their 
altitudes. The predictive display provided ground referenced predictors 
showing predicted positions of the ownship and intruder as well as a tag 
showing the intruders projected altitude at time of closest approach. In 
the third condition noise was introduced into the predictive display 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
In this analysis encounter variables, describing the physical 
relationship between the intruder and ownship which the pilot is instructed 
to control, were differentiated from experimental variables. Five 
encounter variables were used. Four describe the relative positions of the 
aircraft at their point of closest approach as projected at time of alarm. 
The fifth measure, intruder vertical velocity, remains constant throughout 
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the encounter. 
hpass-horizontal passing position= behind, intercept, or infront. 
hsep-projected horizontal separation= very near(0-.24nm), near(.24-1nm), 
or far( > lnm). 
vcross-vertically crossing trajectories= no,yes. 
vsep-projected vertical separation= very near(0-140'), near(140-350'), 
or far( > 350'). 
vveloc-intruder vertical velocity= zero or non-zero. 
Of the sixteen programmed encounters, encounters 7 and 8 which 
introduce crossing angle between the aircraft as a variable were excluded. 
Encounters 11-16 which involve abrupt changes in intruder course or 
introduction of intruder in near proximity to ownship, invalidating 
projections made at time of alarm, remain unanalyzed as in Palmer's (1983) 
report. 
TWo non-encounter variables were considered, display type and pilot. 
Display type in conjunction with the encounter variables describes the 
stimuli under which a decision is made. Inclusion of pilot identification 
in the generalization introduces individual differences. 
RESPONSE VARIABLE 
Pilots' responses were represented in terms of maneuvers toward or 
away from the intruder along a dominant axis. The dominant axis was 
determined by comparing the horizontal and vertical magnitudes of a 
maneuver to the respective tolerances which the pilots had been instructed 
to maintain. Five response classes result: no action, vertical-toward, 
vertical-away, horizontal-toward, and horizontal-away. 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Nonparametric measures of association tau-b, the ratio of between 
groups sum of squares to total sum of squares, and PRE, the reduction in 
error relative to assigning the modal response to all cases, provide 
measures of rule performance which consider both coverage and 
discrimination. Tau-b provides a nonparametric analog to a squared 
correlation with values under .1 indicating a relatively weak association 
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(corresponding to r < .30) and those over .5 a relatively strong one 
(corresponding to r > .70). Using tau, single rules are evaluated by 
comparing the distribution of response classes within the rule with that of 
the remainder of the cases. This provides a measure (barring 
intersections) of described variance contributed by that rule to its rule 
set. Rule set performance may be evaluated relative to the situations in 
which it applies or to the entire range of examples. When restricted to 
applicable regions, tau may be interpreted as a measure of the extent to 
which the rule set describes identified consistencies. When evaluated 
relative to the entire space, an additional "response category" formed by 
uncovered observations is required. In this case tau may be considered a 
measure of rule set performance relative to arbitrarily chosen examples. 
Aq ALGORITHM 
A pattern generalization program, INDUCE 3 (Hoff, et al. 1983), was 
obtained for use in rule identification. In this analysis only the V1,1 
(Aq) subprogram which identifies rules in propositional logic was employed. 
The hg algorithm generates a set of putative rules which match a 
particular positive example and exclude all negative examples. The rule 
which matches the most additional positive examples is retained. At each 
iteration sucessfully matched examples are removed from consideration. The 
process terminates when all non contradictory positive examples have been 
matched. Although previously matched examples cannot contribute to the 
retention of rules, they become "blanks" in the space, which being neutral, 
may become part of subsequent generalizations. The resulting rules may 
overlap substantially. If "rectangular rules" were identified for figure 
1, three rules would be found: Rule-1=(2,3,4,5), Rule-2=(2,3,4,6,7,8), 
Rule-3=(1,3,7). As Rule-1 substantially describes this space with little 
non redundant contribution from rules 2 or 3, a parsimonious description 
may all the smaller regions, 1,6,7, and 8 to go undescribed. Under other 
circumstances collapsing across an explanatory variable to produce a more 
general rule making occasional errors may be the choice dictated by 
parsimony. 
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EFFECTS OF NON-ENCCUNTER VARIABLES 
The complete set of rules generalized using the Aq algorithm provides 
an upper bound on the consistency with which the responses can be 
associated with the explanatory variables employed. The contribution of a 
variable may be examined by comparing performances between rule sets 
generalized with and without that variable. While modest improvement will 
be obtained from an additional variable based on an increase in degrees of 
freedom, major improvements in description will mirror the "influence" of 
that variable on pilot decisions. An index to the relative contribution of 
an explanatory variable may be found by rank ordering rules by performance. 
The relative performance for same sized sets of rules can then be compared 
for rule sets of varying sizes. 
A generalization based on encounter variables alone produced 230 
correct matches with 154 errors resulting in tau-b=.18. If individual 
differences among pilots are considered as well, correct matches rise to 
324 with 60 errors and tau-b=.61. Less improvement is found in the 
generalization based on encounter variables and display types: correct 
matches=254, errors=130, tau-b=.27. If display type and indivielnAl  
differences are entered into the generalization simultaneously only one 
error occurs yielding a tau-b of .99. 
VARIABLES 	 No. Rules Hits 	FAs 	Tau-b PRE 
ENCOUNTER 	 20 	230 	154 	.18 .38 
ENCOUNTER + DISPLAY 	 42 	254 	130 	.27 .48 
ENCOUNTER + PILOT 	 85 	324 	60 	.61 .76 
ENCOUNTER+ PILOT + DISPLAY 	114 	383 	1 	.99 .99 
Considering performance as a function of the number of rules reveals 
the same ordering of effects as found for the complete rule sets. The 
steeper slope of the generalization including individual differences and 
display type indicates the importance of their interaction in describing 
control strategy. Individual differences appear the stronger of the 
factors, halving the number of errors found in a generalization based on 
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encounter variables alone. Pilots appear to develop individnalized 
strategies which are influenced in similar ways by the type of display 
being used. Individual differences in the adaptation of control strategy 
to display, however, appear necessary to account for pilot behavior in 
detail. 
IDENTIFICATION OF STRATEGIES 
Examining the effects of non-encounter variables by comparing the 
performance of complete rule sets relies on the Aq algorithm's capability 
of finding a set of rules embodying whatever consistencies are present in 
the data. In this usage, ability to phrase noncontradictory rules is more 
crucial than their generality. When used to identify strategies, however, 
the generality and performance of particular rules or families of rules 
becomes of primary importance. 
General strategies tend to be somewhat broader than absolute 
noncontradiction requires. Particular pilots, displays, and encounters 
often demonstrate slight variations on more basic strategies. In 
extracting strategies from a rule set it is necessary to consider a number 
of explicit trade-offs: 
1. Discrimination- The strategy should make few false matches 
2. Generality- The strategy should apply to many of the examples 
3. Uniqueness- Multiple identified strategies should not match the 
same examples 
4. Coverage- Selected strategies should cover a substantial portion 
of the examples 
5. Parsimony- Only a small number of strategies should be identified 
In spatial terms these criteria call for partitioning a large part of 
the attribute space (coverage) into a small number (parsimony) of large 
(generality), homogeneous (discrimination), non-intersecting (uniqueness) 
regions. These goals are often conflicting. As the size of regions (and 
concomitantly coverage of the rule set) increases, so does the likelihood 
of matching negative examples or intersecting neighboring regions. 
Identification of strategies requires selection of a subset of 
representative rules which "best" meet these criteria. 
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While the appropriate quantification of these criteria is not apparent 
it is not necessary for a rough identification of major strategies. 
Selection of a subset of rules from major regions of homogeneity requires 
only that the analyst simultaneously consider rule performance and region. 
Once selected, the performance of the reduced rule set can be evaluated and 
its usefulness as an abstraction of major consistencies in the observations 
appraised. Other possible selections do not invalidate this choice but 
merely vary the fineness of detail in exchanging generality for 
discrimination or parsimony for coverage. The resulting rule sets provide 
production system models of the observed behaviors. Conditions under which 
consistent responding failed to occur can be identified as well. 
RULE TREES 
Since rules may be refinements of one another or otherwise share 
observations it is necessary to consider rule sets in a way making their 
redundancy explicit. This is facilitated by representing rules in trees in 
which successors are subsets of their predecessors. Rules below a selected 
rule then describe subregions of that rule while the rule, itself, 
demarcates a subregion of the rules above it. Rules which are not subsets 
of any other rule form roots. 
Well developed tree structures are typical of major strategies. Roots 
are found in generalizations collapsed across non-encounter variables while 
more specific generalizations provide refinements and variations on this 
basic theme attributable to particular pilots, displays, and encounters. 
Solitary roots by contrast tend to delimit smaller, less populous regions 
of the attribute space. 
Rules from all generalizations, with tau > .01-.02 to exclude those 
covering only two or three events, were assembled into rule sets for each 
control action. Trees were then generated for each response type. A rule 
was considered a subset if: 
1. proper subset- its conditions were a subset of its predecessor's 
2. phenotypic subset- all events covered were also covered by its 
predecessor 
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3. intersecting subset- 90% of events covered were also covered by 
its predecessor 
While representing rules within trees clusters those most closely 
associated, even roots may share substantial numbers of observations in 
common. In selecting rules depicting general strategies it is also 
necessary to consider the uniqueness of these rules which are not quite so 
closely related. This overlap can be conveniently expressed in an 
intersection matrix whose entries are the number of common observations for 
the rules appearing in its indices. Although less complete in its 
depiction than the rule tree which represents relations directly in the 
attribute space, the intersection matrix provides a convenient means for 
representing more isolated regions. In identifying major strategies the 
analyst may use the structural information provided by rule trees along 
with the more complete picture of intersections supplied by the matrix to 
choose rules from among branches, between trees, and among roots. This 
task will generally prove less formidable than it sounds since a major 
strategy will usually spawn a tree with a good representative(s) near its 
root while isolated roots typically have low coverage and may be 
disregarded. 
RESULTS 
A set of 9 rules were selected from the generalizations based on rule 
trees and intersection matrices. The selected rule set covers 44% of the 
sampled event space with 143 correct matches and 24 errors yielding PRE=.77 
and tau=.61. When performance is considered relative to the entire event 
space these figures become: correct matches=213 errors=171 with PRE=.32 
and tau=.27. 
Two rules describe conditions for taking no action, three for turning 
vertically away, and four for turning horizontally toward. Turning 
vertically toward the intruder occurred very rarely (12 out of 384 
encounters) and so was not modeled. The horizontal away response 
accounting for 70 of the 384 encounters also was not represented. Although 
73% of these occurrences are successfully described by a set of 29 
horizontal-away rules with only 21 errors, these rules have uniformally 
small coverage and low overlap. Over half of the horizontal-away rules 
were restricted to groups of five or fewer pilots indicating the 
idiosyncratic (or coincidental) nature of this response choice. The 
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overall inconsistency in the choice of this response is revealed in the 
rule trees for horizontal-away where 27 of 29 rules stand alone if a 90% 
inclusion criterion is applied. To consider pilot strategy it is necessary 
to examine the rules, themselves, in greater detail. This will be done for 
each response class. 
NO ACTION 
Rule No. 1 
[Pilot=7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16] & [Horizontal passing position=intercepting or in front] 
& [Projected horizontal separation=far] 
correct matches=22, errors=7, PRE=.09, tau-b.07 
Rule No. 2 
[Pilot=3,4,7,8,11,14,15,16] & [Projected horizontal separation=far] & 
[Vertical crossover=true] 
correct matches=l8, errors=6, PRE=.07, tau-b=.05 
RULE SET SUMMARY FOR NO-ACTION 
correct matches=35, errors=11, PRE=.14, tau-b=.11 
The essential condition for eliciting no response appears to be a 
large projected horizontal separation. Thirty of the 36 rules found for 
no-response were refinements of this condition, [Projected horizontal 
separation=far]. Standing alone this condition produces 43 correct matches 
with 52 errors. The two rules selected miss 8 of these matches but result 
in 41 fewer errors. 
Both individual differences and other aspects of the encounters appear 
responsible for the increase in selectivity. In the first rule, encounters 
in which the intruder would pass behind are excluded. This finding is 
consistent with (O'Connor et.al., 1980) and findings in relation to the 
horizontal-toward response in this study, that pilots tend to maneuver in a 
way to cause intruders to pass in front. Individual differences have an 
equally clear influence. Pilots 7,8,11,14,15, and 16 appear in both of the 
selected rules. If [Projected horizontal separation=far] is constrained to 
this group of pilots, correct matches are reduced by only 44% while errors 
decline by 79%. If the selected rules were restricted to these pilots, 
selectivity again improves with correct matches declining from 35 to 22 and 
errors from 11 to 5. 
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While pilots made no response on only 48 out of the 384 encounters, 
patterns are found for this choice. A relatively small group (6-8) of 
pilots account for almost all occasions on which a constant course was 
maintained. This choice was made appropriately for large horizontal 
separations but failed to occur when the major separation was vertical or 
the intruder was oriented to pass behind. 
VERTICAL PRAY 
Rule No. 3 
[Pilot=2,6,7,8,10,11,12,15] & [Projected vertical separation=near] & 
[Vertical velocity=zero] 
correct matches=43, errors=3, tau-b=.09 
Rule No. 4 
[Pilot=6,7,11,13,16] & [Projected horizontal separation=near] & 
[Projected vertical separation=very near or near] & 
[Vertical velocity=zero] 
correct matches=27, errors=l, tau-b=.06 
Rule No. 5 
[Display=no predictor] & [Vertical velocity=zero] 
correct matches=27, errors=5, tau-b=.05 
RULE SET SUMMARY FOR VERTICAL-AWAY 
correct matche62, error7, tau-b=.12 
Rules for the vertical away response are contained within the portion 
of the space in which the intruder is approaching at a constant altitude. 
Seventy-six of 134 encounters responded to with a vertical-away response 
were of this type. While 34 additional encounters are covered by 13 more 
rules in which this condition is not explicitly 
observations fall largely within the constant altitude 
to find strong rules covering the 54 encounters in 
changed altitude indicates an inconsistent usage 
response under these conditions. Rules 3 and 4 
conditions and apply to all displays. In rule 
expressed, their 
region. The failure 
which the intruder 
of the vertical-away 
contain proximity 
5 both proximity and 
individual differences are dropped. In the absence of predicted separation 
pilots chose a vertical away response when confronted with an intruder at 
constant velocity regardless of the actual threat. Examination of these 
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rules indicates that, for these encounters, projected proximity information 
influenced the decision to respond but not the response chosen. Pilots' 
choice of the vertical-away response appears limited to the constant 
altitude intruder although a strategy of increasing vertical separation 
would apply to vertically moving intruders as well. The presence of 
predicted altitudes does not appear to influence this decision. While the 
vertical-away response was the modal response in this study its association 
with a clearly discriminable form of separation information rather than 
projected separations provided by the predictor displays may indicate some 
difficulties in the use of this information to guide control actions. 
HORIZONTAL TOWARD 
Rule No. 6 
[Pilot=7,11,12,141 & [Display=no predictor or predictor] & 
[Projected horizontal separation=very near or near] & 
[Vertical crossover=no] & [Vertical velocity=not zero] 
correct matches=14, errors=0, PRE✓.06, tau-b=.03 
Rule No. 7 
[Pilot=6,11,12,14] & [Projected horizontal separation=near] & 
[Projected vertical separation=far] & [Vertical velocity=not zero] 
correct matches=9, errors=0, PRE.04, tau-b=.02 
Rule No. 8 
[Pilot=4,5,11,12,15] & [Projected horizontal separation--very near] & 
[Vertical velocity=not zero] 
correct matches=19, errors=6, PRE=.07, tau-b=.03 
Rule No. 9 
[Pilot NE 5,6,10] & [Display=no predictor] & [Passing position=intercept or in front] 
& [Projected horizontal separation=near] & [Vertical velocity=not zero] 
correct matches=15, errors=0, PRE=.06, tau-b=.04 
RULE SET SUMMARY FOR HORIZONTAL-TCWARD 
correct matches=46, errors=6, PRE=.18, tau-t=.10 
Rules for the horizontal-toward response are contained within the 
complementary "changing intruder altitude" portion of the event space. 
This factor rather than proximity or relative orientation appears crucial 
in the choice between horizontal and vertical responding. While the 
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vertical-away response was chosen consistently throughout the constant 
altitude region, the choice of the horizontal-toward response is less 
monolithic. As noted in the discussion of "no-response", this choice 
occurs almost exclusively (98%) in this region. Similarly 83% of the 
vertical-toward, 43% of the vertical-away, and 93% of the horizontal-away 
responses occur in encounters in which the intruder is changing altitude. 
Rules 6, 7, and 8 are refinements based on individual differences of a 
strategy of turning toward intruders who are laterally close and changing 
altitudes: 
[Projected horizontal separation=very near or near] & 
[Vertical velocity=not zero] 
correct matches=85, errors=107, PRE=.12, tau-b=.05 
The poor performance of the rule expressed in this general way indicates 
this strategy is followed by only a small group of pilots. The improved 
selectivity of rules 6 and 7 is attributable primarily to pilots 11, 12, 
and 14. The general rule restricted to these pilots: 
[Pilot=11,12,14] & [Projected horizontal separation=very near or near] 
& [Vertical velocity=not zero] 
correct matches=28, errors=8, PRE=.08, tau-b=.04 
accounts for 75% of the encounters covered by rules 6 and 7 and represents 
a major improvement in selectivity over its unrestricted form. Rule 8, 
another refinement of the general strategy which restricts the rule to 
intruders at the closest proximity, is followed by a larger group of 
pilots. None of these rules shares as many as 60% of its observations with 
the rule embodying the recommended strategy for a horizontal-toward 
response: 
1. There is a threat 
2. Maneuvering horizontally toward the intruder will maintain the 
aircrafts' relative horizontal positions and increase horizontal 
separation at point of closest approach. 
[Passing position=intercept or in front] & 
& [Projected horizontal separation=very near or near] 
correct matches=65, errors=79, PRE=.02, tau-b=.03 
Rule 9, by contrast, is a refinement of the recommended strategy fitting 
most pilots using the display without a predictor. 
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DISCUSSION 
Within the range of encounters examined, the vertical movement of the 
intruder appears the most crucial factor in determining the pilot's 
dominant response. Under conditions in which the intruder approached at a 
constant altitude pilots under all displays, with few individual 
differences, and with little regard to the degree of threat, maneuvered 
vertically away. This strategy follows the principle of least effort in 
limiting the decision to a single dimension (vertical velocity) and 
producing a response which increases separation at point of closest 
approach under all conditions. While ensuring success at the pilots' 
primary task of avoidance, this strategy may run counter to the secondary 
task of maintaining course in the face of nonthreatening encounters. This 
shortcoming is highlighted by noting that of 48 occasions on which the 
pilot did not maneuver only one occurred under these conditions. 
When the intruder was changing altitude the vertical response 
dimension was largely ignored accounting for the dominant response on only 
24% of such occasions. As in previous studies (Palmer et al. 1981, Ellis 
and Palmer 1982, Smith et al. 1982,1984) horizontal-toward were preferred 
to horizontal-away responses. Palmer et al. 1981 have attributed this 
tendency to the pilots' desire to maintain visual contact with the intruder 
while Ellis and Palmer (1982) have suggested they desire, instead, to 
minimize the time to resolution of the conflict by passing behind the 
intruder. Regardless of the motivation, this effect is found consistently 
in CI TI studies and should be considered in assessing the usefulness of 
such displays. Smith et al. shed additional light on this preference, 
finding that encounters rated as less threatening showed a stronger 
turning-toward tendency. Rules identified for the horizontal-toward 
response support this view showing a general preference for the 
hcrizontal-toward response while using predictor displays which allowed a 
clear view of conflict resolution but limiting the response to the more 
conservative recommended strategy when the display lacked predictors. 
As found in earlier studies (Smith et al., Palmer et al., Ellis and 
Palmer) large individual differences were noted among pilot's strategies. 
The most nearly universal decision was the choice of the vertical-away 
maneuver under conditions in which it unambiguously increased separation. 
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The rules identified suggest that vertical information may not be 
presented in the most useful manner. None of the nine selected rules 
contain any reference to this relation although it contributes as much to 
achieved separation and collision avoidance as the horizontal dimension. 
This neglect is further reflected in the pilots' overall preference for 
horizontal maneuvers. Smith et al. have suggested the preference for 
horizontal responses may be due to FAA regulations, comfort, safety or fuel 
conservation but the absence of vertical information from decision rules 
suggest the bias may more likely be due to the superior display of 
horizontal traffic information. 
The finding that pilots using predictive CDTI displays were more 
likely to proceed with conflict resolution by turning toward the intruder 
than following the recommended strategy reinforces concerns aired by Palmer 
et al. (1981), Lester and Quan (1983) and others that CDTI in some 
instances may actually make collisions more likely. Pilots, themselves, 
are not immune to this fear. The October 28, 1984 New York Times observes 
that, "The Airline Pilots Association has been especially insistent that 
the devices must ultimately be able to recommend a horizontal right turn or 
left turn maneuver in addition to a vertical maneuver." Earlier analysis of 
this data (Palmer 1983) indicates that the noiseless predictor display led 
to fewer positive CAS advisories and smaller maneuver magnitudes while the 
predictorless display resulted in smaller achieved separations and less 
frequent agreement with the recommended strategy. The present 
investigation suggests that the superiority in performance on the predictor 
displays results from improvements in execution rather than fundamental 
shifts in strategy. For one group of pilots, in fact, consistent violation 
of the recommended strategy was linked with the use of the noiseless 
predictor display. While the most widely employed strategy observed was 
the vertical away response to a constant altitude intruder, vertical 
responses were generally avoided under other conditions. Since projected 
altitudes at closest point of approach provide information unavailable from 
rapidly updating data tags, the failure to find a related consistency in 
pilots' responses suggests some difficulty in abstracting or using this 
more detailed altitude information as it is presented. 
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ABSTRACT 
This research addressed the feasibility of adapting an 
existing rule-based system as an online "coach" for controlling 
PLANT, a simulation of a generic process plant. KARL, a 
rule-based model capable of controlling PLANT, was adapted to 
provided three types of information to subjects: 1) situation 
assessment (i.e., which operational procedure, if any, was 
applicable for a given situation); 	2) guidance in following 
procedures 	(i.e., feedback whenever subjects' actions were 
inconsistent with available procedures); 3) performance feedback 
(based 	upon changes in the system's stability). 	Subjects 
-received this information online while controlling PLANT. 
Compared to subjects in an earlier experiment who controlled 
PLANT without the benefit of the coach, these subjects maintained 
a generally more stable system, scored higher on a 
paper-and-pencil test of system knowledge, and were more 
successful in diagnosing an unfamiliar failure of the PLANT 
safety system. Careful analysis of these results in light of 
previous research with PLANT indicated that the reasons for these 
differences were not as straightforward as they might appear. 
This experiment is viewed as illustrating potential benefits and 
subtleties of using a rule-based model as an online coach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As systems increase in complexity, the question of how 
persons should be trained to operate them becomes more important. 
The amount of training required for someone to become proficient 
at controlling a complex system may be quite extensive, and it is 
necessary to consider a number of issues when developing such a 
training program. These issues include the content and format of 
instructional material and the structure of the program. Because 
of inherent human limitations, it may also be necessary to 
consider provision of some kind of performance aid, in addition 
to appropriate training. 
Many reports are available which directly or indirectly 
address issues relevant to training (Morris & Rouse, 1984b). 
Some are directed at obtaining an understanding of how people 
solve problems, either in the laboratory or in contact with an 
actual system. Others investigate the effects of various 
training approaches upon performance. Often there is a 
discussion of the human's "mental model" of the system being 
controlled (Rouse & Morris, 1984). 
One study in particular served as a basis for the present 
research. 	Morris investigated the effects of different types of 
instruction upon subjects' ability 	to 	control 	PLANT, 	a 
computer-based simulation of a generic fluid production process 
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(Morris, 1983; Morris & Rouse, 1984a). 	The PLANT operator's 
task is to supervise the flow of fluid through a series of tanks 
interconnected by valves so as to maximize production. This may 
be done by opening and/or closing valves and adjusting input and 
output, via commands entered at the terminal keyboard. A number 
of failures may occur in PLANT, so there are several diagnostic 
and repair commands available as well. 
The primary comparison in Morris' research was between two 
different types of instruction: 1) operational procedures, and 
2) a description of dynamic principles and functional 
relationships in PLANT. Four groups of subjects were compared, 
distinguished on the basis of the combination of written 
instructional materials they received (i.e., principles, 
procedures, neither principles nor procedures, or both principles 
and procedures). Instruction was found to have no effect upon 
subjects' achievement of the overall goal of production, in that 
there were no differences between groups with respect to this 
measure. However, those groups receiving procedures were found 
to control the PLANT in a more stable manner, even though all 
groups had been told to maintain stability. 
An interesting aspect of this research was an investigation 
of subjects' ability to deal with two unfamiliar failures: a 
tank rupture, and failure of the PLANT safety system. (The 
failures were unfamiliar in that, although subjects knew they 
PAGE 4 
could occur, they had not experienced them before.) Almost all 
subjects repaired the tank rupture; however, only half of the 
subjects in each group successfully diagnosed the safety system 
failure. This was surprising, because subjects with an 
understanding of the functioning of the system (as described in 
the principles) should have been better able to make that 
diagnosis. 
As a result of these findings, it was suggested that one of 
the reasons a knowledge of principles failed to help many 
subjects deal with the unfamiliar failure was that those people 
did not realize that they were in an unusual situation, and thus 
did not realize that they should use their knowledge. In other 
words, they failed to make an accurate assessment of the 
situation. This notion was indirectly supported by the fact that 
those persons who did repair the unfamiliar safety system failure 
also maintained a more stable system in general; since the 
effect of the safety system failure was to make the PLANT appear 
more unstable, maintaining a stable system may have enabled 
subjects to detect the presence of an unusual situation more 
readily. 
Some useful insights into subjects' behavior were gained by 
comparing their performance to that of KARL (Knowledgeable 
Application of Rule-based Logic), a model capable of controlling 
PLANT (Knaeuper, 1983; Knaeuper & Rouse, 1984). KARL is a 
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rule-based model patterned after a general model of human problem 
solving proposed by Rouse (1983), which suggests that problem 
solving is accomplished in three stages: 1) recognition and 
classification, 2) planning, and 3) execution and monitoring. 
These three stages essentially define KARL's structure. When 
controlling PLANT, KARL accesses a knowledge base consisting 
basically of information contained in written information 
available 	to 	subjects 	(i.e., 	operational heuristics and 
procedures, and information about 	dynamic 	principles 	and 
functional relationships). 
When the performance of subjects and KARL was compared, it 
was noted that KARL consistently achieved higher production and 
maintained a more stable system than did subjects. It was also 
interesting to examine differences in the courses of action 
chosen by subjects and KARL in solving problems in PLANT. 
Basically, two rather systematic differences were found. First, 
the levels of system input and output chosen by subjects were not 
as high as those chosen by KARL (and suggested by procedures); 
subjects were more conservative in this respect. Second, KARL 
adjusted input and output much more frequently than did subjects; 
this reflected heuristics within KARL which were directed at 
maximizing production, which were not a part of operational 
procedures. 
Considering some of the apparent difficulties experienced by 
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subjects in making an accurate situation assessment and following 
procedures, and the benefits derived from using KARL as an 
off-line analysis tool, an idea emerged. Why not make it 
possible for KARL to analyze subjects' actions online and provide 
advice, thus functioning as an online "coach"? It seemed that 
such an approach could prove to be useful for both training and 
aiding.* 
DESCRIPTION OF THE COACH 
In light of the factors noted above, the decision was made 
to provide subjects with three types of information. In the 
context of PLANT, this information was displayed on the terminal 
near the area where normal operating messages were displayed. 
-The first type of information was related to situation 
assessment. Specifically, a message informing the subject which 
procedure was currently applicable was shown (e.g., "Procedure 
5"). If no procedure applied, the following message was 
displayed: "No procedure applicable; Normal tuning". 
Subjects also received guidance in following procedures. 
KARL monitored subjects' actions, and provided feedback if a 
given action was inconsistent with the applicable procedure. For 
* Of course, one could view this approach as simply a 
special case of "expert systems". This issue is discussed later 
in this paper. 
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example, the following message might appear: 	"Your action 
(cva,e)* is inconsistent with Procedure 5. Keep all valves open , 
until the system is stable again. Type 'y' for change." As may 
be ascertained from the last portion of the message, subjects had 
the option of overriding KARL or changing their actions to be 
consistent with KARL's recommendations. 
The third type of information supplied by KARL was 
performance feedback, or information about the degree to which 
subjects' actions were succeeding in remedying problems in the 
system. This information was supplied because of the length of 
time required for the consequences of actions to become manifest. 
These messages were based upon changes in PLANT stability over a 
period of 10 time units, and consisted of the following: 
"Instability extreme", "Instability excessive", or "Instability 
improving". 
The process of enabling KARL to supply such messages was 
relatively straightforward. However, when an attempt was made to 
control PLANT with KARL as an assistant, a number of problems 
became apparent. 	For example, KARL's advice as to what actions 
should be taken was not always consistent with procedures. 	This 
could be attributed to the nature of KARL's approach to PLANT. 
cva,e = close the valve between tanks a and e 
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Although the information in the procedures was contained in 
KARL's knowledge base, KARL also employed several heuristics when 
controlling PLANT, which occasionally preempted the action 
recommended in procedures. 
Another problem was related to KARL's situation assessment. 
During the course of PLANT operation, situations would 
occasionally arise which were "borderline" conditions with 
respect to the applicability of various procedures. KARL's 
decisions as to which procedure applied were based upon fixed 
values of state variables. In borderline situations, normal 
fluctuations of these state variables caused KARL to change the 
situation assessment message rather frequently (e.g., every other 
time unit). 
A third source of difficulty was KARL's "persistence" in 
reporting actions which were inconsistent with procedures. The 
PLANT operator was given the option of overriding KARL and 
implementing an action against KARL's recommendations. However, 
the consequence of thus failing to conform was to receive another 
message. KARL did not know how to concede; in short, KARL was a 
nag. 
These problems were remedied in two general ways. First, it 
was necessary to inhibit the display of all messages which were 
not procedure7oriented. Second, thresholds for prompts were 
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incorporated. 	For example, if a subject failed to comply with 
one of KARL's suggestions, KARL did not make the same suggestion,  
again for five time units. As another example, "hysteresis" was 
introduced into the situation assessment thresholds to avoid the 
aforementioned problem of borderline conditions. 
An experiment was conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of 
KARL as an assistant. Two general issues were of interest: 
1) the feasibility of adapting a rule-based system (which was not 
originally designed as an aid) to support human problem solving, 
and 2) the effects of an online coach upon humans' performance. 
METHOD 
Subiects 
Junior and senior undergraduates at Georgia Institute of 
Technology served as paid volunteer subjects. All eight of them 
were majors in industrial and systems engineering, and had 
completed courses in physics, dynamics, calculus, and 
differential equations. 
Experimental Procedure  
The experimental procedure in this experiment was almost 
identical to that used in the research described earlier (Morris, 
1983; Morris & Rouse, 1984a). Training provided to subjects in 
this experiment was equal to the group receiving instruction in 
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both principles and procedures in the earlier experiment, with 
the exception that aiding was available. 
Subjects served in a total of 13 sessions each, with the 
average length of each session being approximately 60 to 75 
minutes. Generally, training was accomplished during the first 
eight sessions, in which subjects read instructional materials 
and practiced controlling PLANT. A discussion of principles 
governing PLANT was provided during session 3, and operational 
procedures were made available for the first time in session 5. 
KARL was used as an online coach during sessions 5-8, and 
supplied the three types of aiding information described earlier. 
Sessions 9-13 were considered experimental sessions, in that 
no further instruction was provided by the experimenter, and no 
questions from subjects were answered. As with the earlier 
experiment, unfamiliar situations (i.e., a tank rupture and a 
safety system failure) were introduced in sessions 10 and 12, 
which were counterbalanced across subjects. The coach did not 
provide guidance in following procedures during sessions 9-12; 
subjects received only information related to situation 
assessment and overall performance feedback. No information from 
the coach was available during session 13. At the end of session 
13, subjects completed a paper-and-pencil test of knowledge about 




In order to assess the effects of aiding, the performance of 
subjects in this experiment was compared via analysis of variance 
to performance of the group receiving both principles and 
procedures in the earlier PLANT research. (In the following 
presentation, these groups are referred to as the aided and 
unaided group, respectively.) Thus, performance measures were 
used as dependent variables in two-way analyses with one 
between-subjects factor (aiding) and one within-subjects factor 
(session). 
As with the earlier research, the experimental manipulation 
had no significant effect upon total production achieved, 
although the mean for the aided group was slightly higher (344.6 
vs. 320.2 units of production per time unit). There was also no 
significant effect of aiding on the number of automatic valve 
trips experienced (an indication of PLANT stability). However, 
as with total production, the mean for the aided group was 
slightly better (i.e., lower) (0.497 vs. 0.605 trips per time 
unit). 
Aiding also failed to have a significant effect upon another 
measure of PLANT stability: variance of fluid levels in the 
system. Once again, the trend was in the expected direction, in 
that the mean for the aided group was lower (12.44 vs. 15.27). 
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Two performance measures were significantly affected by 
aiding. Aided subjects kept a higher percentage of valves open 
(92% vs. 87%, 2 < .04), and generally maintained a higher level 
of input into the system (116.8 vs. 106.9 units per time unit, 
2 < .04). The practical significance of these results is 
presented later. 
Assessing 	subjects' 	performance 	during 	unfamiliar 
situations, there was no effect of aiding upon subjects' repair 
of the tank rupture (15 of the 16 subjects did so). However, it 
was found that seven out of eight subjects in the aided group 
repaired the unfamiliar failure of the PLANT safety system, 
whereas only three of the eight unaided subjects found that 
failure. This difference in proportions was found to be 
statistically significant (2 < .04). 
Differences in scores on the test of PLANT knowledge were 
examined. Although overall scores did not differ significantly, 
it was found that the aided group scored significantly higher on 
the section of the test related to dynamic principles (83% vs. 
69%, 2 < .05). 
Finally, the actions selected by subjects were compared to 
actions which would have been selected by KARL in the same 
situation. This comparison was similar to that reported for the 
earlier experiment (Knaeuper, 1983; Knaeuper & Rouse, 1984). 
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There was no significant difference in the degree to which 
actions chosen by aided and unaided subjects agreed with those 
selected by KARL. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
As noted in the introduction, this research was prompted by 
two issues: 1) the feasibility of adapting a rule-based model as 
an online coach, and 2) the effects of such asistance upon 
subjects , ability to control PLANT. With regard to the second 
issue, none of the statistically significant effects the coach 
had upon subjects' performance were related to primary 
performance measures. Although mean performance for the aided 
group was better with all measures, the only significant effects 
-of aiding were upon the secondary performance measures of number 
of open valves and level of system input. 	These measures 
indicate that subjects did what they were told to do. 	Although 
all subjects (in this research and in the earlier experiment) 
were instructed to keep all valves open and maintain a relatively 
high level of input and output, apparently the coach's presence 
caused them to follow these instructions more closely. 
Whereas it is fairly easy to provide an explanation for 
subjects' following instructions more closely, explaining why 
more subjects in the aided group were able to diagnose the safety 
system failure is not as straightforward. Three possibilities 
are suggested by the data. First, since failure of the safety 
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system resulted in automatic closing of valves at random, the 
ability to maintain more valves open in general may have assisted 
subjects in detecting the presence of an unusual situation. Once 
detected, it should have been easy to determine that the cause of 
the unusual situation was failure of the safety system, since 
only two unusual failures were possible. 
Judging from the available evidence, however, 	it 	is 
difficult to imagine that this is a sufficient account of what 
happened. A look at the performance of all subjects supplied 
with procedures in the earlier experiment conducted by Morris 
(i.e., those with procedures only, and those with both procedures 
and principles) reveals that there was no difference in the 
number of valves kept open by persons who repaired the safety 
system and those who did not (89% vs. 88%). Additionally, a 
subsequent examination of logs kept by the unaided group during 
the time the safety system had failed indicated that at least six 
of the eight people felt that something was wrong; yet, only 
three of these successfully diagnosed the failure, and the others 
attributed the problem to deficiencies in their control actions. 
Another possible explanation may be found in the fact that 
the aided group scored significantly higher on the test of 
information related to dynamic principles. Perhaps an increased 
knowledge of the functioning of the system enabled the aided 
group to diagnose the unfamiliar failure. This explanation also 
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seems inadequate. There was no difference in the test scores of 
unaided subjects who repaired the safety system and those who did 
not (69.3% vs. 69.2%). 
The third explanation for aided subjects , success 	in 
diagnosing the failure of the safety system is that somehow 
providing them with the coach made the difference. 	During the 
session in which the safety system failed, two types of aiding 
messages were provided: 	situation assessment and performance 
feedback. 	The situation assessment consisted of informing 
subjects which procedure, if any, applied. 	There were no 
messages such as "unfamiliar situation". Performance feedback 
was related to changes in the stability of the system. When the 
safety system failed, it is possible that subjects received 
conflicting messages, such as "No procedure applicable" and 
"Instability extreme". Apparent conflict such as this may have 
served as a cue that something was wrong, and could have 
suggested to subjects that the problems in the system were not 
the result of poor control actions. 
These ideas about the role of the coach in the unfamiliar 
situation are purely conjecture at this point. It seems likely 
that a combination of all of these factors (i.e., increased 
system stability, knowledge of the functioning of the system, and 
assistance in situation assessment) contributed to subjects' 
success. An understanding of factors affecting the human's 
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ability to deal with an unfamiliar event could have important 
theoretical and practical implications, and further investigation 
of this issue is warranted. 
Finally, another question arises with regard to the results 
of this research: Why did aided subjects score higher on the 
test of dynamic principles? Since the primary difference in the 
way the two groups were treated was the presence or absence of 
the online coach, it would appear that this was the reason for 
the difference in the test scores. This is counterintuitive, 
however, because the focus of the aiding was on following 
procedures, and not on understanding the functioning of the 
system. Therefore, interpretation of this result must be delayed 
until the research can be replicated, using a larger number of 
subjects and controlling for potential differences in abilities. 
Considering the feasibility of adapting a rule-based model 
as an online coach, this research has served to emphasize the 
complexities and subtleties of model-based online aiding and 
training. As noted by other researchers (Clancey & Lestinger, 
1982; Jackson & Lefrere, 1984), answering the questions of what 
advice and feedback to provide, as well as when they should be 
provided, is far from straightforward. This point is 
particularly 	supported by the results reported here where 
subjects benefited along several dimensions by having an online 
coach, but did not become more like the coach in the process 
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(i.e., there was no increase in agreement between the subjects' 
and model's choices of actions). Thus, the results of being 
coached can be more than, or at least other than, simply gaining 
the coach's expertise. This has profound implications for the 
current view of "expert systems" as a panacea for training and 
aiding. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This report covers progress during two six-month reporting periods: 
1) August 1984 - February 1984, 2) March 1985 - July 1985. During these 
periods substantial progress has been made in three areas. 
In the rule-based modeling area, Mike Lewis' Ph.D. work is nearing 
completion. This report includes two papers related to identification 
and significance testing of rule-based models, and a third paper on an 
application to CDTI data. 
In the area of operator aiding, Wan Yoon's Ph.D. research is 
focusing on aiding operators in novel failure situations. Chris Mitchell 
has developed a discrete control modeling approach to aiding PLANT 
operators. Finally, Bill Rouse and Nancy Morris have developed a set of 
guidelines for implementing automation. 
The third area of progress is the flight simulator hardware and 
software. While this development effort has taken much more time than 
originally envisioned, the hardware will be complete within two months 
and initial simulation software will then be integrated and tested. 
SIGNIFICANCE TESTING OF RULE-BASED MODELS 
The appended article by Lewis and Hammer describes how to test the 
significance of rules in rule-based models. The danger in rule-based 
model building is that the overall model may fit the data well but that 
individual rules may not contribute to this fit. The article explains 
several relatively easy methods for testing rule fit. 
IDENTIFICATION OF RULE-BASED MODELS 
The Human Factors and IEEE SMC conference papers on rule 
identification included with this report recapitulate much of the work in 
the re-analysis of CDTI data (Palmer 1983] contained in our last report. 
Attention over the interim has largely focused on significance testing in 
the identification process. The SMC paper concentrates on methodological 
difficulties inherent in employing logical generalization and points out 
some of the strengths of alternate approaches. 
The possibility of developing significance tests for logical 
generalization remains a paramount advantage over the top-down 
approaches. The Monte Carlo procedure described in the SMC and Human 
Factors papers proved effective but inefficient. Running in the 
background at low priority it has taken about 10 minutes per iteration. 
One thousand iterations are used. The working paper on representation 
describes well formed formulas in VL1 which might be used in deriving a 
closed form significance test. If attainable it would avoid the 
inefficiencies of repeated search by generating counts of rules 
directly. 
The primary effort in rule identification is now being directed 
toward the PLANT [Morris 1983] data. Preliminary identification of rules 
has indicated a lack of stationarity associated with shifts in operator 
goals and phases of operation. This result is not unexpected as task 
constraints led KARL [Knaeuper 1983], a production system model of the 
operator, to employ explicit state->state rules to achieve such 
transitions. 
Since these shifts are unobservable, state vectors will be augmented 
with an oracle variable encoding shifts KARL "would have made". Shifts 
in phase dictated by a discrete control model of PLANT (Mitchell 1984) 
will also be employed in a parallel effort. 
AIDING THE OPERATOR DURING NOVEL FAULT DIAGNOSIS 
An aid containing a qualitative device model and designed to 
counteract human decision-making biases is being investigated. This aid 
is designed to be used during novel failures, which are defined as 
failures that are not covered by the operator's training or procedures. 
The remainder of this section covers the qualitative model, decision 
aiding, and the applicability of the aid. Further details are in an 
appended paper. 
A qualitative model [deKleer and Brown, Davis, Forbus] represents a 
physical device as a network of components and connections. Each 
component and connection can have several discrete states. The behavior 
of a component (in terms of connection flows such as current) is governed 
by rules. Component state transition is also governed by transition 
rules. A solution to a diagnostic problem is an assignment of states to 
components and connections that explains the observed symptoms and obeys 
physics as described by the rules. The qualitative model is included in 
the aid to assist the human in reasoning about the physical device. , 
The aid also is designed to counteract some human decision making 
biases. This aiding takes a number of forms. Working memory is 
augmented with the display of hypotheses and data. The human tendency to 
forget or overlook is counteracted by the aid's mechanistic reasoning. 
Applicability  
The applicability of the kind of aid is whenever a novel failure 
occurs. In commercial aviation, such failures are relatively rare. They 
would seem to be more common in process control and space flight. The 
most applicable area would seem to be commercial space loads. Because 
most of these are one shot, non-life threatening tasks, the operator's 
training will be limited than on the operation of spacecraft itself. The 
economic consequences are high for an improperly diagnosed payload 
problem. 
A DISCRETE CONTROL MODEL OF PLANT 
The appended working paper by Chris Mitchell develops a discrete 
control model of the PLANT process control simulation and discusses the 
potential use of the model as a basis for a new human-computer interface 
for PLANT. 
GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING AUTOMATION 
The appended paper by Bill Rouse and Nancy Morris summarizes recent 
efforts to understand how people perceive automation and the influence of 
these perceptions on acceptance of automation. A set of eight guidelines 
are proposed as a possible means of enhancing acceptance. 
FLIGHT SIMULATOR HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE 
The hardware is scheduled for completion by September 15, 1985. The 
following have been completed. 
1. Wiring to the sensors 
2. Pedestal has been reinstalled. 
3. Keyboards are mounted in the pedestal. 
4. The CRT's have all been tested and mounted. 
5. A force feel system with trim for the elevators was designed 
and installed. 
Progress on the software is as follows. 
1. An engine display program has been completed. 
2. A very simple flight instrument display has been completed. 
3. The existing simulation has been revised to run under UNIX. 
The hardware changes that remain are: 
1. Cooling fans must be installed for the CRT's. 
2. The glare shield must be installed. 
3. Some metal panels must be added to shroud CRT's and otherwise 
close up the cockpit. 
The software that remains to be done can be categorized as follows. 
1. Modifying the simulation to accept inputs from the A/D 
converter. 
2. Modifying the simulation program to drive different, multiple 
displays for the instruments. 
3. Integration - simply making sure that everything is connected 
and works the way it is supposed to. 
The completion of the above will demonstrate that the simulator will 
work. 
The simulator has come along at a much slower rate than anticipated. 
We did not initially realize the complexity of the project. As 
compensation, the final cost of the simulator will be a small fraction of 
the cost of a new one. 
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ABSTRACT 
Rule identification is proposed as an alternative to parameter. 
estimation in the analysis of human performance data. The relation 
between the choice of language and identifiable consistencies is 
discussed. Advantages of production system models for the description of 
complex human behaviors are examined. Threats to validity posed by the 
use of flexible languages in data analysis are examined. Contrivedness, 
defined by Eilbert anti Christensen (1982) as, "..the tendency of a search 
procedure to uncover apparent patterns where none exist", is advanced as 
the major inferential hazard to rule identification. A Monte Carlo 
significance testing procedure to deal with this threat is proposed. 
Nonparametric measures of relation, tau-b and PRE, are presented as 
appropriate performance measures for rule-based models. A rule-based 
analysis of data from an experiment (Palmer, 1983) involving pilot 
decisions in air traffic conflicts is presented. Identified rules 
indicate satisficing with respect to the secondary goal of maintaining a 
constant course. Reduction in dimensionality of utilized information led 
to errors or a subgroup of pilots. 
INTRODUCTION 
Suppose an experiment were conducted in a cooking class. Students 
have been observed preparing a hollandaise sauce. 	Measurements on 
interval scales are available of ingredients, cooking times, 	and 
temperatures. 	A reliable gourmet has rated each student's sauce. Could 
a regression equation or discriminant 	function 	provide 	adequate 
information to judge a future hollandaise? No cook would consider 
compensating for a shortage of eggs by adding extra salt yet this is 
exactly the remedy such models would suggest. An expression which 
specified allowable ranges for ingredients, temperatures, and cooking 
times would fare better. 
Such 	data are fairly common. 	Crystal formation, catalytic 
reactions, and disease diagnosis all appear to depend more on the 
synthesis of values than the sum of their individual effects. These 
types of relations are frequently encountered in human behavior. In 
problem solving a subject commonly has a variety of available actions. 
His task lies in choosing a sequence consonant with some goal. The 
salience of variables will often depend on their context. For example, 
functioning headlights may be a useful cue in diagnosing an electrical 
fault yet be irrelevant to fixing a flat tire. This dependence on 
context and qualitative differences among responses are hallmarks of data 
in which the coincidence of values dominates their individual 
contributions. 
Language and Deuription  
Formal description of regularities in data hinges on the choice of 
language. The validity of generalizations depends on the ability of the 
chosen language to describe the consistencies present in the data. 
Languages consist of primitive elements such as attributes, connectives, 
and operators and a syntax which prescribes the ways in which they may be 
combined to obtain meaningful statements. The general linear model (GLM) 
which includes multiple regression, ANOVA, and discriminant analysis is 
the language of choice in the description of human performance. It has 
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strong advantages in statistical inference and a ubiquity of description, 
yet the rigidity of its syntax renders it incapable of expressing many of 
the observable consistencies in human behavior. In essence GLM allows_ 
but a single statement: 
Y = BO + Blxl +..B12x1x2..+ e' - 
While well suited to describing data which fits this mold (e.g., stimulus 
intensity and reaction time), it becomes nonsensical when turned toward 
domains such as problem solving or process control. In these more 
complex domains studied in man-machine interactions, an adequate 
description must capture both the complexity of the environment and the 
heterogeneity of responses within a common representation. 
Production Systems 
A representation gaining currency for describing complex human 
behavior is the production system. Production systems models have 
enjoyed success in domains as varied as: crypto arithmetic, logic, and 
games (Newell and Simon, 1972), air traffic control (Wesson, 1977), fault 
diagnosis (Hunt and Rouse, 1984), and others. In its simplest form a 
production system is a set of statements assigning values. Production 
rules consist of two parts: the condition and the action. When values 
in the domain of the production system satisfy the conditions of a rule, 
the rule is "fired" and its action taken. 
This ability to accommodate assignments (responses) of arbitrary 
form makes production systems particularly attractive descriptions for 
complex behaviors. 
Rule Identification 
Unfortunately there has been no purely objective way to identify 
rules from data. As in the pioneering problem solving work of Newell- and 
Simon (1972), analysts have been forced to rely on their own powers of 
pattern recognition to frame rules consistent with their data. 
Previous work identifying rules from data has largely been 
restricted to expert systems. The most venerable of these efforts, 
METADENDRAL (Mitchell, 1977), supplied cleavage rules to DENDRAL, an 
expert system in the area of mass spectroscopy. Michalski (1980) 
employed GEM, a program based on the Aq algorithm (used in this study), 
to find rules for the diagnosis of soybean diseases that outperformed an 
expert system built in the customary manner. 
Such efforts, however, have employed rule identification as an 
adjunct to subjective identification and placed primary emphasis on their 
models rather than their data. As a technique for data analysis, rule 
identification has remained largely unexploited. 	In the present study 
the propositional 	logic module (Aq algorithm) of a machine learning 
program, INDUCE 3 (Michalski, 1982), was used to identify rules embodying 
consistencies among conditions defining aircraft encounters and 
corresponding pilot maneuvers. 
The 	Aq algorithm identifies rules in the VL1 	language, a 
simplified propositional 	logic. 	VL1 	contains 	only 	single 	place 
predicates and allows only one predicate per class of predicates to be 
true in a particular statement. 	Disjunction is only allowed within 
classes of predicates. For example, if color of bird is a predicate 
class, then black(bird) V blue(bird) is an allowable phrase. Conjunction 
is only allowed between classes of predicates. For example, if type of 
bird is another predicate, then blackbird) & is-raven(bird) is an 
allowable phrase. 
For notational convenience, Michalski (1982) defines a new entity, 
a selector, to describe classes of predicates. 	A selector names the 
predicate class and lists the predicates involved in a disjunction. 
Example: 	[color-bird=black V blue]. 
Redefined in terms of selectors, VL1 allows only conjunctions of 
selectors. Since generalization on the preconditions is performed to 
discriminate among actions, the relationship between precondition and 
action is represented as implication, ->. An example of a statement in 
VL1 is: 
[x 1=a V b] & [x2=d V e]-> F 
This rule says that if the predicate evaluating true for class xi is a or 
b and class x2 is d or e, then F(observation) is true. 	In terms of data 
consisting of stimuli and responses, VL1 	rules identify 	stimulus 
conditions under which particular responses have consistently occurred. 
Significance Testing  
A nonparametric analogue to the coefficient of determination, 
tau-b (Margolin and Light, 1971), was used to determine the percentage of 
variance in the actions explained by rules and rule sets. Individual 
rules and the disjunction of rules issuing a particular action were 
evaluated in this way. 
A similar statistic, PRE (proportional reduction in error) (Bishop 
et al., 1975), measuring the reduction in error achieved by predicting 
actions based on the rules rather than assigning the modal action under 
all rules, is also reported. While inapplicable to rules assigning the 
modal action, PRE has the advantage of being directly interpretable as 
the gain in predictability attributable to a rule(s). 
Rule identification has been introduced as a process of obtaining 
consistent generalizations from data. To stop here as machine learning 
programs do, amounts to little more than fitting a "form gauge" to the 
data. Inductive inference requires both a consistent description and 
some measure of confidence that the description embodies actual relations 
rather than idiosyncrasies of the data/identification method. The 
syntactic rigidity of GLM reduces this problem to estimating sampling 
error. Even here, when misapplied as in the case of regressions drawing 
upon large numbers of variables (Forsythe et al., 1973), opportunism in 
sampling from a space of descriptions may result in unwarranted 
inferences. 
For logical induction the hazards are reversed. The number of 
consistent statements which can be made about a set of observations is 
much greater than the number of observations. As a consequence. 
expressions of confidence should explicitly consider sampling in a space 
of descriptions. Eilbert and Christensen (1982) refer to this problem as 
contrivedness, "...the tendency of a search procedure to uncover apparent 
patterns where none exist." 
A logical benchmark to gauge our confidence, is the situation in 
which there is no relation between the conditions of a .rule and the 
associated response. 	If this were true, then any pairing of observed 
conditions and responses would be equally likely. 	A distribution 
corresponding to this benchmark can be obtained by considering all 
permutations of responses with respect to the conditions. The relative 
frequency of permutations in which rules of equal or greater "quality" 
are identified provides a measure of the unlikeliness (significance) of 
identifying rules of the "quality" obtained under a null hypothesis of no 
relation. 
All rules presented in this paper were significant, p<.01, using 
the conventional G-square approximation of chi-square associated with the 
tau-b statistic. When tested using an experimental 500 permutation Monte 
Carlo procedure based on controlling contrivedness, only the rules for 
the vertical-away response were found significant at conventional (p<.05) 
levels. Additional methods of significance testing for rules and 
rule-based models are discussed in Lewis and Hammer (in press). 
CDTI DATA ANALYSIS 
Data from an experiment by Palmer (1983) investigating the effects 
of information quality and intruder characteristics in the use of a 
cockpit display of traffic information instrument (CDT() has been 
reanalyzed using rule identification techniques. 
In this experiment sixteen pilots "flew" sixteen programmed 
encounters under three display conditions. Pilots were instructed to 
maintain a steady course, using the autopilot unless they received a 
threat advisory. In response to the threat they were to maneuver to 
maintain a horizontal separation of greater than 1.5 nm and a vertical 
separation in excess of 500 ft. They were advised that an appropriate 
strategy was to maneuver so that the intruder would pass further away but 
in the same orientation at the point of closest approach. 
In the least informative condition, the display portrayed the 
relative positions of the ownship and the intruder along with tags 
showing their altitudes. The predictive display provided ground 
referenced predictors showing predicted positions of the ownship and 
intruder as well as a tag showing the intruder's projected altitude at 
time of closest approach. In the third condition, noise was introduced 
into the predictive display 
Explanatory Variables  
In this analysis encounter variables, describing the physical 
relationship between the intruder and ownship which the pilot is 
instructed to control, were differentiated from experimental variables. 
Five encounter variables were used. Four describe the relative positions 
of the aircraft at their point of closest approach as projected at time 
of alarm. The fifth measure, intruder vertical velocity, remains 
constant throughout the encounter. 
Two non-encounter variables were considered, display type and 
pilot. 	Display type in conjunction with the encounter 	variables 
describes the stimuli under which a decision is made. 	Inclusion of pilot 
identification in the generalization introduces individual differences. 
Response Measures  
Pilots' responses were represented in terms of maneuvers toward or 
away from the intruder along a dominant axis. The dominant axis was 
determined by comparing the ratio of the horizontal and vertical 
magnitudes of a maneuver to the respective tolerances which the pilots 
had been instructed to maintain. Five response classes result: 1) no 
action, 2) 	vertical-toward, 3) vertical-away, 4) horizontal-toward, and 
5) horizontal-away. 
Results  
A set of 9 rules were selected from the generalizations. 	The 
selected rule set covers 44% of the sampled event space with 143 correct 
matches and 24 errors yielding PRE=.77 and tau-b=.61. 
Two rules describe conditions for taking no action, three for 
turning vertically away, and four for turning horizontally toward. 
Turning vertically toward the intruder occurred very rarely (12 out of 
384 encounters) and so was not modeled. The horizontal away response 
accounting for 70 of the 384 encounters was also not represented. 
Although 73% of these occurrences are successfully described by a set of 
29 horizontal-away rules with only 21 errors, these rules have uniformly 
small coverage and low overlap. Over half of the horizontal-away rules 
were restricted to groups of five or fewer pilots indicating the 
idiosyncratic (or coincidental) nature of this response choice. The 
following tables summarize the performance of the selected rule set. 
Rule Performance Summary 
Act 	Hit Fa T-b Pre 
NA 22 7 .07 .09 
NA 18 6 .05 .07 
H-T 14 0 .03 .06 
H-T 19 6 .03 .07 
H-T 15 0 .04 .06 
H-T 9 0 .02 .04 
V-A 43 3 .09 
V-A 27 1 .06 
V-A 27 5 .05 
Table 1 
Performance Summary by Control Action 
Act Hit Fa T-b 	Pre 
NA 35 11 .11 .14 
H-T 46 6 .10 .18 
V-A 62 7 .12 
Table 2 
Discussion 
Within the range of encounters examined, the vertical movement of 
the intruder appears the most crucial factor in determining the pilot's 
dominant response. Under conditions in which the intruder approached at 
a constant altitude, pilots under all displays, with few individual 
differences, and with little regard to the degree of threat, maneuvered 
vertically away. This strategy follows the principle of least effort in 
limiting the decision to a .single dimension (vertical velocity) and 
producing a response which increases separation at point of closest 
approach under all conditions. While ensuring success at the pilots' 
primary task of avoidance, this strategy may run counter to the secondary 
task of maintaining course in the face of nonthreatening encounters. 
This shortcoming is highlighted by noting that of 48 occasions on which 
the pilot did not maneuver, only one occurred under these conditions. 
When the intruder was changing altitude the vertical response 
dimension was largely ignored accounting for the dominant response on 
only 24% of such occasions. As in previous studies (Palmer et al., 1981; 
Ellis and Palmer, 1982; Smith et al., 1984) horizontal-toward were 
preferred to horizontal -away responses. Palmer et al. (1981) have 
attributed this tendency to the pilots' desire to maintain visual contact 
with the intruder. Ellis and Palmer (1982) have suggested that the 
pilots desire, instead, to minimize the time to resolution of the 
conflict by passing behind the intruder. Regardless of the motivation, 
this effect is found consistently in CDT! studies and should be taken 
into consideration in assessing the usefulness of such displays. Smith 
et al. (1984) shed additional light on this preference, finding that 
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encounters rated as less threatening showed a stronger turning-toward 
tendency. Rules identified for the horizontal-toward response support 
this view showing a general preference for the horizontal-toward response. 
while using predictor displays which allowed a clear view of conflict 
resolution but limiting the response to the more conservative recommended 
strategy when the display lacked predictors. 
As found in earlier studies (Smith et al., 1984; Palmer et al., 
1981; Ellis and Palmer, 1982), large individual differences were noted 
among pilots' strategies. The most nearly universal decision was the 
choice of the vertical-away maneuver under conditions in which it 
unambiguously increased separation. 
The identified rules suggest that vertical information may not be 
presented in the most useful manner. None of the nine selected rules 
contain any reference to this relation although it contributes as much to 
achieved separation and collision avoidance as the horizontal dimension. 
This neglect is further reflected in the pilots' overall preference for 
horizontal maneuvers. Smith et al. (1984) have suggested that the 
preference for horizontal responses may be due to FAA regulations, 
comfort, safety or fuel conservation. The absence of vertical 
information from decision rules, however, suggests that the bias may more 
likely be due to the superior display of horizontal traffic information.' 
The finding that pilots using predictive CDTI displays were more 
likely to proceed with conflict resolution by turning toward the intruder 
than following the recommended strategy reinforces concerns aired by 
Palmer et al. 	(1981), Lester and Quan (1983) and others that CDTI in 
some instances may actually make collisions more likely. 	Pilots 
themselves are not immune to this fear. The October 28, 1984 New York 
Times observes that, "The Airline Pilots Association has been especially 
insistent that the devices must ultimately be able to recommend a 
horizontal right turn or left turn maneuver in addition to a vertical 
maneuver." 
Earlier analysis of this data (Palmer, 1983) indicates that the 
noiseless predictor display led to fewer positive CAS advisories and 
smaller maneuver magnitudes white the predictorless display resulted in 
smaller achieved separations and less frequent agreement with the 
recommended strategy. The present investigation suggests that the 
superiority in performance on the predictor displays results from 
improvements in execution rather than fundamental shifts in strategy. 
For one group of pilots, in fact, consistent violation of the recommended 
strategy was linked with the use of the noiseless predictor display. 
While the most widely employed strategy observed was the vertical-away 
response to a constant altitude intruder, vertical responses were 
generally avoided under other conditions. Since projected altitudes at 
closest point of approach provide information unavailable from rapidly 
updating data tags, the failure to find a related consistency in pilots' 
responses suggests some difficulty in abstracting or using this more 
detailed altitude information as it is presented. 
A general picture of encounter resolution as a decision sequence 
emerges from this data (as illustrated in Figure 0-1): 
1 - If the intruder is approaching at a constant altitude, a 
vertical - away response is chosen. This decision requires 
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minimal effort since it will always agree with 	the 
instructions to increase separation in the same orientation 
as would have occurred in the absence of a maneuver. 
2- A subgroup of pilots chose not to maneuver in non 
threatening encounters in accordance with their second 
instruction 	of 	maintaining a constant course. 	This 
decision comes second since it was restricted to encounters 
in which the constant altitude condition was not met. 
3- A second subgroup of pilots chose a horizontal-toward 
response for horizontally near intruders in conflict with 
separation instructions for intruders which would have 
passed behind. 
The horizontal-toward decision for pilots as a whole 
introduced the additional stipulation that the intruder 
would pass in front bringing the decision into agreement 
with instructions. 
PILOT DECISION SEQUENCE 
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\/ 
/\ 	Intruder changing 
/ \ altitude 





/ \ threatening 
\ / 	  
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II 
/\ Intruder too close 
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In this sequence we see satisficing by pilots choosing the 
simplest stratagem (turning away from a constant altitude intruder) when 
possible before considering the potential threat of the intruder. In the . 
incorrect variant of the horizontal-toward response, a subset of pilots 
simplified their choice by considering proximity information only, 
ignoring the more complicated encounter geometry. 
SUMMARY 
This paper illustrates some of the advantages to be gained through 
the use of more flexible languages in the analysis of human performance 
data. The focus of rules on the conditions under which behavior occurs, 
allows an analyst to pinpoint sources of error directly. The ability of 
rules to describe behavior itself, rather than derivative measures makes 
the analysis interpretable in terms of the task rather than abstractions 
such as effects or interactions. In activities such as reliability 
analysis, rule identification offers a means for determining the most 
likely operator actions under conditions of interest. With t!.= emergence 
of technologies placing logical and algebraic expressions on a more equal 
footing, the human factors community can be expected to put these new 
tools to good use. 
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Abstract  
The relationship between language and empirical fitting of data is 
discussed. 	The production system is presented as an 	appropriate 
description of human behavior in Man-Machine systems. 	Issues arising in 
the identification of rules from data are examined. Rules identified 
through 	logical generalization are shown to be equivocal. Difficulties 
arising from the use of logic-based procedures with human perfomance data 
containing errors are explored. Problems relating to rule sets which are 
not_disjoint are discussed and a solution presented. Significant testing 
issues are raised for rule identification and a procedure based on 
controlling contrivedness is presented. A synthesis of data and 
knowledge-based approaches is suggested as a remedy to many of the 
difficulties discussed. 
Introduction  
Suppose an experiment were conducted in a cooking class. Students 
have been observed preparing a hollandaise sauce. 	Measurements on 
interval 	scales are available of 	ingredients, cooking times, 	and 
temperatures. 	A reliable gourmet has rated each student's sauce. Could 
a regression equation or discriminant 	function 	provide 	adequate 
information to judge a future hollandaise? 	No cook would consider 
compensating for a shortage of eggs by adding extra salt yet this is 
exactly the remedy such models would suggest. 	An expression which 
specified allowable ranges for ingredients, 	temperatures, and cooking 
times 	would fare better. 	Such data are fairly common. 	Crystal 
formation, catalytic reactions, and disease diagnosis all appear to 
depend more on the synthesis of values than the sum of their individual 
effects. These types of relations are frequently encountered in human 
behavior. In problem solving a subject commonly has a variety of 
available actions. His task lies in choosing a sequence consonant with 
some goal. The salience of variables will often depend on their context. 
For example, functioning headlights may be a useful cue in diagnosing an 
electrical fault yet be irrelevant to fixing a flat tire. This 
dependence on context and qualitative differences among responses are 
hallmarks of data in which the coincidence of yalues dominates their 
individual contributions. 
Language and Description 
Formal description of regularities in data hinges on the choice of 
language. The fidelity of generalizations depends on the ability -f the 
chosen language to describe the consistencies present in the data. 
Languages consist of primitive elements such as attributes, connectives, 
and operators and a syntax which prescribes the ways in which they may be 
combined to obtain meaningful statements. 
Characteristics of formal descriptions often go unacknowledged in 
the study of human performance. To illustrate the strengths and 
weaknesses of formal descriptions, a mock experiment was simulated in 
which multiple linear regression was used to describe the behavior of 
falling bodies. Data with 5 replications per cell were generated for a 
one-gram ping pong ball and a ten-gram rubber ball dropped from distances 
of 10, 20, and 30 feet. The ping pong ball was assumed to accelerate at 
28 ft./sec**2. Errors in measurement for time were normally distributed 
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with standard deviation = .1 sec. The resulting description was: time 
(in seconds) = .6 + .03 * distance (in feet). 
This apocryphal example illustrates two important points about 
description languages and equivocality (indeterminancy of 
identification). 
1- The empirical fitting of models to phenomena is equivocal 
with respect to languages. For this data, the above new 
"law" fits as well as Newton's law. 
2- Simplicity is favored in the choice of a description 
language. 	The complexity of a language sufficient to 
represent Newton's law might yield other descriptions also. 
This example is not meant to ridicule empirical applications of 
linear models to data, but to illuminate the nature of the enterprise. 
The description is, in fact, excellent by the standards of behavioral 
research (R**2 = .84). The Aristotelian notion that rate of descent is 
'determined by weight was correctly disconfirmed (p < .076) and the 
positive relation between distance and time correctly identified. 
The general linear model (GLM) has been the language of choice in 
the description of human performance. 	It has strong advantages in 
statistical 	inference and ubiquity of description, yet the rigidity of 
its syntax renders it incapable of expressing many of the observable 
consistencies in human behavior. While well-suited to describing data 
that fits this mold (e.g., stimulus intensity and reaction time), GLM 
becomes nonsensical when turned toward domains such as problem solving or 
process control. In these more complex domains, studied in man-machine 
interactions, an adequate description must capture both the qualitative 
complexity of the environment, and the heterogeneity of responses within 
a common representation. 
Production Systems  
A representation gaining currency for describing complex human 
behavior is the production system. 	Production systems models have 
enjoyed success in domains as varied as: crypto arithmetic, 	logic, and 
games [8], air traffic control [12], fault diagnosis [3] and others. In 
its simplest form a production system is a set of statements assigning 
values. Production rules consist of two parts: the condition and the 
action. When values in the domain of the production system satisfy the 
conditions of a rule, this rule is "fired" and its action taken. 
This ability to accommodate assignments (responses) of arbitrary 
form make production systems particularly attractive descriptions for 
complex behaviors. Over the past two years, our research has been 
	
concerned with the identification of production rules from 	human 
performance data. 
Data 
Data from an experiment, reported in [9], dealing with aircraft 
encounters and data from a process control task, reported in [7], were 
chosen for this effort. INDUCE [6], a machine learning program, was 
employed to identify rules that would describe the human performance in 
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these experiments. 
In the study reported in [9], pilots using a Cockpit Display of-
Traffic Information (CDTI) with no predictor, predictor, or predictor 
with noise were required to maneuver away from an intruder. Each trial 
consisted of a single maneuver. For purposes of rule identification 
maneuvers were classified according to their dominant axis of response. 
The VL1 language, a propositional logic, was used for description. 
In the study reported in [7], subjects controlled PLANT, a 
simulated process plant. Sequenced control actions were treated as 
replications. Historical variables were included to provide information 
on PLANT dynamics to induce stationarity. The VL2 language, a predicate 
logic, was used for description. 
Learning Rules  
Both weak (domain independent) and strong (domain-based) methods 
have been applied to the problem of rule learning. Michalski [4] refers 
to these approaches as revolutionary and evolutionary respectively. 
In 	evolutionary 	procedures 	examples 	are 	used 	(usually 
sequentially) to refine programmer supplied rules. Programs which 
improve their performance with experience [10] are the most frequent 
exemplars of this approach. With few exceptions, identification methods 
applied successfully outside of artificially formal domains, such as 
crypto arithmetic or theorem proving, have been revolutionary. 
Revolutionary methods consider examples simultaneously depending upon 
coincidence among observations rather than programmer-supplied structure 
to identify rules. 
As weak methods, revolutionary procedures cannot deal 	with 
representations of the complexity handled by evolutionary procedures. 
Conversely, evolutionary methods are inapplicable if knowledge of the 
domain and a formal problem space are not already available. 
Problems in Conical Generalization  
Procedures 	for 	logical 	generalization identify well-formed 
formulas (wff's) which are consistent with a set of assertions (data) 	in 
the description language. 	Rule identific'ation is a procedure for 
determining equivalence classes within which relations are consistent 
with respect to some criterion. 
Selection of appropriate rules from among the generated wff's will 
in general be equivocal. Problems inherent in the description of data 
through logical generalization are illustrated using a simple description 
language, VL1. Figure 1 presents a set of data from which the 




(raven) black yes bird 
(cardinal) red yes bird 
(penguin) black no bird 
(Irish 	setter) red no dog 
Figure 1. 
Generalization of these observations leads to two equally preferred rules 





Consider the case in which all predicate classes have the same 
number of predicates. 
N = number of predicate classes 
n = number of predicates/class 
Then 
N 







= number of 
VL1 wff's 
Except for the degenerate case in which there is only one 
predicate 	per 	class 	(i.e. 	only one differentiable example and 
description) 	the number of descriptions will be strictly greater, 
typically much greater, than the number of examples. 	While this 
equivocality is tempered by accepting only valid (consistent in the 
criterion) wff's and its exact form will depend on the language used, 
there will almost always be many more valid descriptions than 
observations. 	As a consequence, description by logical generalization 
revolves around choosing the "best" of the descriptions. 	Usually 
staggered criteria such as choosing wff's of greatest coverage and from 
among these those of greatest parsimony, can be employed. In cases such 
as the bird example, this choice will be indeterminate. 
Errors  
Procedures 	based 	on 	logical generalization are inherently_ 
intolerant of errors. Valid wff's exclude them by definition. This is 
not too damaging when inconsistencies occur only on borders between rules 
or there are many replications of observations which are identical in 
their noncriterion predicates. Errors along borders may be expected 
where there is a graduated transition between equivalence classes. 
Identification of rules separated by •:ndescribed observations accurately 
reflects this situation. In cases with many replications, imaging, a 
procedure for assigning a single criterion 	predicate 	to 	unique 
combinations of predicates, can be employed to filter out error. 
For human performance data, however, where occasional errors well 
within the conditions of the rules being employed by a subject are 
expected, a problem is posed. Prior to identification the rule is not 
known so the response is not classified as an error. Subsequent to 
identification, rules have been gerrymandered to exclude the error so it 
again eludes detection. 
One possible solution is to relax the identification criteria to 
allow a small number of errors. An experimental version of Michalski's 
Aq algorithm [5] was implemented to examine this approach. At 
considerable increase in run-time, 	the program identified rules of 
increased coverage (maximum coverage 79 vs. 41) frm PLANT data. 	Cross 
validation 	of these rules, however, 'revealed performance markedly 
inferior (errors 7 vs. 	29) to that of rules identified using the logical 
consistency criterion. This decrease in predictive validity is probably 
attributable to the much larger number of allowable wff's and the 
attendant increase in equivocality. 
A pragmatic approach was ultimately adopted in the analysis of the 
CDTI data. Generalizations were run using various reduced sets of 
predicate classes. Identified rules were then selected from among these 
generalizations based on performance. 
A related problem in the identification of rules from human 
performance data arises in circumstances in which alternate responses may 
be equally appropriate. 	Groups of observations for which no rules are 
found may be indicative of this situation. 	No solution short of 
explicitly re-representing alternate responses as additional response 
categories appears available to data-driven identification methods. 
Intersecting Rules  
As illustrated in the "bird" example, the set of valid wff's will 
commonly contain rules sharing observations in common. Such 
intersections need to be minimized in the selection of a representative 
rule set so that the data can be described with a relatively few number 
of rules. 
The extent to which some common core of observations is shared by 
a number of rules serves as an indication of limitations in the language 
for describing apparent equivalence classes. The structure of the 
relationship among intersecting rules can be revealed by organizing them 
in terms of these intersections. 
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In the analysis of the CDTI data, rules were organized into trees 
in which 90% of the observations covered by a descendent were covered in 
common by its parent. If rule identification is pursued with the purpose 
of explicating observations, this technique provides the additional 
advantage of graphically portraying the relation among .rules. Variations 
attributable to individual differences or experimental manipulations then 
become evident. Interpretation is similar to that used with hierarchical 
clustering procedures. 
In the CDTI data, for example, a subgroup of pilots was found to 
consistently maneuver horizontally toward intruders approaching too 
closely horizontally. The remainder of the pilots followed the correct 
strategy of turning toward only those intruders who were both too close 
horizontally and would pass behind. The rule followed by the errant 
pilots can be interpreted as a "version" of the correct strategy with 
reduced dimensionality. 
In rule sets generated using reduced sets of predicates the root 
rule, while providing the greatest coverage, may not be the best 
performing due to errors introduced through imaging. Better performing 
descendents with minimal redundant coverage can be selected from the tree 
by choosing rules from different branches. 
Significance Testing 
Logical generalization has been introduced as a process of 
describing data. To stop here, as machine learning programs do, amounts 
to little more than fitting a "form gauge" to the data. Inductive 
inference requires both a consistent description and some measure of 
confidence that the description embodies actual relations rather than 
idiosyncrasies of the data/identification method. The syntactic rigidity 
of GLM reduces this problem to estimating sampling error. Even here, 
when misapplied as in the case of regressions drawing upon large numbers 
of variables [2], opportunism in sampling from a space of descriptions 
may result in unwarranted inferences. 
	
For logical induction the hazards are reversed. 	The number of 
consistent statements which can be made about a set of observations is 
much greater than the number of observations. As a consequence 
expressions of confidence must explicitly consider sampling in a space of 
descriptions. Christensen and Eilbert [1] refer to this problem as 
contrivedness, "...the tendency of a search procedure to uncover apparent 
patterns where none exist." 
A logical benchmark to gauge our confidence is the situation in 
which there is no relation between the conditions of a rule and the 
associated response. If this were true then any pairing of observed 
conditions and responses would be equally likely. A distribution 
corresponding to this benchmark can be obtained by considering all 
permutations of responses with respect to the conditions. The relative 
frequency of permutations in which rules of equal or greater "quality" 
are identified provides a measure of the unlikeliness (significance) of 
identifying rules of the "quality" obtained under a null hypothesis of no 
relation. 
A 	nonparametric 	analogue 	to 	the 	coefficient 	of 
determination,tau-b, is representative of the type of statistic often 
misused in this context, as was shown in Toussaint's review [11]. 
Significance levels for the associated G-square approximation of 
chi-square become deceptive when identification methods susceptible to 
- contrivedness have been employed. Figure 3 shows significance levels for 
tau-b based on a 1000 iteration Monte Carlo procedure which replicated 
the identification process used in the analysis of the CDT! data. The 
corresponding signif'cancc level based on chi-square is p < .01 for all 
values of tau-b greater than .05. 
















Knowledge-Constrained Rule. Identification  
From the problems described in identifying rules, it 	is apparent . 
that logical generalization fails to generate generalizations of the 
"quality" that we, as inducers, are accustomed to making. The nature of 
this difficulty is pointed out by Hume who portrays induction as a 
psychological rather than a logical process. According to this view, 
induction is characterized by the repeated pairings of events leading to 
the habit of r,.,...pect:ng an event of one sort to be followed by that of 
another. 	This formulation identifies rules through coincidence by a 
recursive process in which there are habits of forming habits. 	Laws of 
induction, such as Mill's methods, are subsumed in this manner as "meta 
habits". 
Evolutionary methods mechanize the final step of the recursion 
process but with less knowledge than the human analyst. A viable 
identification methodology for rule-based models should incorporate the 
problem reduction available to evolutionary methods, while preserving the 
ob:,ctivity and possibility of novelty accorded the revolutionary 
approach. 
A compromise is afforded by taking the Bayesian view of rule 
identification. 	Knowledge/assumptions could be made explicit, and rule 
identification could be conditioned on these assumptions. Constraining 
the generation of rules would result in reduced equivocality with 
accompanying increase in power for conditional significance tests. 
Experimenters could set constraints at levels appropriate to research 
goals. Reporting these constraints as Bayesians do their priors would 
make explicit the contribution of data to the results. As rule-based 
modeling comes of age, conventions such as these will be required, if a 
coherent body of knowledge is to be developed. 
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REPRESENTATION for CLOSED FORM 
SIGNIFICANCE TESTING in VLI 
C. Michael Lewis 
Center for Man-Machine Systems Research 
School of Industrial and Systems Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
(A Working Paper) 
Programs for machine learning and systems for logical induc- 
tion such as that of Carnap share certain characteristics: 
A language, L, consisting of a vocabulary of predicates 
and connectives is defined for describing a set of 
observations. Induction is achieved by identifying 
generalized statements (wff's) describing the observa-
tions. In this paper these statements will be referred 
to as "rules". 
As relations among predicates are restricted to legal con-
nectives (usually: &, V, -). inductive inference, based on 
the coincidence of predicates rather than the correlation of 
values, results. This distinction is basic to the problem 
of inference since relations are identified between logical 
phrases and their consequents rather than between individual 
"variables". 
In machine learning and other applications of inductive 
logic this usually reduces to a discriminant procedure. 
Predicates are divided into a group describing the observa-
tions and a class of mutually exclusive discriminant predi-
cates one of which is designated as the positive case, I 
while the others are treated as negative cases. When used 
to describe behavioral 'rules', phrases describing the 
stimuli which are accompanied by a particular response are 
discriminated from all others. 
While Carnap's system, based on degrees of confirmation, 
allows 	rules 	to describe negative instances, machine 
learning programs typically inspect only valid rules to res-
trict search. 
If this logical generalization is to be used to form 
inferences from actual observations the relationship between 
the data and its population must be considered. The primary 
threat to validity in the identification of rules through 
combinatorial coincidence lies in the ability of such pro-
cedures to identify apparent consistencies (in the sample) 
where none exist (in the population). This occurs because 
the generalization procedure can examine the data in so many 
ways that it is possible to discover a relationship that is 
only due to chance. To guage our confidence in a particular 
rule, it is necessary to find some benchmark with which it 
can be referenced. A logical choice is the situation in 
which there is no relation between observation descriptions 
and their classification as '+' or then any pairing of 
observation descriptions and discriminant classifications 
would be equally likely (principle of indifference). If 
there are N observations and k of these observations are 
classified as '+' then there are N!/(N-k)!k! distinct map-
pings from the observation descriptions to the responses. 
These mappings will be referred to as instantiations. 
The rub here is that the possible instantiations need 
to be expressed in terms of the rules which would be identi-
fied rather than the mappings of observation descriptions to 
responses. themselves. 
The GENERAL PROBLEM 
Constraints: 
1- The syntax of language, L, which defines the ways in which 
predicates & connectives can be combined to form rules (wff's) 
2- The set of observation descriptions which determines the 
discriminations which can be made 
3- The number of observations classified '+' 
The Problem: 
Devise a method for determining the relative frequency over 
instantiations with which a rule of equal or greater gen-
erality would be identified. Generality, here, is defined 
as the number of observations described by a rule. 
My Problem: 
I am using a covering algorithm (Aq, Michalski 1973) to 
identify pilot strategy (system of rules) in maneuvering to 
avoid intruders. The Aq algorithm identifies rules in the 
VL1 (Michalski's terminology) language, a simplified propo-
sitional logic. VL1 allows only one predicate per class of 
predicates to be true in a particular instantiation. VL1 
syntax allows only one place predicates. example: 
black(bird). 	Disjunction is only allowed within classes of 
predicates. example: black(bird) V blue(bird). 	Conjunc- 
tion is only allowed between classes of predicates. exam- 
ple: black(bird) & is-raven(bird). 
For notational convenience Michalski defines a new 
entity. a selector, to describe classes of predicates. A 
selector names the predicate class and lists the predicates 
involved in a disjunction. example: [color-bird=black V 
blue]. Reaefined in terms of selectors, VL1 allows only 
conjunction of selectors. Since generalization of the 
observation descriptions is performed to discriminate the 
'+' classification, this relationship is represented as An 
example of a wff in VL1 is: 
[x1=a V b] & [x2=d V e]-> F 
This rule says that if the predicate evaluating true for 
class x1 is a or b and class x2 is d or e then 
F(observation) is true. 
An advantage of VL1 for devising a significance test is 
that this syntax is highly restrictive making the number of 
possible rules to be considered relatively small. For exam-
ple a rule to cover the observation descriptions: 
[x1=1J & [x2=1] & [x3=1] 
[x1=1J & [x2=2] & [x3=1.1 
[x1=2] & [x2=1J & [x3=1] 
MUST ALSO INCLUDE 
[x1=2J & [x2=2] & [x3=1] 
To produce a generalized conjunction of selectors 
[x1=1 V 2] & [x2=1 V 2] & [x3=1] 
I will refer to this syntactic property as a rectangularity 
constraint. 
Despite the simplicity of the VL1 language and its res-
trictive syntax there are a very large number of rules which 
would be identified across the instantiations. 
A Tentative Representation: 
1- A. Monte Carlo approach of repeatedly running the identifica-
tion program on randomly selected instantiations is inelegant. 
It also unnecessarily expends resources on instantiations in 
which rules, less general than those being testea are 
identified. 
2- A solution may be to ennumerate instantiations for which rules 
as/or more general would be identified had the identification 
program been run. Since only rules of substantial generality 
should be objects of testing. reduction in generation should 
be achieved. A threshold could be set so that the program 
terminates after ennumerating > N instantiations corresponding 
to a predetermined significance level, introducing further 
economy. 
Ennumerating Instantiations 
The no relation benchmark corresponds to the distribu-
tion of the most general rule across instantiations. Since 
for any particular rule to be identified all observations 
must belong to the K observations in the '+' class, let k= 
the number of observations covered by a particular rule. 
Eq. , 1 
(N-k)!/(N-K)!(K-k)! is then the number of instantiations 
in which that rule is valid. 
Obtaining the set of possible rules of generality >= 
that being tested must be considered. The notion of 
discriminant equivalences will be introduced to accomplish 
this. 
Definition: Discrimination level- a particular predicate class 
or conjunction of predicate classes. For example [x1=a 1 b....] 
would be a selector for a predicate class, 
Ex1=a.b,...] & [x2=c,d....] would be a selector 
for a conjunction of predicate classes. 
Definition: Discriminant equivalence 
Let M be a discrimination level. A discriminant equivalence, dq(M 
in level, M. is a set of observation descriptions 
having identical predicate or conjunction of predicates 
for the predicate or predicate classes of M. 
Due to the syntax of VL1 (conjunction of selectors). 
rules can only be formed at a single level if the degenerate 
case of a selector specifying all members of a predicate 
class is excluded. As a consequence any rule at level M 
must either include or exclude all members of a dq(M.i) at 
level M and the dq(M.i)'s at each level represent a complete 
partitioning of the observation descriptions. As a conse-
quence: 
1- discriminations made by any rule at level, M. may be 
represented as a conjunction of dq(M.i)'s at level M. 
2- All discriminations among observations in VL1 are covered 
if all levels are represented in this way 
Since knowing the number of observation descriptions 
described by a rule allows the ennumeration of instantia-
tions for which it is valid. (Eq.1)• this provides a basis 
for forming and counting rules in accordance to generality 
across instantiations. 
We, however, are interested in counting Instantiations 
for which rules of >.= generality than that being tested 
would be identified. Since it is possible for a rule to be 
valid yet not be the most general identifiable rule for a 
particular instantiation, the ennumeration must be adjusted. 
A rule of greater generality will be said to dominate a rule 
of lesser generality for instantiations for which both are 
valid. For example: any rule at the same level which 
includes an additional dq(M.i) will dominate. Example: 
[x1=1,27 & [x2=21 dominates [x1=21 & [x2=2I, the dq(M.D's 
in this instance are observation descriptions for which x1=1 
& x2=2 and observation descriptions for which x1=2 & x2=2. 
Between Level Dominance 
Definition: Dominance set, Dq(L,M,i) 
A dominance set, Dq(L,M.i), at level L of dq(M,i) at level M 
is defined as the minimal set of dq(M.i)'s at level M that 
contains all of the observation descriptions contained by 
dq(M,i) and is of cardinality < K, the number of observa- 
tions in the '+' class 
Let N= number of observation descriptions 




(N-k)!/(N-K)1(K-k)! - (N-106)!/(N-K)1(N-106)! 
is the number of instantiations in which dq(M.i) is not 
dominated by any rule from level M. 
Minimal dominance rules at level, L, for rules at 
level. M, (conjunctions of dq(M.i)'s) are then simply the 
union of the corresponding Dq(L,M,i)'s at level L (with 
additional dq(L,i)'s at level L included as required by rec-
tangularity constraints). Undominated instantiations can be 
ennumerated in the same way as before. 
To find the undominated instantiations of a rule across 
all levels, however, requires consideration of co-dominance 
and multiple dominances as well. 
example: 
A rule at level L is dominated by its corresponding minimal 
dominance rule at level M. This rule may in term be dom-
inated by its own minimal dominance rule at level N... This 
problem can be dealt with without recursion by considering 
all unions for a set of minimal dominance rules (discarding 
those > K) for the initial rule at level, L, and applying 
the inclusion/exclusion principle. 
To use this representation in deriving a significance 
test for VL1 rules will require: 
1- Some way to ennumerate instantiations for >= rules directly 
for the dq(M.i)'s and Dq(L I M.O's without recourse to actually 
forming the rules (tagged generating functions?) 
failing this 
2- Some computationally cheap way to find the undominated 
instantiations of a rule without having to consider 
all unions of its minimal dominance rules 
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Introduction 
This task entailed the development of a model of the PLANT system 
using the discrete control modeling techniques developed by Miller 
(1985). Discrete control models attempt to represent in a mathematical 
form how a human operator might decompose a complex system into simpler 
parts and how s/he coordinates control actions and system configuration 
so that acceptable overall system performance is achieved. Basic 
questions include knowledge representation, information flow, and 
decision making in complex systems. The structure of the model is a 
general hierarchical/heterarchical scheme which structurally accounts for 
coordination and dynamic focus of attention. Mathematically, the 
discrete control model is defined in terms of a network of finite state 
systems. 
The discrete control model can be thought of as a possible 
representation of an operator's internal model of the system plus a 
control structure which specifies how the model is used to solve the 
decision problems which make up the control functions. Specifically, the 
discrete control model accounts for how specific control actions are 
selected from information about the controlled system, the environment, 
and the context of the situation. The objective is to provide a 
plausible and empirically testable accounting and, if possible, 
explanation of control behavior. 
Theoretical details and practical mechanics of discrete control 
modeling are detailed in Miller (1985) and Mitchell (1980). The model 
described below assumes most of this material as background. 
1 
Model Preliminaries 
The first step in constructing a discrete control model is to 
specify the lowest level of description, the output of the model and the 
bottom nodes in the finite state network. Several discrete control 
models have based their structure on configurations of system switches 
(Miller, 1979; Mitchell, 1980). A model like this for PLANT, for 
example, would utilize the configuration of valves and the flow of 
resources (i.e., PI and P0) through the system. The initial model 
development for PLANT in fact began at this point. As modeling 
progressed, however, it became clear that the more interesting output of 
a PLANT discrete control model was the operator commands which were 
employed to configure and optimize PLANT. The commands available to the 
operator are summarized in table 1. 
Using operator commands as the lowest level finite state nodes of 
the discrete control network, the model attempts to explain an operator's 
choice of commands based on system state and current operator function or 
procedure. The model is normative in that it is constructed using both 
the rules of the system as specified in PLANT documentation and the 
procedures provided to PLANT operators (Morris, 1983). Such a model 
could be used to "explain" operator behavior, that is, to justify and 
contextualize a sequence of operator actions based on goals and 
objectives. In addition, a normative discrete control model may be 
useful in designing an adaptive user interface that is responsive to user 
needs. Additional details on applications of the PLANT discrete control 
model follow the presentation of the model itself. 
2 
ovl,J 	Open the valve between tanks I and J 
cvl,J 	Close the valve between tanks I and J 
ocK 	Open one valve per tank in column K 
ccK 	Close one valve per tank in column K 
otI 	Open all valves from tank I 
ctI 	Close all valves from tank I 
piN 	Set input per input tank to N units 
poN 	Set output per output tank to N units 
skN 	Skip N iterations; the system will be 
updated N times before the display is 
updated 
flI,J 	Check the flow from tank I to tank J 
afI 	Check all flows from tank I 
rvl,J 	Repair the valve between tanks I and J 
rpI 	Repair the pump associated with tank I 
rtI 	Repair the rupture of tank I 
rs 	 Repair the PLANT safety system 
st 	 System trip; close all valves and stop 
all input and output 
Table 1. PLANT Operator Commands 
3 
The PLANT Control Network 
At the highest level, there are four major operator control 
functions for PLANT. As depicted in figure 1, the first control function 
that an operator engages in is system start-up. Once this set of 
activities is completed the operator unconditionally transitions to the 
function of steady-state management. For PLANT, steady-state management 
is a monitoring and fault detection state. In this state, the operator 
is essentially a supervisory controller, watching a fairly autonomous 
system operate within the boundaries specified by the system 
configuration. 
From steady-state management, an operator can, under certain 
conditions, transition to a more active control function. If a fault is 
suspected or if the system is approaching an out-of-control condition, 
the operator engages is fault identification or emergency management. On 
the other hand, while engaged in steady-state management the operator may 
notice the evolution of one or more symptoms which suggest the need for 
proceduralized manual control. 
Figure 1 and the associated footnotes depict these transitions. 
■ 
Several conventions are used in this figure. The heavy black arc between 
the startup node and the steady-state management node is used to denote 
an unconditional transition. This convention will be used both in figure 
1 and in subsequent figures. Conditional arcs are those that denote 
state transitions which occur only when enabling conditions are met. For 
example, steady-state management shifts to operational control when one 
of the conditions calling for a procedure are met. 
4 











Control Overview Notes & Symbols  
1. The heavy black arrow from start-up to steady-state management denotes 
an automatic or unconditional transition, i.e., once the start-up 
control function terminates there is an automatic transition to the 
steady-state management function. Moreover, as the figure suggests, the 
start-up function is performed exactly once for the control session. 
2. Control shifts from start-up to steady-state management and then to 
fault identification and emergency management when a fault or 
operational problem is suspected. 
0 : fault suspected due to 
- random tank check 
- drop in resources 
- insufficient number of system trips 
- unmanageable number of system trips 
0 or 0 : symptoms are present which call for the use of 
procedure i, i = 2,3,4,5,6 
3. Control shifts from operational problem solving to steady-state 
management when system is reconfigured at a minimum stabilization 
will be further specified in the operational control function. 
4. indicates an operator-initiated system trip. 
The conditional arcs at this level of the network are straight-
forward. Condition()is an enabling condition which is true when the 
system state requires the use of a prespecified procedure. Condition E' 
is a minimum level of system stabilization; this condition is set to true 
at the completion of each procedure in operational control. Condition® 
is true when a system fault is suspected during routine management or if 
the number of system trips is so excessive as to make the operator feel 
that PLANT is in an out-of-control condition. Finally, condition ST 
indicates that the operator initiated a system trip. 
The structure of discrete control models is both hierarchic and 
heterarchic. The portion of the model depicted in figure 1 is at the 
highest level of the hierarchy and depicts the somewhat heterarchic 
activities that take place at this level. For the PLANT model, the next 
level of detail explores particular activities or subfunctions within 
each of the major control activities previously described. Figures 2-9 
constitute the remainder of the model. 
Start-Up Control  
The start-up control function (figure 2) consists of three major 
subfunctions. Initially, the operator opens the valves among the tanks 
with a sequence of commands that completes the initial flow 
configuration. 
The conventions used in figures 2-11 include the use of elliptical 
nodes for operator functions or actions and rectangular boxes for 
commands. The distinction being made is one of activity versus 
intention. The commands are activities undertaken to accomplish an 
objective of a function. 
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Start-Up Control Notes  
1. Steady-state conditions: pi = po = 230 
2. Tank deviation: inequality of tank heights within columns 
3. Start-up production management: n = 50,100,150,200,210,220,230; 
m = 5 
Once the initial flow configuration is completed the operator 
unconditionally transfers to a start-up production management function, 
the function which increases input and output to a steady-state 
condition. Each start-up production management task increases output 
(PO), input (PI), and may skip (SK) one or more PLANT iterations. Once a 
round is accomplished the operator checks to see if steady-state 
conditions have been met, i.e., PI = PO = 230. If so, the start-up 
function is concluded and the operator unconditionally transitions from 
start-up control to steady-state management. If start-up conditions have 
not been met, the operator transitions to a fault and configuration 
monitoring subfunction, in which tank heights are scanned to ensure 
levels are the same within columns and no valve has tripped. If a tank 
deviation or valve trip has occurred the operator performs the 
appropriate remedial action, i.e., opens the tripped valves or checks 
flows to identify and fix the failed valve or pump. Once a fault or 
valve trip has been identified the start-up control function concludes 
and the operator transitions to the steady-state management function. If 
after checking tank levels and valves, no problems are detected the 
operator again commences on another start-up production management 
subfunction. 
To summarize, the start-up control function terminates in one of two 
ways. Typically, start-up control is completed when the operator has 
configured PLANT into a minimally stable and optimal mode. If, however, 
a fault is detected before start-up is complete, diagnostic and 
compensation procedures are performed and the operator terminates 
start-up control and engages in steady-state management. 
10 
Steady-State Management  
Following the completion of start-up control, steady-state 
management is the next high level control function undertaken (figure 3). 
This control function has three major components: monitoring and fault 
detection, configuration management, and production optimizaton. 
Monitoring and fault detection is the central subfunction. An 
operator may perform this function with visual scans of the PLANT 
displays together with iteration skips (SK) or by actively testing tank 
flows (AF,FL). The operator terminates this function to undertake 
another steady-state management subfunction if one or more valves trip, 
if a repair crew completion message arrives, or if configuration is 
acceptable and production optimization is required. Configuration 
management is the subfunction which keeps all valves open under normal 
conditions and reopens valves after repair completion. Product 
optimization entails one or more commands to balance and/or increase 
input and output. This subfunction is pursued when the PLANT is stable 
and production is less than the specified goal, i.e., PO = PI = 230. 
Operator control remains in the steady-state management function, 
alternating among its subfunctions, until some problem arises. Operator 
control leaves the steady-state management function when a problem 
requiring either proceduralized control or fault detection occurs. 
Operational Control  
Operational control is an operator function which is, as compared to 
steady-state management, proceduralized and low level; in this function, 
the operator exercises a great deal of direct manipulation over the 





PLANT - Steady-State Management 
Figure 3 
0 Input/Output Tuning Required (pi po or pi < 230 or po < 230) and low frequency of valve trips and tanks are within acceptable range * ) 
- Isolated valve trip or repair crew completion 
D Fault suspected (see control overview) 
E Symptoms of need for proceduralized operation (see control overview) 
* largest difference < 30 units, all levels are > 10 and < 90 units 
,„..._ 0 _ 	v..._ 0 v 0 V 
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Operational Control Notes  
1. (SD indicates an operator-initiated system trip 
symptoms present which require use 
of procedure i, i = 2,...,6. 
3. e or 
	
	conditions have been met which terminate the procedure, 
control then shifts back to steady state management. 
4. 0 system stabilized E' = T if 	i 	or 	for i = 2,3,4,5,6 
• 
one of the prespecified control procedures (see Morris, 1983) or in 
reconfiguration after a system trip. When an operational control 
procedure ends, operator control returns to steady-state management after 
a minimum system stabilization point is reached. 
The simplest subfunction in operational control is PLANT 
reconfiguration after a system trip (figure 5). This simply consists of 
reopening all valves. Once all valves are opened, operator function 
transitions back to steady-state management. Input and output production 
increases are handled by the product optimization subfunction of 
steady-state management and are accompanied by fault detection and 
—monitoring. 
The remaining procedures in the operational control function are 
similar to those used by Morris (1983) to train PLANT controllers. The 
symptoms that indicate a need for these procedures are summarized in 
Appendix A. The PLANT discrete control model has structured the steps in 
the procedures and, as a result, they are not quite isomorphic to those 
used in operator training. One major difference betwen Morris' 
procedures and the model's procedures are the termination points of the 
procedures. The model's procedures terminate as soon as a minimal point 
of system stabilization is reached; system optimization, input and output 
increase for example, are completed as part of the steady-state . 
 management function. The result of these changes in terms of operator 
control activities, however, should be equivalent. The model's version 
of these procedures is summarized below. 
Procedure 2 addresses the problem arising when PLANT's input column 
tank levels are higher than those of the other columns (figure 6). This 
procedure consists of three subfunctions: production limitation wherein, 
depending on system symptoms, input and output are reduced; valve 
15 
PLANT - Operational Control 
Reconfigure System After Operator-Initiated System Trip 
Figure 5 










No valve trips 
END 
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PLANT — Operational Control 
Procedure 2 BC Problem for Input Column 
Figure 6 
PLANT-Operational Control Procedure 2 Notes  
1. Yule IF any tank in Col. 1 > 90 
THEN PI: = 0 & P0: = (0 — 25) 
ELSE PI: = 50 & P0: = (50 — 75) 
2. Rule IF tanks in Col. 2 and 3 continue 
to drop and iteration = 10 
THEN P0: = 0 
(D. PO > 0 AND less than ten iterations 
i). P0: = 0 OR iterations > 10 
management which keeps tripped valves open; and output management which 
monitors output and adjusts production to keep columns 2 and 3 fairly 
balanced. The procedure concludes when columns 2 and 3 stabilize or if 
production output is set to zero. 
Procedure 3, a condition in which column 3 tank levels are too low, 
also begins with a production curtailment function and unconditionally 
transitions to a valve management state (figure 7). From there, the 
operator monitors valve trips, input, and output until columns all 
stabilize (i.e., columns 1 and 2 do not continue to increase and column 
one does not continue to decrease) or until both input and output are set 
—to zero. 
Procedure 4 addresses the problems of high tank levels in column 1 
and low levels in column 3, problems which combine those of procedures 2 
and 3 (figure 8). The steps required in procedure 4 are very simple; 
first input is reduced, then output is reduced. 
Procedures 5 and 6 (figures 9 and 10) address imbalances within 
columns rather than the imbalance between columns addressed in procedures 
2 through 4. Since within column imbalances are often due to system 
faults, an initial concern is to examine the system for component 
failures. Procedure 5 first limits input, then examines the high tank 
for possible valve failure. Following failure detection, the operator 
also limits output. Finally, the operator engages in a set of monitoring 
and tuning activities to compensate for the imbalance and/or component 
failures. Tripped valves are opened. If column 1 shows an excessive 
imbalance among tanks, valves are temporarily closed. Similarly, if tank 
levels in columns 2 and 3 continue to decrease over time, output is 
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PLANT - Operational Control 
Procedure 3: BC Problem 
for Output Column 
Valve trip or 
other 
No trip & Col. or 2 increasing 
ELSE 
PLANT-Operational Control Procedure 3 Notes  
1. PI: = (50 - 100); P0: = 50 
2. IF Col. 3 < 5 then P0: = 0 
ELSE IF Col. 3 < 10 then P0: = 25 
3. IF Col. 1 or 2 increases over 5 iterations, PI: = (25 - 50): 
IF frequent valve trips, PI: = 0 
0, IF PI = PO = 0 or Col. 1 and 2 and 3 are stabilized 
PLANT - Operational Control 
Procedure 4: BC Problem for Input and Output 
Figure 8 
1 Rule: 'IF col. 1 > 90 then PI: = 0 
'ELSE PI: = 50 
2 Rule: IF col. 3 < 5 then P0: = 0 
ELSE P0: = 50 
I Rule: IF Col. 1 tank > 90 then PI: = 0 
ELSE PI: = 50 
2 Rule: P0: = (50 - 150) 
3 Rule: P0: = (0 - 50) 
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PLANT - Operational Control 
PLANT - Operational Control 
Procedure 6: 
WC Problem 
in Output Column AF,AF,AF 
1: Decision Rule: If low tank level > 0, 
further compensation 
2: P0: = (0 — 50) 
3: Close valves to high tanks in output 
column 
(63): All tanks in column 3 approximately 
the same height 
Figure 10 
reduced. These activities continue until the system stabilizes or the 
repair on the failed component is completed. 
Procedure 6 begins with a failure detection and, if necessary, 
compensation subfunction; then, a decision is made about whether 
compensation is needed. If not the procedure is ended. If more 
intervention is required, output is limited, flow to high output tanks is 
restricted, and tripped valves are opened until tank heights in column 3 
stabilize. 
Fault Identification and Emergency Management  
The final high level control function is fault identification and 
emergency management (figure 11). This control function is always 
reached from steady-state management and the transition occurs due either 
to a suspected or detected fault or to a loss-of-control feeling on the 
part of the operator. 
The system trip subfunction is the least straightforward. The 
option is invoked when the system is so unstable that the operator feels 
a total loss of control. It might be argued that this procedure is never 
really required or justified; a competent operator has less catastrophic 
procedures available. 
The rest of the subfunctions within the fault identification and 
emergency management function address requirements for fault detection 
and diagnosis. Repairs to valves and pumps are straightforward and are 
likely to occur as a result of routine valve checks conducted in steady-
state management. 
The procedure to detect and correct a tank rupture is not quite so 
straightforward. The procedure may be invoked because the operator 
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observes an unexplained drop in system resources. The search procedure 
is laborious and may terminate in detecting a tank rupture, concluding 
that there is no tank rupture, or stopping an uncompleted search to 
undertake another control function. 
The final fault identification subfunction is the identification and 
repair of the PLANT safety system. This is a little used procedure and 
is involved only when the operator has observed a critical number of 
anomalous system-initiated occurrences. 
Uses of the PLANT Discrete Control Model 
This model has several potential applications. It can be used 
either as an analysis tool to aid in understanding operator control 
performance or as a design tool to create a dynamic human-computer 
interface to control PLANT. 
As an analysis tool, the model can be used to help explain operator 
control actions given system state. Its normative but nondeterministic 
form allows a great deal of flexibility in the sequence of control 
actions that are permitted within a control function or even within a 
subfunction. The structure is perhaps somewhat more people-oriented than 
KARL (Knaeuper, 1983), in that procedures have a beginning and an end; 
and once a procedure is initiated, it will not be preempted or terminated 
until a completion point has been reached. KARL, exhibiting one of the 
greatest strengths of computers, meticulously examines all system 
variables, updates its statistics every iteration, and assesses, given 
the new state, what it should be doing. As a result KARL could leave a 
procedure before completion and/or hop from procedure to procedure. 
People, given cognitive limitations, are much more likely, once beginning 
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a procedure, to continue its steps to conclusion, almost disregarding 
other symptoms arising in the intervening time. The discrete model has 
similar characteristics. 
Although subject data has not been compared to the discrete control 
model, a logical next step in the model's validation is to compare it to 
human performance and evaluate its explanatory power. The model should 
have a high validity when compared to a "good" operator, i.e., one who 
had good output and faithfully followed prescribed procedures. The model 
should also be very helpful at identifying mismatches. The normative 
nature of the model suggests that these mismatches are likely to be 
_operator mistakes. 
As a design tool the discrete control model can be used to design an 
information display system which selects out, aggregates, or prioritizes 
system state information to facilitate the operator's control decisions 
depending on current operator control function and system state. The 
display system would have individual display pages that are tailored to 
the needs of operator control functions or subfunctions, as specified by- . 
 the model. Used in this way, the discrete control model has potential 
utility as the basis of an on-line interactive decision aid. One 
strategy would be to let the operator specify the control function or 
subfunction currently underway, and given that function, the aid .could 
prompt the operator with suggested next steps and activities as well as 
provide the required pieces of information. 
An aid such as this may avoid some of the problems that KARL 
encountered when used as a human decision aid (Knaeuper and Morris, 
1984). By allowing the operator to set the pace and having the program 
act as an aid rather than an expert, some of the problems of a nagging  
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on—line aid may be minimized. The interactive nature of an aid based on 
a discrete control model gives human operators much more control over 
the human—computer interface. This may be a desirable feature of an aid 
because as long as the human has the responsibility, s/he probably ought 
also to have the authority. The nondeterministic, heterarchic nature of 
discrete control models ensures, and in fact requires, this type of 
interface. The flexibility built into the interface requires that the 
human specify where s/he is and what the intent is. Yet the hierarchic 
structure of the model ensures that once the aid knows where the human 
wants to be in the control heterarchy, the appropriate information or 
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ABSTRACT 
Technology-driven efforts to implement automation 
often encounter problems due to lack of acceptance or 
begrudging acceptance by the personnel involved. It is 
argued in this paper that the level of automation 
perceived by an individual heavily influences whether or 
not the automation is accepted by that individual. The 
factors that appear to affect perceived level of 
automation are discussed. Issues considered include the 
impact of automation on the system and the individual, 
correlates of acceptance, problems and risks of 
automation, and factors influencing alienation. Based on 
an understanding of these issues, a set of eight 
guidelines is proposed as a possible means of avoiding 
problems in implementing automation. 
INTRODUCTION 
The impact of technology on society has been debated 
for at least two hundred years. The initial issues 
included safety and health of workers, and potential 
loss of jobs. In recent years, the debate has both 
broadened and become more focused. It has broadened in 
the sense that the concerns now include the safety and 
health of the community as a whole rather than just the 
workers. It has focused by looking more carefully at 
the individual and studying how his or her perceptions 
and behaviors are affected by technology. 
Of course, technology has affected individuals for 
thousands of years. Humans have invented a great variety 
of tools, devices, and machines. These inventions have 
made tasks easier, enabled improved performance of 
tasks, or enabled performance of tasks that would not 
otherwise be possible. 
Initially, people invented tools for their own use. 
Eventually, people began producing tools to be used by 
others--and the forerunner of the contemporary hardware 
store probably emerged. At some point, machines were 
invented that could perform simple tasks autonomously. 
Finally, machines emerged that could actually replace 
people in jobs once thought to be the sole province of 
humans. 
Automation emerged in the transition from technology 
designed for, assisting people to technology designed for 
replacing people. While the term "automation" is only a 
few decades old, the concept has existed for many 
hundreds of years. However, it is only in relatively 
recent years that automation has come to be viewed as a 
potentially serious threat to humans' roles in a variety 
of contexts. This paper explores the nature and 
potential of this threat. 
Exactly what is perceived as threatening? It cannot be 
the mere existence of automation since most, if not all, 
people readily accept and value a variety of 
automatically-controlled devices and machines. Examples 
of such "everyday automation" include automatically- 
controlled heating and cooling, self-service elevators, 
and automatic automobile transmissions. People tend to 
view these types of automation as very positive, most 
likely because such automation eliminates tedious or 
boring tasks, or tasks that distract them from their 
primary interests. 
Automation is viewed quite differently when it 
impinges on people's primary tasks. In the aviation 
domain, pilots are concerned that the essence of their 
jobs will be automated, except in problem situations 
where they will be expected to "save the day" [1,2,3]. 
In the area of manufacturing, skilled machinists are 
justifiably troubled by the fact that automation has 
reduced their jobs to simply monitoring, tuning, and 
tending the computers that now control the machining 
[4,5]. In the office environment, various commentators 
have noted and expressed some concern about people 
spending increasing amounts of their time interacting 
with machines, or interacting with each other via 
machines, and spending much less time interacting face 
to face [6,7]. 
Perhaps people's apprehensions about these trends in 
automation are simply natural reactions to technological 
and social change. Perhaps automated airplanes, 
factories, and offices will eventually come to be viewed 
as "everyday automation". Alternatively, it seems 
reasonable to hypothesize that technology and society 
may be undergoing a qualitative change that does not 
simply push society along the path of development, that 
has been followed for decades. Instead, this change may 
bridge a discontinuity and move society to a new path, 
one that is not understood nearly as well as might be 
expected. While this hypothesis is not explicitly 
pursued in this paper, much of the discussion relates to 
this issue. 
FUNCTIONS OF AUTOMATION 
It is rather pointless to debate whether automation, 
or technology in general, is good or bad, a blessing or 
a curse (8]. As discussed earlier, some types of 
automation appear to be accepted readily and valued, 
while other types cause more apprehension and even fear. 
Thus, no blanket acceptance or rejection is possible. 
It seems reasonable to assert that what discriminates 
acceptance from rejection is perceived level of 
automation. The concept of level of automation has been 
elaborated by Sheridan (9] and utilized by the Air Force 
Studies Board [2]. Sheridan's ten levels range from 
manual control on the low end to total automation on the 
high end. In order to understand how people might 
perceive these levels, Dieterly [10] has argued that one 
should consider the functions which are automated and 
people's perceptions of these functions. Based on recent 
work on the nature of decision making tasks [11], it 
seems reasonable to conclude that each of Sheridan's ten 
levels (except manual control) involve automation of one 
or more of the following functions: 
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5. Monitoring = 
generation of alternatives 
evaluation of alternatives 
selection among alternatives 
implementation of alternatives 
observation of results 
requires an understanding of a variety of factors, many 
of which are discussed in the following sections. 
THE IMPACT OF AUTOMATION 
Before considering the attributes of these functions 
that might affect perceived level of automation, it is 
useful to discuss examples of each function. 
Examples  
The most common functions of automation are monitoring 
and control. Everyday examples of monitoring include 
smoke detectors, fire alarms, and burglar alarms. 
Examples of automated monitoring and control include 
thermostats, automatic transmissions, and autopilots. 
Automated decision making, or selection among 
alternatives, is difficult to find except in situations 
where time constraints preclude human reactions (e.g., 
"scram" of a nuclear power plant). Further, even for the 
rare examples that do exist, one would have difficulty 
claiming that the computer is exercising "judgement". In 
fact, it would be reasonable to claim that such pre-
programmed selections do not really represent decision 
making on the part of the computer. 
Automated synthesis and analysis have emerged in the 
form of "expert systems" for medical diagnosis, chemical 
analysis, and geological evaluation. These systems are 
automated in the sense that they produce and analyze 
alternatives. However, in general, their autonomy is 
extremely limited because their typical users are very 
knowledgeable professionals who can readily evaluate and 
pass judgement on the systems' results. 
Implications  
From the above examples, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that humans will primarily discriminate among 
the five functions in terms of level of discretion 
allowed or required. In the context of this paper, 
discretion can be defined in terms of opportunities for 
exercising creativity and judgement. While the five 
functions do not map neatly to scales of creativity and 
judgement, it is clear that synthesis usually involves 
more of these abilities than are involved in the other 
four functions. Similarly, analysis and decision usually 
involve more judgement, and occasionally creativity, 
than do control and monitoring. 
While level of discretion, or extent of opportunities 
for exercising creativity and judgement, appears to 
discriminate among Sheridan's ten levels of automation 
in a behaviorally meaningful manner, this refinement is 
not sufficient to explain differences between perceived 
and actual levels of automation. It is quite possible 
for a device to be highly automated but not perceived as 
such because its level of discretion is not high 
relative to the interests of the perceiver. Therefore, 
perceived level of automation will be high to the extent . 
 that the functions which are automated preclude the 
observer from desired levels of discretion relative to 
his or her task objectives. Put simply, most people 
would gladly give their automobile transmissions 
discretion about when to shift, but would not like to 
lose discretion about where the automobile goes. 
To summarize, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that 
perceived level of automation is directly related to the 
level of desired discretion that is automated. If this 
hypothesis proves to be reasonable, then acceptance of 
automation can be increased by manipulating either the 
discretion of the automation and/or the desired 
discretion of the personnel involved. While this 
strategy may appear straightforward, it actually 
In order to discuss humans' acceptance of automation 
it is important to consider first what they are being 
asked to accept. More specifically, what are the impacts 
of automation that are to be accepted? This section 
elaborates upon these impacts in terms of both the 
system and the human. 
Impact on the System  
Interest in automation is usually based on the 
potential benefits to be realized. Improved performance/ 
productivity, safety, and economy are often anticipated, 
regardless of whether the domain is aviation [1,2,3], 
manufacturing [4,5], or the office [6,7]. The basis for 
these expectations is often the possibility of more 
flexible use of equipment and space [3,4,5], as well as 
more accurate and reliable control/production. 
A less obvious, but potentially more far-reaching, 
impact of automation is increased managerial or 
organizational control [5,12]. Computer-based, 
integrated air traffic control systems and computer-
based, flexible manufacturing systems not only have the 
potential for improved performance/productivity, they 
also provide ready access to performance/productivity 
metrics for each pilot, machinist, typist, etc. The 
availability of such a breadth and depth of information 
offers several obvious potential benefits and a few 
less-obvious potential dangers. 
.From a benefits point of view, there is opportunity 
for a management control strategy that approaches global 
optimality, rather than suboptimality due to local 
strategies that ignore system-wide objectives. 
Ineffective and inefficient aspects of system operations 
can be more quickly identified and resources dynamically 
reallocated. Thus, for example, rather than have idle 
resources, component parts can be produced "just in 
time" for humans (or robots) to assemble them into a 
larger system [5]. 
Beyond the obvious pressures that centralized control 
can present for humans who may have difficulty with the 
lock-step pace necessary for the "just in time" concept 
to work, there are two potential problems that are much 
more pervasive. The least subtle of these is the fact 
that individual workers can be monitored, perhaps online 
in real time, by a centralized system. This might 
result, for example, in a word processor informing a 
user that his or her productivity (e.g., pages per hour) 
is off or number of grammatical and spelling errors up 
this morning. Further, of course, the supervisor of this 
individual could access these metrics and perhaps 
"attach" to his or her terminal to provide pep talks 
when necessary! 
This rather obvious danger has received much attention 
by many commentators and is not pursued further in this 
paper. A much more subtle danger of centralized control 
is the strong possibility that globally-optimal policies 
might not be comprehensible in local contexts. For 
example, a reallocation of resources that makes 
wonderful sense from the point of view of the total 
system may seem very counterproductive to those whose 
purview is limited to portions of the system that will 
be net losers of resources. This could be particularly 
problematic if the "extra" resources are due to improved 
human (as opposed to technological) productivity. 
Thus, what emerges is a situation where humans in any 
one part of the system cannot exert substantive control 
over that part of the system because they lack knowledge 
of the objectives and operations of the total system. As 
a result, they may be responsible for implementing 
policies that they inherently cannot fully explain. This 
possibility can severely undercut acceptance of 
automation and perhaps lead to alienation, two topics 
that are discussed in some detail later. 
The phenomenon of lower-level unite of large 
organizations not fully comprehending policies developed 
by a centralized management is certainly far from new. 
However, the potential problems of such situations are 
substantially aggravated by computer-based information 
systems in conjunction with high levels of automation. 
This is due to the fact that the "agent" of the less 
than fully comprehensible policies becomes technological 
rather than human. There is no longer any recourse to a 
human supervisor or manager who understands the basis of 
the misunderstood management policies. 
Such a situation is due in part to technological 
trends toward large-scale centralized systems, and in 
part to an assumption that humans need not fully 
understand the objectives of the systems in which they 
work. This assumption might be tenable if these systems 
were fail-safe. However, in all cases of automation to 
date, humans remain as the ultimate backup system 
[1,13,14]. For example, when the automation fails, due 
to either a design limitation or a hardware/software 
problem, humans have to intervene and assure that normal 
operations are recovered. It is unclear how humans are 
supposed to fulfill these responsibilities if they do 
not understand those overall objectives of system 
operations that are relevant to establishing priorities 
in such failure situations. 
To summarize, the system-wide impact of automation 
includes potential improvements in performance/ 
productivity, safety, and economy. Increased 
organizational control also offers possibilities for 
more global optimization of operations. These potential 
benefits have associated risks. Global optimization and 
control can lead to local lack of understanding, as well 
as possible mistrust and alienation, particularly if 
centralized, computer-based monitoring of worker 
performance/productivity is an important element of 
overall managerial control policies. 
Impact on the Individual  
It is important to avoid limiting discussion to the 
system-wide impact of automation. Some of the more 
compelling effects of automation include the impact on 
the individual's tasks and behaviors. This is due to 
people's rather natural tendency to perceive change in 
terms of how it impacts them rather than in more 
conceptual or abstract terms. 
Upon reviewing the projections of various commentators 
on this issue [4,5,7,9], is seems reasonable to 
generalize several trends across various domains of 
application. With increased automation, humans in 
general will be 
1. Performing tasks less; watching and listening more, 
2. Walking around and communicating face to face less; 
key pressing more, 
3. Exercising much less discretion; coping with much 
more complexity. 
These trends may make sense if the only concern is 
machine-like productivity in normal, routine operations. 
A key issue is whether or not it is reasonable for this 
to be the only concern. 
There are two reasons why such a perspective is very 
short-sighted. First, despite substantial investments 
and designers' skill and good intentions, not all 
operations are normal and routine. Unfamiliar and 
failure situations emerge and, as emphasized earlier, 
humans are expected to intervene and take control. Some 
of the above trends are inappropriate and probably 
counterproductive relative to humans filling their 
backup roles. 
The second reason is more subtle. Humane are social 
animals. Whether the• environment is an aircraft cockpit, 
a factory, or an office of engineering designers, people 
need to interact with each other, and they value this 
interaction greatly. Indeed, face-to-face interaction, 
including exchanging of job-related stories, is an 
important and usually underestimated means of gaining 
information. Tidbits and nuances learned in this way can 
have profound effects on people's abilities to solve 
novel problems that later emerge. The trends noted above 
will substantially decrease this type of learning. 
A discussion of the impact of automation on the 
individual would be incomplete If workload was not 
mentioned. One of the frequent justifications for 
pursuing automation is a need to reduce mental and 
physical demands on the personnel in the system. While 
some arguments can be made for automation having reduced 
physical workload, most results to date indicate that 
mental workload is usually increased [3,5). This is due 
in part to designers' penchant for increasing system 
capabilities in the process of automating, and in part 
to automation requiring set-up, monitoring, and 
intervention activities that did not previously exist. 
Thus, the intended benefits for the humans in the system 
are seldom realized. 
ACCEPTANCE OF AUTOMATION 
While the previous section emphasized potential 
problems with automation, this does not mean that 
potential benefits are insufficient to outweigh these 
costs. In fact, the choices usually made by the 
techologically-oriented portions of society would seem 
to indicate that the benefits are perceived as 
outweighing the costs. Of course, the decision makers in 
question are not the same individuals who have to pay 
the types of cost outlined earlier in this paper. 
The individuals paying these costs are likely to have 
to deal with automation as a fait accompli. The issue 
for them, therefore, is not one of choosing automation 
but whether or not to accept it. Automation is accepted 
to the extent that it is favorably received and 
willingly used as intended. A lack of acceptance does 
not imply that the personnel involved strike or quit, 
but that they begrudgingly employ the automation if at 
all. 
Acceptance of automation has been found to increase 
with automation of tasks that humans cannot perform, 
distracting tasks, and tedious tasks [2]. It is, 
obviously, also necessary that this automation be 
reliable. Acceptance also increases as the personnel 
involved gain more experience with automation, and is 
greater for personnel who have relatively more statue, 
responsibility, and authority [16]. 
Acceptance decreases when the functions automated are 
perceived as involving decision making and when the 
costa of failure are high [16]. Acceptance also 
decreases when the personnel involved have no discretion 
in selecting modes of automation and intervening if they 
feel it to be necessary [2]. Finally, a variety of 
automation-specific problems and risks can lead to 
decreased acceptance. These problems and risks are 
discussed in the following section. 
Summarizing, acceptance increases when automation 
reliably performs tasks that people cannot do or would 
rather not do. Acceptance decreases when the tasks which 
are automated are viewed by the humans in question as 
uniquely their province. Acceptance also decreases when 
the humans in question view themselves as having no 
discretion in the use of the automation. 
PROBLEMS AND RISKS 
As noted above, acceptance can also be undermined by a 
variety of automation-specific problems and risks. 
Wiener and Curry [1], Sheridan and his colleagues [17], 
and other commentators have elaborated upon these 
considerations. This section only presents those issues 
necessary to the line of reasoning being developed in 
this paper. 
The most obvious problem is failure of the automation 
itself. As earlier discussion has emphasized, many of 
the potential difficulties for humane are due to the 
fact that they have to be prepared to intervene and 
assure recovery. People's concern that they will be ill-
prepared for this role could certainly affect acceptance. 
Humans errors in setting up automation have led to 
some well-documented aviation incidents and accidents 
[1,3]. Automation usually does what it is told, even if 
its instructions are inappropriate. If humans do not 
have the means and motivation to check what is 
happening, automation can "blindly" fly into off-limits 
territory or into the aide of a mountain I Humans' 
concern that they might supply inappropriate inputs 
could lead to their avoiding automation or duplicating 
its efforts as a means of checking. 
Humans can also be misled by automation. False alarms 
and missed events by automated caution, warning, and 
alarm systems can lead humans to be distracted by 
spurious events, and to be unaware of important events, 
respectively. Fault-tolerant control systems can 
progressively compensate for an increasingly degraded 
system, and avoid "bothering" the personnel involved 
until the situation is almost hopeless. When humans are 
misled in such ways, they tend to avoid using and/or 
depending on the automation. 
The types of problem discussed thus far would seem to 
be amenable to solution by improved and more 
sophisticated technology. There are other types of 
problem, however, that do not seem quite so 
straightforward. One of these problems is humans' 
consistently poor performance in monitoring complex 
systems. When humans' primary role is simply watching, 
they have a very difficult time remaining vigilant and 
interpreting what they see. As a result, they are ill-
prepared to detect that intervention is necessary and, 
subsequently, act appropriately. 
Beyond vigilance and interpretation problems, humans 
have a great deal of difficulty in acquiring and 
retaining skills that they hardly ever use. With the 
current state of technology, automation is typically 
monitored by pilots and machinists who have developed 
and refined their respective skills over many years. As 
a result, they know what should happen and how it should 
be done. This enables them to monitor, tune, and 
intervene effectively. With increasing automation, how 
will such skilled personnel be developed in the future? 
In fact, many current pilots and machinists complain 
about loss of skills due to lack of use. 
Perhaps the biggest risk is that people will become 
alienated by automation in particular and technology in 
general. If this happens to a large enough portion of 
society, then either technological change will be 
substantially slowed, or a technological elite will 
emerge which is inconsistent with society's usual 
egalitarian orientation. To devise possible means of  
avoiding these results, the factors that appear to lead 
to alienation must be explored. 
FACTORS INFLUENCING ALIENATION 
There exist possibilities for alienation throughout 
the process of technological change. Prior to 
implementation of an increased level of automation, 
there may be misunderstanding of the impending change 
[10]. This can lead to perceived inferiority and 
threatened obsolesence [9], perhaps due to people's 
inability to view their roles in the system as dynamic 
[10]. 
Once implementation occurs, humans may feel 
increasingly remote from their tasks [9] and, 
consequently, feel a loss of value of their sensory/ 
motor skills [1,5,9,17]. It is also likely that there 
will be decreased interaction with other humans, and 
more interaction with computer input devices [7]. In 
general, humans may feel a lack of discretion or 
freedom, and an overall loss of control [13]. 
On a longer term, as people gain experience with the 
system, acceptance may increase as noted earlier. 
However, also possible are several more pervasive 
aspects of alienation. The personnel in the system may 
place too much trust in the automation, endowing it with 
almost mystical abilities [9,17]. This can lead to 
diffusion and abandonment of responsibility [13,17], 
which presents obvious problems since the automation is 
unlikely to have any social or legal responsibility for 
its behaviors. Finally, any or all of the factors 
outlined in this section can lead to decreased job 
satisfaction, prestige, and self-concept [1,17]. 
It is easy to see how alienation can emerge. A lack of 
understanding of upcoming change, anticipated 
obsolesence, and loss of control would alienate many 
people, regardless of whether automation is involved or 
not. If the risks of alienation are to be minimized, and 
the chances of acceptance maximized, the development and 
implementation of technology must be approached in a 
different way. 
SHIFTING THE EMPHASIS 
A prerequisite to developing an appropriate approach 
to automation is explicit recognition that the goal is 
to support the personnel involved so that they may 
achieve system objectives of performance/productivity, 
safety, and economy. From this perspective, the use of 
automation technology is a means rather than an end. 
Thus, automation efforts should be objectives-driven 
instead of technology-driven. . 
Assuming that an increased level of automation is the 
best means to the above goal, how can user acceptance be 
assured? The earlier discussions in this paper would 
seem to indicate that acceptance is more likely to be 
high if the level of automation is not perceived as 
excessive. User acceptance can, therefore, be affected 
by manipulating perceived level of automation. The 
following guidelines seem to provide a reasonable 
synthesis of the variety of issues and perspectives 
discussed in this paper: 
1. To the extent possible, only automate system 
functions that personnel in the system feel should 
be automated (i.e., those for which they are willing 
to lose discretion), 
2. To the extent necessary, particularly if the first 
guideline cannot be followed, increase the level and 
number of functions for which personnel are 
responsible so that they will be willing to delegate 
lower-level functions (i.e., expand the scope of 
their discretion), 
3. Assure that the level and number of functions 
allocated to each person or type of personnel form a 
coherent set of responsibilities, with an overall 
level of discretion consistent with the abilities 
and inclinations of the personnel, 
4. Avoid automating functions when the anticipated 
level of performance is likely to result in regular 
intervention on the part of the personnel involved 
(i.e., assure that discretion once delegated need 
not be reassumed). 
These general guidelines reflect what might be termed 
necessary conditions for personnel to accept increased 
automation. However, these conditions are not 
sufficient. Recalling the discussion of alienation, it 
is important to consider how personnel will anticipate a 
planned increase in automation. From this point of view, 
the following additional guidelines appear relevant: 
5. Assure that all personnel involved are aware of the 
objectives of the automation effort and what their 
roles will be after the change, 
6. Provide training that assists personnel in gaining 
any newly required skills and helps them to 
internalize the personal value of having these 
skills, 
7. Involve personnel in planning and implementing the 
changes from both a system-wide and individual 
perspective, 
8. Assure that personnel understand both the abilities 
and limitations of the increased automation, know 
how to monitor and intervene appropriately, and 
retain clear feelings of still being responsible for 
system operations. 
The eight guidelines offered in this concluding 
section are meant as a starting point, perhaps as a next 
step from the Air Force Studies Board's guidelines [2]. 
While the empirical basis of these guidelines is far 
from rigorous, it is not clear that they can be 
"validated" in any traditional sense. Nevertheless, they 
are proposed with a primary goal of fostering a user-
oriented approach to automation, an approach that 
emphasizes supporting humans rather than replacing them. 
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An aid is proposed for the operator who must deal with a 
novel failure. A novel failure is one that is not covered by the 
operator's training or procedures or by an expert system (if 
present). The aid contains a disaggregated model of the system 
for reasoning causally about the system. It is to work in paral-
lel with the human and interact at various levels of control. It 
is designed specifically to mitigate some human suboptimalities 
and biases during decision making. 
I n LxQ d gALLIR 
In highly automated systems, the human operator is primarily 
a monitor and supervisor. A very important monitoring function 
is diagnosing equipment faults, an increasingly difficult task in 
automated systems. The current approach to fault diagnosis is to 
train the operator to deal with common faults, usually with 
training and specific written procedures. This approach has 
pbvious limitations when the fault is not covered by training or 
procedures. 
Recently, there has been much interest in supporting the 
human operator via expert systems for diagnosis. To be sure, 
this approach will improve the system performance on relatively 
common failures. Generally speaking, however, the expert systems 
are subject to the same limitations as training and procedures: 
the designer usually has to anticipate the failure for the expert 
system to solve it correctly. 
The approach used in designing this aid is to provide it 
with a disaggregated model of the equipment and to let it work to 
solve the problem in parallel with the human. It specifically 
aims to mitigate certain human suboptimalities during decision 
making. 
The disaggregated model will most likely be a qualitative 
model [21. It will provide the aid with some ability to diagnose 
the problem by reasoning causally about the system. It is 
claimed that a qualitative model represents the system in the 
same terms as does the human [41 [3]. Furthermore, it should be 
robust. Davis [1] has argued that systems that reason from an 
understanding of causality of the device can cover a wider range 
of faults than the traditional expert systems using collections 
of rules based on experience. 
Sequential interaction is the norm for most human-computer 
systems. It would be advantageous, however, if the human and 
computer both perform similar tasks in parallel, with some degree 
of independence from each other [8]. Then each, especially the 
human, can freely pursue his own strategy without being forced to 
change planned actions except when information is needed from the 
other diagnostician. This parallelism causes a wide range of 
interaction levels which we will discuss later in this paper. 
Mitigation of decision making biases is an important part of 
the aid. These biases can cause serious performance problems. 
Experimentally. we hope to demonstrate that the aid improves 
human diagnosis on novel failures. 
lha Igak and Ihg IuLaKgacia 
There is a system of components (e.g., pumps, valves, 
switches) and connections (e.g., wires, pipes). There are flows 
(e.g., current, heat) between components through connections. 
The operator's task is to find the states of the components 
(e.g., on. off) and flows (e.g., 	low, high) that explain the 
observed symptoms. 	Some states are known (in particular, the 
symptoms), and some must be inferred. 
The behavior of the system is governed by component rules 
that are selected by component state [2]. For example, a switch 
might be defined as follows. If the switch is cnigaft4, then its 
input and output currents are equal. If the switch is ialaga, then 
its input and output currents are zero. 	glgag4 and glagg are 
states. 	It is also possible to imagine other states which 
represent faulty behavior. A legal explanation is an assignment 
of states to components and flows that are consistent. To be 
consistent, the flow state must be equal at both ends of a con-
nection. It should be obvious that an explanation could be found 
by combinatorially searching through all possible component state 
assignments. The operator's task is to find this explanation. We 
do not consider fault correction or compensation here,, even 
though these problems are important. Presumably. a similar kind 
of search for an acceptable state would work. 
Ihg Illtg44Aag 
The interface will consist of a display with windows for the 
schematic, hypotheses, assumptions. and interaction. The 
schematic window displays a schematic of the system. It will 
show the components. connections, and the states assigned to them 
(if known). A system too large to fit on a screen will be 
hierarchically displayed. The operator will be able to zoom in 
and out to the appropriate level of detail. The schematic will 
represent the current state of reasoning about the equipment. 
The hypotheses window will display the current set of 
hypotheses about what could cause the system to fail. These 
hypotheses take the form of state assignments to components or 
flows (e.g., switch3 : closed). The list is creates first by the 
aid. The human may examine and modify the list. 
The assumption window will display assumptions made by the 
operator. An assumption is simply an assumed state (e.g., switch 
13: on). Assumptions are needed because some equipment is 
configured such that it is impossible to deduce states without 
assuming something. If the window cannot display all the 
hypotheses simultaneously, they may be scrolled within the win-
dow. Also attached to a hypotheses will be a plausibility indi-
cator. Currently displayed hypothesis will have their plausibil-
ity updated whenever new evidence requires it. The operator may 
also request the list to be sorted and redisplayed in order of 
plausibility. 
Interaction will be initiated in the interaction window. 
The actions available to the operator would include: 
(1) Making assumptions. 
(2) Asking the aid to search for a consistent set of states. 
(3) Changing the level of the schematic display. 
(4) Asking the aid to explain a chain of reasoning of how a par-
ticular state was determined. 
(5) Manipulating the hypotheses list. 
(6) Asking what-if questions. 
An additional possibility not heretofore mentioned is that 
of creating new states for components. Our intent is to make the 
component models complete, but there is always the possibility 
that a component could be in a state that is not part of the 
model. The operator will be allowed to create a new state with 
its own, new behavior. 
Mitigating gmhantimalitiaa 
A goal for this project is not only to aid human problem 
solving but also to mitigate human suboptimalities or biases in 
decision making [10]. In this section we will enumerate these 
suboptimalities. The suboptimalities breaK down into two general 
categories: those that can be mitigated and those that cannot. 
Our definition of mitigation is that the aid takes some specific 
action to reduce or eliminate the suboptimality before it occurs. 
This action must go beyond the aid's simply reasoning without 
bias about the problem. An example of a suboptimality that can 
be mitigated is limited short-term memory. It can be aided by 
using a display as a form of memory. An example of a suboptimal-
ity that cannot be mitigated is ignoring base rate probabilities. 
(An example of this would be an initial diagnosis of an extremely 
rare disease that covered the symptoms exactly). There is little 
that the aid can do directly to mitigate this except to reason 
correctly itself- More emphasis will be placed on suboptimali-
ties that can be mitigated in this section. 
Amhantigalitiaa Ihat Can Bt migi&Ageg 
An incorrect mental model is an operator's model of the sys-
tem that does not predict the actual system operation under all 
conditions. Many authorities agree that operators use models to 
make such predictions. especially under novel circumstances [4j 
[7]. Our ability to identify and understand limitations in men-
tal models is itself not well understood [9]. The compensation 
for an incorrect mental model will be the aid's (presumably) more 
complete and more correct conceptual model. Furthermore, the 
operator will be able to examine this model at the component 
level and ask for explanations of a chain of reasoning with the 
model. One requirement of the model is that its interface 
representation be compatible with the human's. 
Anchoring, confirmation bias. and cognitive tunnel vision 
are names for phenomena that will be treated in the same way. 
Humans tend to stay with an initial hypothesis. ignore evidence 
that disconfirms it, and avoid exploring alternative hypotheses. 
-To mitigate, the aid will list the most plausible hypotheses. 
When the human anchors to a relatively implausible hypothesis. 
there will be a discrepancy. Some hypotheses will be ranked far 
superior to the anchored one. This discrepancy would presumably 
cause the human to drop the anchored hypothesis. 
Another compensating action the aid will take is to undo 
assumptions. 	Suppose the operator makes an assumption about the 
state or some pump, which then leads to a solution. 	Berore 
allowing the operator to accept this solution as the only one, 
the aid will undo the assumptions and suggest a search for oth-
ers. 
Humans have limited ability to entertain more than three or 
four hypotheses or to generate a full set of hypotheses. To 
mitigate, the aid will display hypotheses in a window and main-
tain a full set with plausibilities. The operator will be able 
to interact with this list. 
Humans tend to use the more salient data (i.e., perceptually 
more prominent) in decision making. The aid will not be suscepti-
ble to this bias. of course. The aid could mitigate the human's 
bias by displaying saliently the most diagnostic information. 
This requires that the aid be able to choose the most diagnostic 
information. 
As mentioned earlier, humans have limited short-term memory. 
To mitigate, the display will augment memory. The current system 
state, the set or feasible hypotheses, and any current assump-
tions will be displayed. 
gmhonLimalltiaa nat. GATIAQL Jig Mitigated 
For the sake ot completeness we list and define here the 
suboptimalities that cannot be mitigated. As stated earlier, the 
only remedy for these seems to be to keep them out of the aid's 
reasoning. Then the disagreement between the aid's results and 
the human's results may be fed back either by continuous display 
or interrupting advice. It may be, however, that we have missed 
some way of actively mitigating them. The suboptimalities are: 
(1) Overestimation of the strength of causal relationships. 
(2) Representativeness. A diagnosis that matches the symptoms 
may be chosen even though its a priori probability is rela-
tively low. 
(3) Availability. If a hypothesis is easily recalled from 
memory, it may be used. 
(4) Elimination by aspects. If a large number of cues are 
relevant to a decision, the human may reduce the number of 
choices by eliminating all that do not qualify on a few, 
most important cues. 
(5) Revising odds over time. Relative to the optimal Bayesian 
model, humans are conservative in adjusting odds over time 
as new data become available. 
(6) Reasoning difficult when opposite to encoding. 	The normal 
operation of a system is most likely encoded as cause to 
effect 	(i.e., 	source to destination). 	Fault diagnosis 
requires reasoning from effect to cause. Reasoning opposite 
to encoding is more difficult than reasoning in the direc-
tion of encoding. 
(7) Insensitivity to data reliability. When faced with data of 
unequal reliability, humans tend to treat all data as 
equally reliable. 
(8) Sampling data. The human's sampling of data is biased 
toward the cheap and unreliable. 
The results of these suboptimalities, however, can be 
detected in the forms of an overlooked hypothesis, an overlooked 
datum, or poor evaluation or plausibilities. The aid will try to 
alert the operator to those faults whenever they are apparent. 
fighagtimglitigg faig thg Aid 
The suboptimalities of the aid are also of interest. 	Since 
the aid has not yet been completed, we do not know how it will 
perform. We suspect the following: 
(1) The aid may be slow. In this case, some of these computa-
tions might be done in the background while the human is 
thinking and interacting with the computer. 
(2) The aid will not be able to innovate. It will be bound by 
the model. 
(3) The aid will not be able to make inductive leaps. 
(4) The aid's explanations may be so long as to be useless. 
LigNala (34 IntgAAfiLAGA 
Throughout the preceding discussion we have been silent on 
the issue of dialogue control. Because the aid has some reason-
ing abilities about the system and is to intervene during some 
human suboptimalities, this issue is important. This section 
explains a philosophy of interaction. 
Our aid is designed to work in parallel with the human. 	By 
working in parallel. we mean that the aid and the operator both 
.,work toward solving the diagnosis problem [81. Each may have a 
hypothesis that it regards as most plausible and can take actions 
to try to determine if that hypothesis is true. Since the aid 
should at times work independently. the degree of intrusiveness 
of one problem solver (i.e., the human or the computer) toward 
another in interaction could have a wide range. For instance, 
the human could instruct the aid to do a subtask the human finds 
taxing or error-prone. In another extreme, the computer could 
pace the problem solving while requesting the human to follow 
instructions. At an intermediate level, advice and other forms 
of information exchange are also possible. Such a wide range of 
interaction levels is possible only when the aid can work in 
parallel on the problem. This in turn requires the aid to have 
some diagnostic reasoning ability. 
Controlling the interaction levels may be viewed as giving 
the general scheme of dialogue control. In the following section 
we stratify into five levels the ways in which the human and com-
puter interact. 
In the hggail -AiEgatgd lgugi, the computer will respond to 
the operator's request to perform a subtask or to answer a ques-
tion. Some subtasks may require a simple data retrieval and oth-
ers may require highly sophisticated reasoning. They are categor-
ized, however, into the same level since the computer's tasks are 
initiated by the human and the results are interpreted by the 
human. 
In the hmmga-aggggag lgugl of interaction, the human may 
tune the computer's processing by controlling its intermediate 
results. For example, the human may constrain the computer's 
attention by rejecting or reranking some computer-generatea 
hypotheses. Although adjusted by the human, the computer will 
generate and evaluate hypotheses with its own strategy. 
In the middle is the aciapgzAtigu lgmal in which each problem 
solver works independently except that one can voluntarily take 
the other's intermediate results as input. The plausibility 
indicators, for example, may and may not affect the human's pro-
cedure, depending on whether he wants to refer them or not at the 
point of time. Explicit dialogue is minimal at this level. Each 
problem solver will seek to evaluate hypotheses more or less 
independently of the other. 
The computer can advise the human in the Gwagutg;-AgggeAg 
lgmal. 	When it is apparent that the human has missed an impor- 
tant point, the computer should interrupt the human 	with 
appropriate advice. In response to this, the human will need to 
modify his problem solving. For example, if the human is inves-
tigating hypotheses of low plausibilities while there exists one 
that the computer thinks is highly plausible, the computer can 
suggest the hypothesis. 
The 5ow2uLgE-digga4ed lgugl is a counterpart to the human-
directed level- The computer will guide the problem solving by 
assigning subtasks to the human. The results will also be taken 
and interpreted by the computer. 
Several points need to be discussed in connection with the 
interaction levels. 	In a session of problem solving. the level 
is not necessarily restricted to one or two of the aboves. 	The 
level is dynamic and will be controlled by both the human and the 
computer. The level, unless explicitly maintained elsewhere, 
will tend towards the center (i.e., the cooperation level), in 
which the problem solving will be more independent. 
It is preferable for the interaction to stay as much as pos-
sible in the cooperation level for two reasons. The benetit of 
parallelism will be maximized at this level. Also, information 
exchange will be very efficient, if it is possible in this level, 
in that it is implicit. quick and does not disturb the human's 
problem solving procedure. Thus, information to be displayed in 
the cooperation level should be selected caretully to match the 
needs of the human. The list of highly plausible hypotheses is 
an example of such information. If it is not found in the 
display of cooperation level, the human should initiate the 
human-directed level interaction (i.e., requesting the possible 
hypotheses and their plausibilities) whenever he needs an aid to 
select the next hypothesis to be investigated. 
Choosing between directed and suggest levels when the com-
puter is to intervene is a technical problem to be solved. The 
computer should consider the seriousness of possible consequences 
of a detected bias to determine the interaction level. For the 
human, if both levels are possible, the human-suggest level may 
be safer to use than the human-guided level. At the former level, 
the computer will continue to work and thus give the human some 
intermediate results to which he can compare his own results. 
For example, the human may suspect several hypotheses whicn are 
not seriously considered by the computer. At the human-directed 
level he can examine these hypotheses one by one using the aid's 
facilities such as what-if inquiries. Alternatively. he can for-
cibly assign high ranks to those hypotheses so that their evalua-
tion by the computer will continuously be reported on the 
display. In this way, the computer will give more feedback to 
human from its independent reasoning. 
Cgualggign 
An aid for novel fault diagnosis is proposed. To the best 
of our knowledge, this aid is unique in the following ways. It 
attempts to aid the operator during novel fault diagnosis while 
most aids are designed for routine problems. It contains a 
disaggregated model which presumably corresponds to the human's 
representation of the system. It is designed to work in parallel 
with the human at changing levels of interaction. It specifi-
cally attempts to mitigate a number of human decision making 
suboptimalities during fault diagnosis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many researchers have used rule-based systems to model human problem 
solving [1,3,6,7,11,12]. Typically, the rule-based system has a large 
number of rules, each of which has several free variables that were 
adjusted during the modeling process. For the most part, significance 
testing of these rules has not been much of a consideration. It should 
be. It is certainly possible to describe N data perfectly with N rules 
using a trivial model that simply reproduces the data. While there is no 
evidence that this has happened in any of the research reported to date, 
there is a certain danger of overfitting a rule-based model. 
In this article we present three methods of testing the statistical 
significance of rules and other components of rule-based models. 
Throughout this article we shall assume that the percentage of behavior 
matched (e.g., commands) is the performance measure of interest. Two of 
the testing approaches, however, are not limited to this measure. They 
may be used to study any performance measure, though it may well be 
possible for a rule to produce a statistically significant effect on one 
performance measure but not another. The remainder of this article 
contains a section on notation, three sections on testing by analysis of 
variance, randomization, and contingency tables, respectively, and two 




A rule-based system consists of three components. The first is a 
set of rules of the form IF condition THEN action. The meaning of the 
rule is that if condition is true, then action could be taken. For 
example, the following rules describe behavior at traffic light 
controlled intersection: 
IF In intersection 
IF Yellow and arrival at intersection 
before the light turns red 
IF Yellow and arrival at intersection 
after light turns red 
IF Green 
IF Red 







Figure 1. Rules for traffic lights. 
If the above model can successfully match human behavior, then the rules 
form a model of the human. Often, the rules are interpreted as a model 
of the human's knowledge. Intuitively, the better the model matches 
human behavior, the better the model, all other things equal. 
The rules can be transformed easily into a computer program as 
follows. First, control statements are added that cause the program to 
examine the rules repeatedly and execute those whose conditions are true. 
Second, in order to compare model and subject actions, an input statement 
is added before the first rule. This statement reads the state vector 
3 
(e.g., the lights, the traffic, short term memory) that was available to 
the human when his or her decision was made. The program looks something 
like this: 









(in intersection) 	 THEN proceed 
(Yellow) AND (predict arrival at 
intersection before light turns red) 	THEN proceed 
(Yellow) AND (predict arrival at 
intersection after light turns red) 	THEN stop 
(Green) 	 THEN proceed 
(Red) AND (right turn) 	 THEN proceed 
(Red) 	 THEN stop 
Figure 2. Rules in a program. 
The second component of a rule-based system is a conflict resolution 
strategy. It selects the rule to execute when multiple conditions are 
true. In the above example, a rank-order resolution strategy was shown. 
It simply uses the first rule that matches. The ranking of rules can 
then be interpreted as a subject's strategy. Some other conflict 
resolution strategies include random selection, meta-knowledge, and 
backtracking. A random selection strategy simply picks at random one of 
the many matching rules. A meta-knowledge strategy has a higher-level 
rule-based system that chooses which rule to execute. A backtracking 
strategy will, if necessary, try all possible matches. It should also be 
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noted that it may be possible to write the rule conditions so that there 
is always exactly one rule that matches. 
The third component of a rule-based system is the input and internal 
variables. The input variables correspond to external data. The 
internal variables correspond to human short-term memory, which may be 
changed by the action part of rules. Both internal and input variables 
are examined by the condition part of rules. 
Evaluation of Models  
When comparing subject and model performance, the model is usually 
run open-loop without any knowledge on subject actions. In other words, 
the model can simply be treated as another subject. When comparing 
subject and model behavior, the model is usually run closed-loop as 
follows. The model has as input the same state vector the subject saw. 
The model chooses an action, and then it is recorded whether the subject 
and model agree. Then, the subject's action is used to control the 
system, and the process repeats. The reason for always following the 
subject's action is as follows. If the subject and model action differed 
and both were used, then the state vectors would be unequal after 
applying these actions. The model and the subject would then be working 
on different problems, and a comparison of their actions would make 
little sense. 
The following sections on testing rule-based models will specify 
ways in which the model will be modified and then run. The typical 
modifications are to delete or modify one or more rules. Running a 
model, perhaps in a modified form, means to compare its overt behavior, 
(e.g., commands) to a subject's and determine the percentage in 
agreement. 
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
The analysis of variance approach is the simplest of the three 
approaches for testing rule significance. To use it, each rule in the 
model is equated with an independent variable. The meaning of the 
variable is that at its high level, the rule is in the model, and at its 
low level, the rule is deleted from the model. The rule-based model is 
then run 2
N times (for each subject), which corresponds to a run with 
each possible subset of rules present. It must make sense for the model 
to do nothing, or else the model must be augmented before testing with a 
special, nondeletable rule that applies when no other rule applies. The 
resulting data can then be analyzed as an N-way factorial. 
To economize on model runs, fractional factorial designs should be 
used. The full factorial design, proposed above, will estimate the 
effects of many high order interactions that cannot occur. In fact, the 
interpretation of an interaction is that the corresponding rules 
interact. An example would be two rules, the first of which stores some 
value in a temporary variable and the second of which uses the temporiry 
variable. Such rule interaction is common, but rarely do many rules 
interact. An inspection of the rule-based model will reveal what 
interactions could occur. It should be possible to create experimental 
designs which test only the desired interactions. 
The testing of condition components of rules is also possible. In 
this case the reduction in error attributable to the greater specificity 
provided by the additional condition can be evaluated. Suppose, for 
example, that a significance test of each of the conjunctive conditions 








Proceeding as before, three independent variables might be equated, one 
with each of the three conditions. A three-way ANOVA could be run to 
test each of the three clauses. It would most likely be necessary to 
estimate the value of the response at the point where all three 
conditions have been deleted from the rule. Obviously, this process 
could be extended to cover all of the conditions for all of the rules in 
the model. 
The testing of groups of rules as a whole is also possible. To do 
this, an independent variable is equated with several rules, not just one 
as was done initially. The experimental interpretation is that the 
entire set of rules is either present or absent from the model during an 
experimental run. This pooling of rules corresponds to a supersaturated 
experimental design, and may be the only economical means of testing 
models with many rules. One logical choice for pooled rules would be 
interacting rules. Another choice would be the modeler's organization of 
rules into groups (e.g., S-rules and T-rules [6]). 
Analysis of variance makes several assumptions, one of which is that 
error residuals are normally distributed. Moderate departures from this 
assumption do not produce large deviations in calculated and actual 
significance levels. If the normality assumption is known or seriously 
thought to be incorrect, an approximate technique [4] may be used. 
Simply, the data are replaced with their ranks, and the remainder of the 
analysis of variance calculations remain unchanged. The significance 
levels produced by this method are reported to be nearly equal on 
normally distributed data to that produced by the standard F-test. The 
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rank transformation is more robust with respect to the distribution of 
the data, though it is not a distribution—free test. Finally, the 
hypothesis being tested here is whether the presence of a rule (or 
some other similar entity) explains a significant amount of variance in 
the subjects' performance. This significance is independent of the 
significance of other rules (or other entities) but may be dependent on 
the conflict resolution strategy. It is important to note the hypothesis 
because the next section tests somewhat different ones. 
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RANDOMIZATION 
The second approach to testing a rule involves forming a 
randomization distribution by randomly permuting a rule. Suppose a 
particular rule is under test. Its action can be replaced by a random 
action (e.g., a random number generator that chooses commands according 
to a priori frequencies). The model, with a single modified rule, can be 
run many times. Its matching performances can be considered a 
randomization distribution. The model in its unaltered form can then be 
run, and its resulting performance be referred to the randomization 
distribution. If its matching were higher than 95% of the randomly 
'generated values, the null hypothesis could be rejected at the 5% level 
(one-sided). The null hypothesis would be that a random action would be 
as suitable as the proposed action in the rule under test. The 
empirically determined significance level is partial in that it is 
potentially dependent on all the other rules being present in the model 
as well as conflict resolution strategy. 
The condition part of a rule can be tested by a very similar method. 
There is a minor difficulty in that a random number generator in the 
condition part of a rule does not appear to make sense. A solution would 
seem to be to create various mutant conditions by randomly selecting 
condition clauses from other rules in the model. The null hypothesis 
being tested here is that random conditions are as suitable as the 
proposed condition in the rule under test. The significance level 
attained is partial just as the one obtained in testing actions. 
An entire rank order conflict resolution strategy may also be tested 
by randomization. Basically, a randomization distribution of 
performances can be obtained by running all possible rank orderings (or a 
Monte Carlo sample) of rules. The performance of the model with the 
original rank ordering can be referred to this distribution as above. 
The significance level obtained is dependent on the rules. 
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CONTINGENCY TABLES 
Contingency tables are used to analyze nominal data. If the 
following is a rule-based model: 
IF condition ) THEN action1 


















NOT (condition ]. OR...OR 
conditions ) 
Figure 3. A contingency table for rules. 
The last row in the table covers the conditions that are not covered by 
any rules. The observed data fill the table in the obvious way: for a 
given state vector and subject action, the unique condition which holds 
is determined, and the cell under the subject's action is incremented. A 
model that matched the data perfectly would have all zero entries off the 
diagonal. 
1 1 
Certain restrictions must be met to employ contingency tables: 
1. Conditions must be mutually exclusive (2 rules cannot fire at 
the same time) 
2. Actions must be overt 
3. Each action must be unique (2 rules cannot issue the same 
action) 
These restrictions may be met in a variety of ways. Mutual 
exclusivity will be satisfied by any model containing conflict 
resolution, rank—ordering, or disjoint rule provisions. The unique 
action requirement may be accommodated by phrasing composite rules in 
which constituent rules prescribing the same action are joined by 
disjunction. 
The performance of the rules in matching the data can be evaluated 
with a chi—square or similar tests. The hypothesis is tested whether 
conditions and actions are independent, i.e., whether there is a 
significant difference between the proportions given the rules and the 
overall proportions. As a consequence, rules containing infrequently 
used actions receive more latitude using these tests than they do under a 
simple percentage of commands matched measure. 
Testing a set of rules is also possible as follows. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the action and the 
conditions aside from the relationship that is already described by the 
existing rules. Consider the test for the rule: 
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Figure 4. Table for testing a set of rules. 
Two statistics are computed. The first is a maximum likelihood estimate 
of chi-square, (G
2
) for the complete table. The second is a test of 
quasi-independence [2] for a reduced table in which cells corresponding 
to rule(s) under test are excluded. This corresponds in a table such as 
figure 4 to one cell per row for conditions covered by the rule(s). If 
the original G
2 
is significant and the quasi-independent one is not, this 
implies that the rules capture the dependency of the actions on the 
conditions. While attractive in directly referencing observables, this 
method requires large samples with replications of observed combinations 
of variables. (Unobserved combinations are treated as structural 
zeros.) 
Other Statistics 
A nonparametric analogue to the coefficient of determination R 2 is 
T
b 
[8] which may be used to determine the percentage of variance 

















 Z X_Fj 
Xij = table entry in rowi , column j 
X i+ = E Xij 
= 	X.. X+j 13 
N = total number of observations 
Individual rules, the disjunction of rules issuing a particular action, 
or the complete rule set consolidated into disjunctions by action can be 
evaluated in this way. If uncovered observations are excluded, T b may be 
interpreted as the extent to which actions covered by the rule are 
explained. If all observations are present, a N+lst category should be 
formed following the distribution of the uncovered actions. This T b is 
interpretable as the extent to which rules explain all the actions. 
Values of T
b 




2 X(I-1)(J-1) = (N-1)(I-1)T
b 
This statistic tests the hypothesis that Tb = 0, corresponding to the 
premise that there is no relation between conditions and the actions 
prescribed by the rule(s). 
A similar statistic, PRE (proportional reduction in error) [2] 
measures the reduction in error achieved by predicting actions based on 
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As demonstrated by this potpourri of procedures, a unified technique 
for testing rule significance based on multinomial sampling is yet to be 
developed. PRE answers the pragmatic question of gains in prediction. 
The quasi-independence procedure provides its complement by testing for 
unmodeled consistencies. Rules can be simultaneously tested in a 
contingency table but their contributions to rule set performance will 
remain unknown. T
b 
allows both significance testing and estimation of 
effects but cannot evaluate rule set performance without pooling rules by 
action. 
1 - P +m 
is 
APPLICABILITY OF VARIOUS TESTING METHODS 
For testing the degree to which a model's behavior matches a 
subject's, all three methods will work. A contingency table is clearly 
the best, however, since it requires the minimum in computation. 
Randomization is clearly the worst technique because of the large amount 
of computation and the partial significance levels it produces. A 
fractional factorial ANOVA is clearly superior to randomization on both 
of these points. ANOVA and randomization can both be used to test rules 
that modify internal, unobservable states. Contingency tables cannot. 
For testing overall performance measures, (e.g., time to solution, 
total errors) only randomization and ANOVA are suitable, with ANOVA 
preferred. Ordinarily, much more emphasis is placed on behavior than on 
performance, since behavior is much more difficult to model. There are 
situations in which testing hypotheses about both performance and 
behavior is desirable. One might want to show that a certain set of 
rules will affect behavior but not performance. For example, Morris and 
Rouse [10] have observed that theoretical training given process control 
operators often fails to change their performance. It would be 
interesting to test this concept analytically in a rule-based system. 
For example, a group of rules might be identified as the intended 
consequences of theoretical training. The model might be run with and 
without these rules, using ANOVA to evaluate performance measures and 
contingency tables to evaluate behavioral differences. 
The randomization method can be used on two hypotheses. The first, 
and more important, is to test the significance of a rank ordering of 
rules. This would seem to be the only way to test this type of 
resolution strategy. The second use is to test the hypothesis that part 
of a rule performs no better than random. This test would seem to be of 
little use, since ANOVA can test nearly the same hypothesis. 
16 
VALIDITY 
The previous methods are generally devoted to evaluation of rule 
performance and do not address the issue of rule validity. Just as a 
high R
2 
does not imply that all terms of its regression equation are 
significant, a high Tb does not vouchsafe for the future predictiveness 
of its rules. This distinction becomes important in the identification 
phase of rule—based modeling. Unlike identification based on parameter 
estimation, the identification of rules requires a search of the space of 
possible rules. An inductive pattern matcher must consider a large 
number of potential rules. In evaluating identification it becomes 
necessary to account for the probability of finding rules of comparable 
quality by chance. To answer this question the structure of the event 
space (observed combinations of condition variables), distribution of 
actions, and extent of search (set of possible rules) must be considered 
simultaneously. 
Eilbert and Christensen [5] refer to this problem as contrivedness, 
" ...the tendency of a search procedure to uncover apparent patterns where 
none exist." They suggest a randomization test for measuring the extent 
to which a search procedure uncovers contrived rules. The data consist 
of many pairs of state vectors with subject responses. The state vectors 
are left undisturbed, but the responses are randomly permuted. The 
resultant permuted data has reasonable state vectors paired with random 
responses. Contrivedness is the degree to which the search procedure can 
make sense of this random data. When many permuted data sets are 
searched, the search procedure results form a randomization distribution 
against which the results from the original, unpermuted data can be 
referred. While the previously mentioned randomization test will give an 
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idea of how opportunistic the search procedure is, it does not say how to 
refine the search procedure so as to avoid contriving rules. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article has identified several ways of testing a rule-based 
model of human-problem solving. The amount of testing seems to be on a 
par with the size of the model. Left unresolved for the most part was 
the problem of contrivedness of automatic rule identification. It seems 
fitting to close with the description of an interesting and difficult 
question in identification of rules. As stated earlier, many cognitive 
models have been built using rule-based models. Sometimes these models 
are built when the investigator has access to the subject's thinking. 
This is always the case in developing a rule-based expert system. Other 
investigators, particularily those running experiments with humans, may 
have only the data (i.e., commands) to examine. 
An important theoretical question is the limits to identification of 
rules from data that contain response errors. While there has been work 
in machine learning, it does not seem that anyone has examined this 
question [9]. It does seem important, because it bears on our ability to 
construct models. This problem also seems to be very difficult to solve 
formally. Hence, a preliminary investigation could be done via 
simulation, as shown in Figure 5. Basically, the approach is to generate 
some rules and some random stimuli, apply the rules, add noise, and try 
to identify the rules from the noisy data. 
The following would seem to affect identification: 
1. the amount of data and its coverage of the stimuli domain 
2. size and number of rules 
3. the number of times a rule fires 
4. the level of noise 
18 
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Figure 5. Block diagram for, rule induction. 
An example output from each block is shown. 
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It might also be interesting to investigate the addition of oracle 
variables in rule identification. An oracle variable is an extra 
variable (beyond the original stimulus vector) that provides information 
that ordinarily is not available. The first oracle variable might be a 
single bit to tell whether the response was in error. Another set of 
oracle variables would identify which rule fired. Yet another set of 
oracle variables could identify the variables that are part of the rule 
that fired. While these oracle variables may appear to be practically 
giving the solution to the identification program, they do not. These 
variables would be treated the same as any of the real stimulus 
variables. The identification program would have to infer the meaning of 
these variables in order to make use of them. 
While it does appear theoretically interesting to determine how much 
oracle variables can add, there are important practical benefits as well. 
Oracle bits could approximate the hunches of a human investigator. For 
example, the investigator may suspect certain data to be in error, a 
certain rule to have fired, or that only certain variables could be 
influencing the operator's decision. These hunches are a second order 
human-machine system: the investigator's attempt to identify (with a 
program) the rules of the human in the first-order human-machine system. 
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Introduction  
This report covers progress during the six month period from August 
1985 to February 1986. During this time there has been considerable 
progress in the following areas. Identification of the rules of PLANT 
operators is nearly completed. The aid for the Diagnosis of Infrequent 
Malfunctions (ADIM) has been programmed in a prototype form. 	A 
conceptual basis for preventing aircraft constraint violations (e.g., 
collisions) has been established in the constraint-based pilot's 
associate. Finally, the mechanical and electrical work on the aircraft 
simulator has been completed. The goals of the research are to build 
aids to help human operators control complex systems. A common approach 
throughout this research is the use of models to understand and aid 
operators. For example, the novel fault diagnosis research uses a model 
of a physical system to aid the human. The constraint-based pilot's 
associate uses an aircraft model to detect violations in constraints. 
The motivation for using system models in aids is to build smart 
interfaces. One way to produce an intelligent interface is to give the 
aid an understanding of the physical system. (A second way, perhaps 
orthogonal to the first, is to give the aid an understanding of the user, 
perhaps in terms of task or typical use knowledge.) It is possible to 
produce the illusion of intelligence by using an expert system based on 
shallow reasoning. This is not the approach taken in this research. 
Instead, aids based on models would seem to produce interfaces that are 
truly intelligent and more reliable. 
Inductive Rule Identification of Human Operators in Plant  
The research problem is to identify the rules used by human 
operators to control PLANT, a generic process control simulation. The 
data consists of a chronological sequence of state vectors and the 
operator's response to these states. The state vector consists of all 
displayed information about PLANT. 
It is believed that operators used goals when controlling PLANT. 
Since these goals are unobservable and usually time-varying, a discrete 
control model was used to infer operators' goals. The inferred goal then 
augmented the state vector. It was necessary to augment the state vector 
in this way, because the inference program INDUCE only works with 
information provided to it (it cannot infer missing variables). 
The current status of this project is that INDUCE has finished 
analyzing all of the data. There remains some post-processing that must 
be done. First, the rules must be merged, since INDUCE was able to 
analyze part of the data at one time. Second, the data coverage and 
selectivity of rules must be determined to retain only the best rules. 
Finally, the rules are organized into a tree and the final selection is 
made by hand. 
Aid for the Diagnosis of Infrequent Malfunctions (ADIM)  
The research problem is to build a fault diagnosis aid that 
understands the system and human fault diagnosis well enough to aid the 
human operator who is diagnosing a novel failure. The aid contains a 
qualitative model of the Orbital Refueling System (ORS), a NASA-designed 
shuttle payload for refueling orbiting satellites. By using the 
qualitative model, the aid (or the human) is able to deduce component 
states from given data (pressure, temperature, flow, valve commands, and 
other known component states). 
The aid is also designed to compensate for various suboptimalities 
that occur when humans troubleshoot. A widely recognized suboptimality 
is an incorrect understanding of component and system operation 
(incorrect mental model), which the qualitative model should remedy. 
Other important suboptimalities include incomplete hypotheses set 
generation and "cognitive tunnel vision" (fixation on a single hypothesis 
without considering any others). To remedy these, the aid will generate 
and display its own hypothesis list using the qualitative model. The aid 
will also attempt to infer the operator's hypothesis from the commands 
issued. The aid will then apply plausibility tests to the operator's 
inferred hypothesis. 
The status of this project is that the qualitative model is 
finished. Work is now underway to program the user interface. We expect 
to send to NASA-Ames a demonstration program (in Franz Lisp) in May. 
A Constraint—Based Pilot's Associate  
A "pilot's associate" may be based on either task analysis or 
physical constraints. 	The first and relatively common approach uses 
mission models to recognize the pilot's task from a rich and complex set 
of uses. 	Natural language understanding techniques are useful for 
recognizing situation and intent. After recognizing the pilot's intent 
and the situation, the aid can use this information to plan, provide 
advice, select displays, take action on its own, etc. 
The task model approach uses pilots as a source of expertise. One 
possible serious problem is that pilots may disagree with each other 
about what is proper. This disagreement may be so significant that each 
pilot might require a personalized associate. Identifying personalized 
associates might be magnitudes more complicated than building a generic 
associate. 
A second approach to the pilot associate is to view flying as 
operation within constraints. Further, operation of the aircraft 
anywhere in the feasible region (thus allowing for pilot judgment) could 
be viewed as satisfactory. Only constraint violation is a concern for 
the associate. Most constraints are based on physics, or relatively 
crisply defined laws and policies. It may be that there is only a single 
set of constraints for a given model of aircraft, in contrast to multiple 
pilot preferences. 
The constraint approach uses designers as a source of expertise. To 
within a safety margin, most designers would seem to agree on 
constraints. Furthermore, designers are available during the aircraft 
design, and it would seem wise to use their knowledge in the associate. 
An appendix ("Preventing maneuvering errors") contains a description 
of a constraint-based associate. This working note outlines the 
philosophy of such an aid. While this philosophy is still adhered to, 
the notion of using algebraic manipulation has been abandoned. The only 
models suitable for use are numerical. While the technical feasibility 
of the approach has yet to be demonstrated, it may be that this approach 
would eliminate aircraft crashes and solve in a general way the problem 
of when automation should take over from the pilot. 
The original plan for demonstrating a constraint-based associate was 
to study aircraft landing. As it turns out, this choice was unfortunate. 
Considerable time was spent studying aerodynamics and stability/control 
to build an aircraft model. 	It would appear that these models are 
relatively well understood. Consequently, it would appear relatively 
straightforward for an airframe manufacture to produce this kind of aid. 
Consequently, a new problem based on a more symbolic task has been 
chosen. 
DC-8 Flight Simulator  
Mechanical and electrical changes to the DC-8 Flight Simulator are 
complete. 	The simulator has been reassembled, and all sensors, 
indicators, and displays are electrically connected to terminal boards at 
the base. 	Much of this work was completed by Georgia Tech Research 
Institute personnel, who had the necessary fabrication facilities. They 
were also expensive. It is fair to say that we did not fully understand 
the knowledge, time, or finances required to build a simulator. 
Nevertheless, most of the investment has now been made and the simulator 
(see photo below) is close to being ready to support research studies. 
Two phases remain to be done. The first is to interface the 
simulator inputs to the A/D converter and thus to the VAX. The second is 
to use the VAX simulator outputs to drive the displays. 
PREVENTING MANEUVERING ERRORS 
OR 
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ABSTRACT 
A new approach to error-tolerant system design is proposed. Its source 
of expertise is in symbolic interpretation of physics equations, not in rules. 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem is to build an aircraft which tolerates human error. The 
approach is to build a monitoring system that observes the aircraft and the 
changes made to it by the pilot. Conceptually, the aircraft must operate 
within an envelope. The monitoring system has a model of the aircraft, the 
envelope, and pilot plans. It uses these to predict possible envelope viola-
tions. 
This automation approach is termed human error tolerance. The observa-
tion behind it is first, that human error cannot be eliminated. The introduc-
tion of automation displaces but does not eliminate human error. The 
automated device must still be monitored by the human. Humans are poor moni-
tors and sometimes perform poorly when taking over after automation fails. 
Rather than use automation in a futile attenv 	L to eliminate human error, 
we propose to use it to build an error-tolerant system. Under this arrange-
ment, the human is allowed to operate the system normally. The automation 
monitors the human for errors according to a computer-based representation of 
what should happen. The monitor asserts itself only in the event of an error. 
EXPERT SYSTEMS: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN 
An approach often espoused for this kind of problem is to build an expert 
system for monitoring. Such a system is usually contains a set of shallow 
rules that examine the current aircraft state for possible errors. This seems 
to be the approach taken by the aerospace community. 
There are disadvantages to such an approach. First, the future must be 
predicted if the action is to be taken by the pilot in time. Pilots usually 
agree that their planning must remain "ahead of the aircraft." Thus, the 
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values needed by the expert system must be future, predicted values. Second, 
how can a large rule-based system be verified to work? Program testing, which 
is the usual method of verifying software, demonstrates only the presence of 
bugs. Further, the rules are not well organized for the purposes of proof. 
Knowledge has been scattered about, which often causes unusual side effects in 
unusual situations. Unanticipated modes of operation and expert system brit-
tleness combine to cast a shadow of doubt on the value of this aid. 
My subjective experience with such an expert system is the basis for 
these statements. While the system works, there was always some uncertainty 
that the program would behave correctly on new data. Often this uncertainty 
would be on the correct value for a parameter in a rule. For example, should 
the clause be (altitude < 1500) or (altitude < 2000)? Another frequent uncer-
tainty was whether the correct variable was being used or if a condition might 
be missing. 
While an expert system should work some large fraction of the time, it is 
not clear that its reliability will approach that of traditional aeronautical 
systems. Thus, the question arises as to whether there should be an invest-
ment in an approach that might have practical reliability limits. 
A SYMBOLIC, AERODYNAMIC INTERPRETATION OF MOTION 
The proposed alternative to a shallow (i.e., surface cues only) expert 
system is to use the aerodynamic equations of motion to interpret the aircraft 
maneuvers. Simply stated, the expertise to be used is the set of equations of 
motion. The system block diagram appears in Figure 1. 
The basic question which the symbolic interpreter (MACSYMA, REDUCE) is 
repeatedly asked is the following: 
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(1) For a given control (e.g., flap position) 
(2) For a particular constraint (e.g., C1 < Cl ) 
max 
(3) Is there a point in time in the near future (say 90 seconds) at which 
flap position could cause the constraint above to be violated given the 
following: the current aircraft state (from sensors), other predicted 
control actions (from script), and current model of motion. 
(4) If the symbolic manipulator indicates a problem, it will give a specific 
time or time range when the constraint will be violated. 
This basic question is asked of all control-constraint pairs. 
The purpose of the scripts is to fill in default values for pilot 
actions. In essence, the scripts allow fixed values for all pilot control 
actions except for the one being solved for. There is an assumption here that 
the one variable-at-a-time approach will work. 
Some examples of constraints include fuel quantity, lift, airspeed, g-
forces, and a complex ensemble of conditions for landing. 
ADVANTAGES OF THIS APPROACH 
This approach has several advantages over an simple expert system. The 
first is that the system is more explicit. The predictions of the future are 
explicitly done. The assumptions of future pilot actions are explicit in the 
script. The aerodynamics are explicit. All this explicitness should make the 
aid verifiable and perhaps smaller and separable. 
The second advantage should be that the knowledge is more general and 
robust. 
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The final advantage is that this approach solves the difficult problem of 
when Automation should step in, and take over. Note that the output of the 
symbolic problem solver is, in effect, a plan. It is the last possible time 
that a control action could be taken to avoid a constraint violation. As the 
aircraft approaches the constraint, the pilot can be warned. As the aircraft 
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Figure 1. Block diagram of equation-based interpretation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This report covers progress during two periods: March 1986 -
August 1986 and September 1986 - February 1987. During this time 
substantial progress has been made in two areas. The first is 
Wan Yoon's Ph.D. thesis, "Aiding the Operator during Novel Fault 
Diagnosis." The second is a newer initiative, "A Model-based'and 
Constraint-based Warning System." 
The following were published during this period: 
Journal articles  
Yoon, W.C. and Hammer, J.M., "Aiding the operator during 
novel fault diagnosis," to appear in IEEE_ Transactions on  
Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 1987 (Appendix A). 
Yoon, W.C. and Hammer, J.M., "A deep reasoning aid for 
aiding deep reasoning fault diagnosis," to appear in Human-
Computer Interaction II, (G. Salvendy, ed.), Elsevier: Amsterdam 
(Appendix F). 
Technical reports  
Lewis, C.M., Identification of Rule-Based Models. Technical 
Report 86-5, Center for Man-Machine Systems Research, Georgia 
Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia. 
Conference papers  
Yoon, W.C. and Hammer, J.M., "Aiding the operator during 
novel fault diagnosis," Proceedings of the IEEE 1986 
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International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 
Atlanta, Georgia, 1986. 
Technical Effort  
During the first six months of this period, only Wan Yoon 
was supported. During the last six months, all three personnel 
were supported. During the summer of 1986, Dr. Hammer worked on 
the DARPA/AF Pilot's Associate program. Many of the interface 
concepts in the PA program were developed under NASA-Ames 
sponsorship. It was clear by the end of the summer that direct 
competition with this program was not possible. The PA program 
has more funding. The PA program can implement any aiding 
process that depends on knowledge acquisition from pilots. It 
cannot stop to answer basic research questions, although many 
have arisen during implementation. These unresolved questions 
are excellent topics for this grant because they are both 
relevant and realistic. 
Relation to Earlier Work  
The current research is focused on detection of human error 
and protection from its consequences. The first work in this 
area under this grant was [Hammer, J.M. "An intelligent flight-
management aid for procedure execution," IEEE SMC 14(6), 1984], 
which described a program for monitoring pilot errors by 
comparing pilot actions to a script. There were two dimensions 
to this work. First, it dealt primarily with routine errors 
(slips) that occurred during checklist activity. Second, the 
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model to which operator actions were compared was a script. 
There was no model of the aircraft or any part thereof. 
Current research is an extension along these two dimensions. 
The ORS novel fault detection aid uses a sophisticated device 
model rather than a script. Since this aid has been used to 
study novel fault diagnosis, the errors committed are bad 
decisions, not slips. Although error detection is not currently 
implemented, the plans for it are discussed in (Yoon and Hammer, 
1987] and later in this report. 
The newer initiative, the model-based and constraint-based 
warning system, uses an even more sophisticated device model and 
is to prevent all types of error, not just slips or bad 
decisions. 
PROJECT ORGANIZED BY MODELS OF DEVICES AND HUMANS 
The principle that organizes this project is that model-
based reasoning be the basis for aiding the human operator of an 
aerospace system. There are two models. First, the aid will 
contain a model of the device. The aid uses the device model to 
produce information for the operator. Second, the information 
produced for the operator is based on a model of human 
information processing. More specifically, the aid produces 
information that the operator needs and that is difficult to 
produce. What is difficult to produce is determined from the 
human information processing model. 
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The principle can be seen quite clearly in the novel fault 
diagnosis research. First, the aid has available to it a 
qualitative model of the orbital refueling system. Second, the 
aid uses this model to display information about what the ORS 
does normally (N aiding), what it is estimated to be doing (0 
aiding), and the difference between normal and observed behavior 
(0-N aiding). It can easily be argued that the unaided human 
operator must use at least some of this information in order to 
diagnose effectively a novel failure. This means the unaided 
operator must produce the information internally. It is 
difficult for the unaided operator to produce this information. 
Model-based aiding can also be seen to organize the model-
based and constraint-based. warning system. The function of this 
aid is to keep track of the present and future constraints on the 
system and to detect present and future violations. 
Central to this warning aid is a model of the physical 
system. Constraints arise from both physical and operational 
considerations. The model of the human is used to provide 
operational constraints and potential future inputs to the 
device. This model is actually part of the aid. The model also 
tells us that the operator does not or cannot consider all of the 
constraints when choosing an action. This model is not part of 
the aid. It is the reason that aiding was implemented. 
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Motivation for a Model-based Approach 
The motivation for a model-based approach is two-fold. 
First, model-based aiding is aimed at a technological breakout 
through the use of artificial intelligence in device modeling 
and, to a lesser extent, in the operator intent inferencing. We 
believe this approach will yield larger system performance 
improvement than a more empirical approach. 
The second motivation is to use what is known about human 
information processing and cognitive psychology to do cognitive 
engineering. Fortunately, exact predictions about human 
information processing are not always required. If some require 
processing is known to be difficult or error prone, then aiding 
(using artificial intelligence) should be investigated. 
Artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology (or at 
least that part that is model-oriented) are close enough to use 
the same technical language. A consequence of this is a 
synthesis between the human and device models. Another 
consequence is an increased emphasis on the artificial 
intelligence technology of the aid. 
AIDING THE OPERATOR DURING NOVEL FAULT DIAGNOSIS 
The technical status of this effort is described in 
Appendices A and F. The remainder of this section describes the 
technical progress during the reporting period and future plans. 
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Technical progress  
In February 1986, the ORS simulation was just a simulation 
connected to a display. There were plans for aiding, but no 
implementation. Since then, the following have been completed. 
1. The code for 0, N, 0-N, and 0-H aiding was written and 
debugged. 
2. A preliminary, observation evaluation of unaided problem 
solving was conducted. The results are described in 
Appendix A. 
3. Three experiments to evaluate N, 0 and 0-N, and 0-H have 
been planned. The first two have been completed and the 
results are described in Appendix F. 
4. The training materials for the experiment were produced. 
The materials had to be carefully prepared and refined for 
two reasons. If they allowed too much practice or were 
otherwise too successful, the subjects might no longer use 
knowledge-based reasoning. On the other hand, too little 
training would not allow the subject to understand or 
interpret the basics of fluid flow. 
Future plans for the ORS simulator  
Considerable effort went into the construction of the ORS 
simulation. Relatively less effort was required to produce the 
existing aids. We would like to capitalize on this by studying a 
variety of research questions using the ORS simulator. The 
following are a list of potential problems to investigate. 
1. Add and improve existing aids. We have observations from 
our more recent experiments that suggest more about aiding 
the operator. The 0-N aid, which points out pressures which 
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differ between the observed and normal system, is useful 
primarily at the beginning of diagnosis. This is because it 
guides the diagnosis to the proper locale but is of less 
assistance thereafter. (In contrast, the 0 aid, which shows 
equal pressure paths and mass flow paths, appears useful 
throughout diagnosis.) 
These observations suggest that operators need an aid during 
local testing. During local testing we have observed two 
operator deficiencies. First, the operator may incompletely 
test a local region (which does contain the fault), and then 
moves to another part of the ORS for testing. This greatly 
lengthens the time to diagnose. The operator needs to know 
when a locale has been completely tested. Second, the 
operator could probably benefit from seeing a list of • 
suggested hypotheses. While suggesting hypotheses is 
computationally intractable for the entire ORS, it may be 
reasonable for small locales. In fact, if the aid were able 
to eliminate infeasible hypotheses as data were collected, 
the display of remaining hypotheses may keep the operator 
from leaving the locale prematurely. 
Another observed problem is that the operator can choose 
good hypotheses but cannot effectively test them. This 
suggests a hypothesis testing aid which converts a specific 
hypothesis into a series of actions that test it. 
Interpretation of the results could optionally be included 
in the aid as well. 
Another aid would prevent fault masking. It is possible to 
configure a malfunctioning system so that its fault is not 
apparent. For example, if there is a leaking valve, this 
failure can be masked by closing another valve in series 
with it. The operator can mask a fault through a series of 
changes and then be unable to unmask it. Unmasking requires 
only undoing all the changes, but the operator may not be 
able to remember them. It would be relatively simple to 
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make available a command to return to the most recent state 
where abnormal behavior was observed. 
2. Inference of operator intent, especially of hypotheses. 
For the aid to know the operator's intent would be useful in 
several advanced aiding methods described below. (Intent 
inference is not directly useful in and of itself.) The 
first step in understanding operator intent is to understand 
the process of hypothesis formation in the diagnosis task. 
While a preliminary description of this is in the paper in 
Appendix A, it is too subjective to be implemented on a 
computer. A more detailed examination of the verbal 
protocols currently being collected should yield a process 
description of diagnosis. 
Given an objective process description, it would then be-
possible to detect the occurrence of decision-making biases 
during fault diagnosis. In fact, virtually all of the 
effort to do so is front-loaded into the intent inference 
work. Once an operator hypothesis is known, it would be 
relatively easy to test it for plausibility or keep track of 
how long the operator maintained it. 
To build a training system for the ORS requires an intent 
inferencer. It may have to be modified to reflect a 
student's reasoning process. A more systematic approach, 
however, would be to let the intent inference be a 
prescriptive model or descriptive model of an expert. To 
accommodate the novice, a buggy model of dynamic process 
understanding could be used. This buggy model would be 
analogous to the buggy models of subtraction and programming 
that have already been developed. 
3. A failure novel to the aid. Currently, the aid's 
model has a representation for every possible failure 
mode of every component. It would be interesting to 
give operators a failure that the aid's model does not 
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represent. This truly novel failure would occur after 
the operators had been aided on a series of more 
routine problems. It is important to know if the 
operators could determine when the aid was wrong. 
MODEL-BASED AND CONSTRAINT-BASED WARNING SYSTEM (MCBWS) 
MCBWS is a warning system for detecting present and future 
constraint violations in aerospace systems. For demonstration 
purposes, the fuel system of the F15 was chosen (Appendix E). 
The warning system contains a model of the fuel system and the 
physical and operational constraints on it. The purpose of this 
research is to demonstrate an electronic cocoon to surround the 
operator. The boundary of the cocoon is determined by present 
and future constraints. The system will be allowed to operate 
anywhere within the cocoon. Drawing near the boundary will cause 
an error message. Once demonstrated, the principles should be 
applicable to a wide variety of aerospace systems. 
Motivation for the Warning System 
Flying an aircraft requires thinking about the future. 
Avoiding error means avoiding constraint violations. Thus, it 
would seem that avoiding future constraint violations is central 
to avoiding error. Our view of flight is that it is a problem of 
remaining within the constraint envelope. The remainder of this 




The two primary components of the warning system are the 
fuel system model and the constraint identifier. The fuel system 
model is capable of answering questions such as whether a 
particular constraint is currently violated or will be violated 
either now or in the near future. Predictions about a future 
constraint violation require both the constraint itself and 
likely fuel system inputs from now until the future point. Both 
of these come from the constraint identifier. Most constraints 
are the result of operator plans. The constraint identifier uses 
both the aircraft state and operator actions to select pilot 
plans. Associated with these plans are 
- predictions of the future input actions to the fuel system 
- constraints that must hold during the plan 
- future plans that may occur, along with a description of 
the situation in which they will occur 
As can be seen, once a plan is identified, its actions, 
constraints, and future plans are known. From future plans, 
future actions and constraints can be determined. Obviously, 
this forward chaining process can be continued as long as 
necessary or feasible. 
Current Status  
All of the technical effort has been devoted to building the 
fuel system model, which is more fully described below. The 
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constraint identification code has received no attention becailse 
1) I know how to do it from working on the Pilot's Associate 
program; 2) it is not hard to construct a plan recognizer for 
those plans relevant to the fuel system; and 3) the constraint 
recognizer cannot be tested without the fuel system model. 
Fuel system model  
The fuel system model is organized as a set of components. 
Each component is connected to other components or to inputs or 
outputs at the boundary of the system. Components have one or 
more behaviors, each of which is described by a set of equations 
or inequalities (termed algebraic relationships) 1 . These 
algebraic relationships describe the relationships between 
component inputs, outputs, and state variables. The 
relationships are symbolic and could be interpreted either 
quantitatively or qualitatively. If symbolic processing cannot 
answer a question about constraint violation, a numerical answer 
could be determined. 
One of the basic operations is to solve the fuel system, 
which means to determine the behavior of each component. This 
occurs as follows. Each component has several mutually exclusive 
behaviors. First, find the subset of behaviors that is feasible. 
Some behaviors can be shown infeasible immediately because at 
least one algebraic relationship in the behavior is violated by 
other algebraic relationships known to be true. For each 
1. The constraints that arise from operational or physical 
considerations will be expressed in a form identical to the 
algebraic relationships that describe component behavior. 
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feasible behavior, assume that behavior is valid. Then, 
recursively attempt to solve the remaining components for their 
behaviors. This is a simple depth-first search through a space 
that is constrained by the behaviors of the components. 
What has been written is the following. A slot-filler 
representation has been adopted for component descriptions 
(Appendix D). A set of routines that solves for the component 
behaviors has been written. A set of routines for manipulating a 
quantity space has been written. We were unable to reuse Wan . 
 Yoon's quantity space code for the following reason. His code 
uses property lists to store information. A change to a 
property, even if done within a function, is globally visible. 
It is as if properties are stored in global variables. 
Properties are not automatically undone during a search backup, 
which makes them undesirable. 
Future Plans  
The following must be done: 
1. Build a model of the fuel system. This requires that we 
understand the fuel system: the types of pumps, the components 
that are not shown on the figure, etc. This understanding must 
then be encoded in the representation language and debugged. 
2. Build the constraint identifier. This will require 
knowledge engineering with pilots to determine operational and 
physical constraints. These will be attached to plans, which 
will also require identification and duration conditions. 
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After this much development, the system can be demonstrated 
to detect current constraint violations. As described earlier, 
this is not sufficient to meet the need to prevent the 
consequences of pilot error. Reasoning about the future is also 
required. The second part of the project will develop this 
capability and will parallel the the first part. 
1. Extensions for reasoning about the future. The model 
(the reasoning component, the device representation, and the fuel 
system description) must be enhanced to allow prediction of the 
future. The inputs to the model then become: the current system 
state, the predicted pilot inputs to the system, and the 
constraint(s) to be tested for potential future violation. It is 
possible for the model to output either yes or no. A no output 
means that there is no way that the constraint will be violated. 
A yes output will mean that there is noway to avoid violating 
the constraint. The most likely expected output from the model 
would be another list of constraints. This output list would 
have to hold for the input constraint to remain unbroken. The 
output constraints in general will have to hold at times not 
later than the input constraint. This is because if violating 
the output constraints would cause the input constraint to be 
violated, then the output constraints must be violated first. 
The output constraints hold at times closer to the present than 
the input constraints. 
2. The constraint identifier knowledge representation will 
need to be enhanced. Each plan will also need to have (1) 
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potential future plans plus the conditions under which each 
future plan would occur; and (2) the predicted pilot input over 
the duration of the plan. 
Appendices 
A 	Aiding the Operator During Novel Fault Diagnosis 
B Instructions for Wan Yoon's experiment, parts 1 and 2 
C 	Problems worked after part 2 training (both training 
problems and experimental problems) 
D Component knowledge representation 
E F-15 fuel system 
F 	A Deep-Reasoning Aid for Deep-Reasoning Fault Diagnosis 
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AIDING THE OPERATOR DURING NOVEL FAULT DIAGNOSIS 
Wan C. Yoon and John M. Hammer 
Center for Man-Machine Systems Research 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, Georgia 30332 
ABSTRACT 
The design and philosophy are presented for an intelligent aid for a 
human operator who must diagnose a novel fault in a physical system. A novel 
failure is defined as one that the operator has not experienced in either real 
system operation or training. -1Because the fault is novel, the human must rea-
son using causal knowledge. The aid contains unique features that support 
such reasoning. One of these is a qualitative, component-level model of the 
physical system. Both the aid and the human are able to reason causally about 
the system in a cooperative search for a diagnosis. The aid has direct access 
to the operator's hypotheses when the qualitative model is used. Because of 
this, various decision-making suboptimalities and biases can be detected and 
mitigated by the aid. 
INTRODUCTION 
In highly automated systems, the human operator is primarily a monitor 
and supervisor [Rasmussen 1983, 1984]. An important monitoring function is 
diagnosing equipment faults, a difficult task in automated systems. The 
current approach to fault diagnosis is to train the operator to deal with 
relatively common faults. The training might teach the operator to use symp-
toms to distinguish faults and to follow procedures to correct them. While 
this approach should be successful with common faults, it does not support 
diagnosis of novel faults. 
A common sense but unsuccessful approach to help operators diagnose novel 
fault is to teach them the principles of operation of the system. With this 
theoretical knowledge, the operators should be able, in principle, to diagnose 
any failure. Unfortunately,- there is little evidence that theoretical 
knowledge helps operators diagnose failures [Morris and Rouse 1985a, 1985b]. 
A logical consequence of this observation might be to put theoretical 
knowledge into the aid rather than the operator. 
Recently, there has been much interest in supporting the human operator 
via expert systems for diagnosis. To be sure, this approach will improve the 
system performance on relatively common failures. As for novel failures, many 
expert systems for diagnosis [Shortliffe 1976, Miller, Pople, and Myers 1984] 
are based on shallow reasoning: a set of symptoms suggests a diagnosis. This 
mapping is not explicitly based on a system model. Consequently, such systems 
are subject to the same limitations as training and procedures. The designer 
may have to anticipate the failure for the expert system to solve it 
correctly. 
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Aiding from Deep Reasoning 
In contrast to the above, our aid is based on deep, causal reasoning 
about the system. There are several advantages to this approach. First, 
novel fault diagnosis is normally considered to be knowledge-based reasoning 
[Rasmussen 1983]. Hence, it seems appropriate for an intelligent aid to rea-
son causally. Second, this approach should be more reliable and robust. The 
system knowledge is represented at the component level. Because components 
are small and comprehendable, it should be possible to create representations 
that are correct, perhaps even provably so. These points support the belief 
that causal reasoning can cover a wider range of faults [Davis 1984]. 
In spite of the power of the intelligent aid, we believe there are 
several reasons to keep the human in command of the problem solving. First, 
diagnosing a novel failure may require the human to extend the aid's model. 
Second, when diagnosis involves operating the system (e.g., opening valves, 
starting motors), it would be better to leave these operations to the human. 
Third, causal reasoning is slow because the diagnosis problem is a combina-
torial search. It may be that the human and the aid may be better able to 
find a solution cooperatively than either can alone. This is possible, even 
necessary, for two reasons. The human has better pattern recognition capabil-
ities and can make inductive leaps. Second, the human may need to resolve 
ambiguities inherent in the aid's model. 
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Decision—Making Biases  
The aid is designed to mitigate human suboptimalities that occur during 
decision—making and troubleshooting [Wickens 1984]. Two categories of subop-
timalities used here are knowledge—limited and cognition—limited. The 
knowledge—limited suboptimality is simply that the operator does not fully 
understand the system. Obviously, the aid's model is a basis for compensating 
for this problem. There are many cognition—limited suboptimalities, which are 
discussed fully in a later section. The aid is designed, however, to prevent 
suboptimalities from occurring as well as detect and announce any that do 
occur. It should be noted that detection of suboptimalities requires a system 
model. Without a model it is logically impossible for the aid to interpret 
what the operator is doing. Thus, the system model is fundamental to aiding. 
Motivation for this Aesearch 
There are several justifications and motivations for the research in this 
area. The first is to explore a new basis -- qualitative models -- for aiding 
humans in a domain for which there are few aids. Specifically, we wish to 
evaluate the suitability of qualitative models as the internal model of the 
aid. Many claims [Gentner and Stevens 1983; Rouse and Morris 1986] have been 
made that humans reason qualitatively about physical systems. The implication, 
which will be tested, is that qualitative models are useful as models in aids. 
Second, we wish to form a more detailed understanding of human diagnosis of 
novel faults. This presumably significant role for humans will be studied 
initially with observational methods, including verbal protocols. 
In the subsequent sections of this article, we will review some relevant 
research on novel fault diagnosis, discuss the context of our experimental 
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task, and discuss the qualitative model in our aid and its expected effects. 
In the final section, we will discuss the suboptimalities of interest and the 
methods to mitigate them. 
REVIEW OF NOVEL FAULT DIAGNOSIS IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
The literature on novel fault diagnosis in complex systems is limited. 
The section will have three parts. The first is empirical research on the 
effects of training on diagnosis. The second is Rasmussen's system engineering 
approach to the information needs of operators. The third is Wohl's perfor-
mance model for predicting diagnostic times for novel failures. The last is 
the human information processing view of problem solving, which is similar in 
some ways to novel fault diagnosis. 
Shepherd et al. [1977] have studied the effects of training on the errors 
operators committed while diagnosing familiar and unfamiliar failures. There 
were three kinds of training. The first was "no story," which amounted to a 
brief introduction to the control panel instruments. The second was "theory," 
in which the operation and flow of materials was explained. The third was 
"rules," which included the above theory training plus a set of proceduralized 
rules for diagnosing failures. After this training was administered, the 
three groups were tested. All three groups were significantly different, with 
rules best and the no story group worst on accuracy. The groups were then 
trained by examples to diagnose faults, and a second test revealed no differ-
ences between the groups. Later, all groups were tested again with two sets 
of faults -- familiar and unfamiliar. Familiar faults were diagnosed equally 
well by all groups, but unfamiliar faults were diagnosed best by the rules 
group. 
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An experiment on the effects of training on operator control of a simu-
lated process control plant has been conducted by Morris and Rouse [1985a]. 
One situation examined was the diagnosis of novel failures for which some of 
the subjects had sufficient theoretical training to diagnose the failure. 
The system controlled was a network of fluid tanks. Fluid was pumped 
from these tanks through valves to neighboring tanks. Two novel failures were 
studied: a tank rupture that caused a loss in fluid, and a safety system 
failure that caused the system to shut down when it was not in danger. The 
experimental results did not show any differences due to training. Nearly all 
subjects were able to diagnose the tank rupture, and only half were able to 
diagnose the safety system failure. 
System Engineering 	Complex Diagnosis  
Rasmussen [1983] has discussed operator control of complex systems in 
terms of three levels of information processing: skills, rules, and knowledge. 
Skill-based performance applies primarily to automatic, sensory-motor tasks 
that proceed without conscious control. One characteristic of such perfor-
mance is that it is not decomposable or verbally expressible (for example, one 
cannot verbalize the skill of riding a bicycle). 
The rule-based level is the second level of processing. A rule is a 
direct mapping from a set of input symptoms to a diagnosis or action. While 
performing at this level, the operator does not make recourse to causal 
models. Rule-based reasoning can be verbalized, which distinguishes it from 
the previous level. 
The knowledge-based level is most relevant to the research reported here. 
Knowledge-based reasoning must be applied when novel failures occur. Neither 
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skill-based or rule-based behavior should be used, and hopefully, the operator 
realizes this (but there is no guarantee). The operator's control occurs by 
first forming a goal and then a plan consisting of actions that lead to the 
goal. The plan is evaluated and perhaps modified by a combination of mental 
simulation or actual actions taken on the machine. Mental simulation relies, 
among other things, on the operator's mental model of the system. 
Rasmussen [1985] has discussed functional and causal reasoning in diag-
nosis and control of complex plants during novel failures. Physical systems 
may be represented along a hierarchical, causal-functional continuum. The 
causal end of this dimension is a description of components according to their 
local behavior and their physical and structural location (much like a quali-
tative model). The functional end of the dimension is a description of aggre-
gates according to their function or purpose. In highly automated systems, 
the operator also needs to know the intent of the automation, since it can 
change both the function and structure by its own action. The implications 
for novel fault diagnosis are the claims that an operator needs a multilevel 
display for intention, function, and causation. The motivation for this is 
that diagnosis begins at a functional level and moves toward a causal level as 
the diagnosis becomes more precise. 
Maintenance Complexity 
Wohl [1982] has observed that electronic troubleshooting in complex 
equipment operates in two modes. This first mode is for routine failures, 
which account for 65-80% of all failures. These are repaired relatively 
quickly. The second mode is for novel failures, which require substantially 
more time to diagnose and lengthen substantially the mean time to repair. A 
model for predicting the frequency distribution of novel malfunction repairs 
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has been developed and tested. The model has three parameters: an equipment 
complexity index, which is the average connectivity of a component; second, an 
average time to test a component; and third, a parameter that describes how 
diagnostic interpretation becomes geometrically more complex with each diag-
nostic test. The test of the model showed a correlation of r=.98 between 
measured and predicted mean time to repair for fourteen different electronic 
systems. In a related article, Wohl [19831 observed that the model predicted 
an infinite mean time to repair when the equipment complexity index exceeded 
7.5. An infinite mean time to repair simply means that some malfunctions are 
never diagnosed. An equipment complexity index of 7.5 means that the average 
component is connected to 7.5 other components. This limiting value is close 
to the chunk capacity of human working memory. This result is consistent with 
the often observed relationship between connectivity and diagnosis complexity. 
Complex Diagnosis Ana Human Problem Solving.  
Much of the research on problem solving would appear to be relevant to 
novel fault diagnosis [Newell and Simon 1972]. We briefly review here the 
human information processing approach to modeling of problem solving and then 
discuss how novel fault diagnosis differs from it. The information processing 
approach is centered around the idea of a problem space., which is the human's 
representation of the key characteristics of a problem. The subject is given 
an initial and goal state in the problem space and a set of operators that 
transform the problem from one state to another in the problem space. Usu-
ally, the states and operators are crisply defined. Often, there is a metric 
for the difference between a given state and the goal state. This metric can 
be used as a heuristic for selecting the operator that moves the greatest dis-
tance toward the goal. 
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The behavior of a human is modeled by a production rule system. Each 
production rule contains a condition and an action. The condition is a 
boolean expression on the features of the problem space, some of which are in 
the human's working memory and some of which are externally perceivable. The 
potential actions are working memory changes or operators as described above. 
Clearly, novel fault diagnosis is a special case of problem solving. The 
specializations are as follows. First, the human operator must realize the 
presence of a novel rather than routine failure. Ideally, the displays that 
result from a novel fault would be sufficiently different from the displays of 
routine faults. If the novel fault had a display different from routine 
faults, detection of a novel fault would seem to be assured. Unfortunately, 
no existing system has been designed from this perspective. 
Another specialization is - that novel fault diagnosis will occur when the 
operator has a problem space designed for routine operations and routine 
failures. It is not known if an existing problem space representation will 
interfere with novel fault diagnosis. It would seem difficult to believe that 
some interference does not occur. 
A final distinction between novel fault diagnosis and most problem solv-
ing research has been how clearly the human can observe the system and the 
consequences of changes to it. For example, in cryptarithmetic, the human has 
complete information about the system, the legal operations, and their immedi-
ate consequences. Typically, when an operator controls a complex system, the 
system state is less clearly perceived, the available operations are larger in 
number, and their effects less clearly perceivable. The consequences of this 
imprecision are not well understood. 
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THE SYSTEM AND THE TASK 
The Orbital Refueling System (ORS), a NASA-designed payload on the Space 
Shuttle, was selected for study [NASA 1985]. The function of the ORS is to 
refuel orbiting satellites with hydrazine, with the objective of extending 
their useful service life. As shown in Figure 1, the ORS fluid system con-
tains a variety of components such as tanks, valves, pipes, etc. The operator 
controls the simulated ORS by opening and closing valves. Transfering fuel 
from propellant tank 1 to propellant tank 2 might proceed as follows. First, 
tank 2 pressure is reduced by momentarily opening valves 10, 11, 13, and 17. 
Second, tank 1 is pressurized by opening valves 1, 3, and 7. Gaseous nitrogen 
will flow out of the two small supply tanks, be pressure regulated, and fill 
tank 1 on one side of the bladder. To transfer fuel to tank 2, valves 5, 14, 
15, 16, and 9 would be opened. Because this version of the ORS was for 
demonstration purposes, all transfers take place between the two large tanks 
rather than to a satellite fuel tank. There are several assemblies whose pur-
pose was not explained in the above example. The relief valves RV1 and RV2 
serve as a safety pressure relief. Check valve CV1 prevents backflow into the 
gas system. The bladders in tank 1 and 2 serve to isolate the fuel from the 
propellant and also to contain the fuel in the weightlessness of space. Some 
components (e.g., valves 10 and 11) may seem redundant; they are so by design 
for two failure tolerance. 
Ihg Diagnosis Task 
The operator's task is to diagnose the failure in the system. This 
requires the operator to manipulate and observe the system, because a diag-
nosis cannot be determined uniquely from an observation of a state vector at a 
single point in time. A solution is an assignment of states to components 
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such that the assignment's behavior is always identical to system behavior. 
For a single valve failure, the solution would be a normal state for all com-
ponents save the failed valve, which might be jammed shut. The diagnosis 
problem can be viewed as a combinatorial search for a state assignment. The 
search is constrained by the laws of component physics. That is, a state 
assignment to a component imposes constraints on its neighboring components. 
For example, if a valve is opened and permits a flow down a pipe, the com-
ponent receiving the flow must be in a state to accept the flow. 
QUALITATIVE MODELS OF CONTINUOUS PHYSICAL PROCESSES 
This section describes qualitative models: representations, the computa-
tional problems solved, and the specific needs of our aid of the qualitative 
model. 
A qualitative model is a symbolic representation of a system. Its most 
basic description is of a component. A component is described in terms of its 
connections to other components and its behavior. Behavior is described in 
terms of the physical variables which are present at its connections. The 
differentiation between the structural description (connections) and the 
behavioral description is particularly important for insuring the robustness 
of a qualitative model. The isolation of each component in the behavioral 
description has usually been emphasized by other qualitative modeling [De 
Kleer and Brown 1983]. Our qualitative model represents the system at both 
the component level and at an aggregated level as paths. The motivation for 
this is the belief that a multi-level description is closer to the operator's 
internal model of the process. 
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From a given state, the behavior of a component is described in terms of 
the physical variables present at its ports. A physical variable (and its 
time derivative) may take several values. The time derivative usually has 
only one of three possible values: negative, zero, or positive. The variable 
itself may take either nominal or ordinal values. The nominal values usually 
correspond to points at which behavior (component or material) changes. For 
example, water temperature would have nominal values at freezing and boiling. 
Variables may also take on ordinal values (or relationships). For example, 
water temperature could be taken to be greater than freezing and less than 
boiling. 
The nominal and ordinal values taken by physical variables are said to 
occur in a quantity space [Forbus 1984, Kuipers 1984]. The quantity space is 
a partial ordering on the physical variable values it contains. The partial 
ordering occurs because not all comparisons are relevant to understanding the 
physical system qualitatively. For example, consider a valve between two 
tanks, A and B. When the valve is opened, the resulting behavior is deter-
mined by the pressures in two tanks. The pressure at other unconnected points 
in the system is unrelated to the above behavior. 
One question that is often raised is why bother with qualitative models. 
They are not, as it turns out, particularly fast or accurate. For engineering 
purposes they are inferior to analytic or numerical models. The answer to 
this question is, first, that the aid does not require a qualitative model; 
any system model will be acceptable if it can provide the required information 
to the operator. Our motivation for using a qualitative model is to test the 
hypothesis that humans use such models internally. Obviously, it is difficult 
to test this hypothesis directly. A weak test would be whether the qualita- 
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tive model really aids human performance as described here. A stronger test 
would be finding similar reasoning weaknesses. As mentioned earlier, a quali-
tative model cannot answer some questions. If well—trained operators could 
not answer such questions, did not ask such questions, or could not use 
answers to such questions, there would be evidence for the hypothesis. 
AN EXPLORATORY EXPERIMENT 
An exploratory experiment was conducted to observe the strategies sub-
jects used to diagnose the ORS. Three Georgia Tech students were used as sub-
jects. The use of college students is usually considered a compromise in 
experimental research. Since some space shuttle astronauts have been 
engineers, this compromise is reasonable in this situation. 
The training contained both theoretical and practical elements. First, 
the basics of gas and fluid transfer were reviewed. Second, there was an 
explanation of the normal and malfunction behavior of each component. Third, 
subjects were told how to test for a failed component and how to operate the 
system. 
The subjects then solved five single failure malfunctions. The failures 
were as follows: 
(1) Valve 13 leaked, allowing an unexpected pressure drop. 
(2) Pressure transducer 2 was biased high. 
(3) A leak to the environment developed between valve 10 and 11. 
(4) The relief valve was open during a fuel transfer. 
(5) Valve 8 leaked. 
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The data collected included a time-stamped record of the ORS commands 
issued and a tape recording of the subject's verbal protocols. The time to 
solution is shown in Table 1. 
Subject 	A 
Problem 
1 28.6 14.4 31.1 
2 *13.8 *21.9 3.6 
3 13.4 7.9 6.2 
4 12.7 10.0 *21.9 
5 7.5 8.3 12.3 
Table 1. Time to solution. * denotes giving up. 
A 1252.61-.114g. Analysis. sti Performance, Data 
The data from our preliminary experiment suggest several interesting 
characteristics of human diagnosis behavior, and which in turn suggested some 
directions for computer aiding. First, the time spent for a successful diag-
nosis is strongly related with the number of information gathering actions 
(IGA) (r = 0.79) and the average time between actions (r = 0.77). The latter 
two variables were not strongly correlated (r = 0.21). The implication of 
this is reducing the number of information gathering actions (IGA) is an 
important goal for improving diagnostic performance. 
Second, we classified IGA's into effective ones (EIGA), which reduced the 
size of feasible hypothesis set, and ineffective ones (IIGA), which did not. 
We found that the number of EIGA is invariant among subjects and is also not 
significantly correlated with the total number of IGA. The total number of 
IGA is correlated with IIGA (corr.= 0.98), which outnumbered EIGA by 2.5 : 1. 
This suggests that a problem is solved by collecting the right number of EIGA 
(largely determined by the complexity of the problem). A better performance is 
possible when the effective actions are executed earlier in the diagnosis. 
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Third, we investigated how well the subjects detect the abnormal behavior 
of the system. We assessed the delay in diagnosis due to failures to collect 
information that would have revealed the abnormal system behavior. The delay 
showed high correlation (r = .79) with the number of ineffective actions. 
Also, 75% of effective actions were of abnormal behavior, and the remaining 
25% were of normal behavior (negative evidence). Observations on abnormal 
behavior, if they are correctly interpreted, became effective actions in 
almost all cases. Thus, abnormal behavior of the system is probably the most 
important source of effective information. 
The conclusion is that, to help the diagnosis, the cues for effective 
actions need to be given. Abnormal system behavior is worth watching for this 
purpose. When desiging an aid, a major advantage of using abnormal behavior is 
that inferring or requesting the human's current hypothesis is not necessary. 
Observation, DI Strategies  
There appeared to be three strategies that subjects used: hypothesis-
driven evaluation, data-driven evaluation, and topographic search. 
Hypothesis-driven evaluation starts with the planning of a test procedure for 
a given hypothesis. The hypothesis needs to be explicit enough to enable the 
prediction of its resulting system behavior. A test plan would be diagnostic 
if, given that the hypothesis is true, the response of the system to the test 
is unique to the hypothesis. When a sufficiently diagnostic test has been 
planned, the test is executed and its result evaluated. This evaluation tends 
to be short because it has already been determined what the results might be. 
With data-driven evaluation, the subject first examines a piece of data 
to determine if it is worth closer attention. This examination is done by 
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comparing the data to expected system behavior. If the data turns out to be 
unexpected (i.e., not explained in terms of previously observed symptoms or 
normal behavior), then hypotheses are formulated to explain the data. Whether 
the formulation is successful or not, this piece of data is remembered by the 
diagnoses as another symptom to be used later during diagnosis. 
Topographic search seems to help reduce the mental workload in diagnosis. 
Both above evaluation strategies involve deep reasoning with functional 
causalities. With deep reasoning, the former deduces necessary data from a 
given hypothesis while the latter formulate and evaluate hypotheses from the 
given data. Topographic search [Rasmussen 19841, without such a deeply based 
hypothesis, is used to find data. For instance, the sensor near the suspected 
component are read in hope that the reading may give some diagnostic informa-
tion. An example of topographic search of hypotheses is suspecting nearby 
components when a sensor reading is out of the normal range. The differentia-
tion of a single general hypothesis to several more specific hypotheses can be 
considered as topographic search. 
Although it is not relevant to our diagnostic task, other forms of rules 
may be used as alternative ways of causal search. With experience or specific 
system knowledge, it is possible to connect a hypothesis with data through 
function-based reasoning [Rasmussen 19841. 
AIDING WITH A QUALITATIVE MODEL 
This section describes how the qualitative model is used as a foundation 
for aiding. For simplicity, the interface will be used to organize the 
presentation. The interface has four windows: schematic, interaction, sensor 
display, and hypotheses (Figure 2). Each window will be described first. The 
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types of aiding that occur within the window will then be described. Finally, 
the justification for the aid, which is the human decision-making suboptimal-
ity we hope to mitigate, will be presented. It is possible that a form of 
aiding and a justification for aiding may apply to more than one window. 
Schematic Window 
The schematic window displays a schematic diagram of the ORS. The 
schematic always shows the commanded state of the valves. One form of aiding 
employed here is the set of components that should be at equal pressure given 
the commanded valve positions. Whenever the operator opens or closes a valve, 
the display changes the path to show this property. 
The motivation for this is that the operator frequently makes a test 
among a set of components that should be at equal pressure. It should be 
noted that the qualitative model uses this same information internally in its 
simulation of the ORS. A related form of topographic information is flow 
paths, which are paths that should contain flow if the valves obey their com-
mands. 
Both of these forms of aiding support the operator during topographic 
search [Rasmussen 1985]. From a cognitive standpoint, both aids should lessen 
working memory loads. It is by no means difficult to determine equal pressure 
and flow paths without the aid, but it is extra work for the operator to do 
S O. 
The second aid and perhaps the most interesting is the what- if model 
with which the operator may test a hypothesis. The what-if model is a model 
that is parallel to the system model. The component states of the what-if 
model are set by the operator. Recall that the diagnosis task is to determine 
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the states of the system components. The operator may use the what-if model 
to test a hypothesis. For example, suppose valve 13 is hypothesized to be 
leading. Then, the operator may turn on the what-if model, set its valve 13 
to leaking and all other components to normal. When activated, the behavior 
of the what-if model and simulation are displayed in parallel. The system can 
be put through a series of state changes to determine if the two behaviors are 
equal. 
The motivation for this aid is to help the operator's mental model of the 
system. There are two ways this might help. First, the operator may have an 
incorrect or incomplete mental model. Second, the operator may have diff i-
culty integrating correct component behavior to correct system behavior 
because of working memory limitations. In either case, the what-if model 
serves as a substitute for the, operator's model. This does not mean that the 
operator need not understand the system at all; he or she must still set the 
component state. It also does not mean that the operator may not have trouble 
using this aid. We will return to this question later. 
Interaction Window 
The interaction window is where the operator's commands are echoed by the 
interface. The commands available to the operator include the following: 
(1) Opening and closing valves. 
(2) Comparing two pressures. On a real physical system, the numerical pres-
sure could be displayed on the schematic. When a qualitative model is 
used, there is no scale in general to which a pressure can be referred. 
Instead, a pressure can be referred to other pressures in the system by 
the relations less-than, equal-to, or greater-than. 
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(3) Display of the first derivative of pressure (positive, zero, or nega-
tive). 
(4) Turning the what-if model on and off. 
(5) Making state assumptions in the what-if model. 
When the what-if model is on, the open, close, and comparison commands apply 
both to the system and the what-if model. 
Sensor Pisplay 
The sensor display contains the output from the comparison command: the 
relationship between two pressures or the first derivative of a pressure. The 
what-if model, if activated, has its corresponding output displayed side-by-
side with the system model. 
The aiding that occurs through this window is to indicate which observed 
behaviors deviate from normal behavior of the system. The aid runs a normal 
model (that is, a qualitative model with all component states normal) and com-
pares its behavior to the system's behavior. Differences are highlighted. 
This display differs from conventional warning systems (for example, annuncia-
tor panels in nuclear power plants) in that reference is made to a system 
model, not a fixed point. 
The strategy supported by this display is data-driven search, which was 
observed in our preliminary experiment. In the initial stages of diagnosis, 
the operator did not have a specific hypothesis. Instead, he or she collected 
data to develop one. The purpose of this aiding feature is to direct the 
operator toward more relevant data. 
The human decision-making biases that we hope to mitigate all deal with 
suboptimal use of data or cues. Human have a limited ability to integrate 
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more than three sources of information. Further, humans sometimes use 
irrelevant data, especially if it is salient. This display attempts to miti-
gate this by making important differences salient. Another deficiency of 
humans is a narrow focus of attention. The aid should work against this by 
displaying all differences, not just those on which the operator has focused. 
Kypotheses Window 
The hypotheses window will display a set of hypotheses that might be the 
cause of the observed symptoms. These hypotheses are simply state assignments 
to components (e.g., valve 13: leaking). The hypotheses will be listed in 
order of plausibility, according to a heuristic of symptom covering. 
Many decision-making biases exist with respect to hypotheses. The one 
that is directly addressed is the difficulty humans have in generating a com-
plete set of hypotheses [Mehle 1982]. 
Representativeness, anchoring, and confirmation bias often occur when 
humans select and evaluate biases. Representativeness refers to the tendency 
to select hypotheses that are easily recalled from memory. This could be due 
either to recent use of the hypothesis or to a close match between actual 
symptoms and symptoms covered by the hypothesis. Anchoring refers to the ten-
dency to stay with an initial hypothesis even after it has been disconfirmed. 
Confirmation bias is the tendency to test data that will only confirm a 
hypothesis. It is in effect a failure to seek negative evidence. To mitigate 
these biases requires meta-aiding, as described below. 
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Meta—aiding, 
Earlier, we mentioned that the operator may have difficulty using the 
what—if model. Recall that the operator must make assumptions about the 
states of components. Having a what—if model means the evaluation of assump-
tions is easy, but making assumptions is not aided by the what—if model. 
Meta—aiding is aiding the use of the what—if model--specifically, helping 
the operator choose component state hypotheses. While listing these 
hypotheses in the hypotheses window is an aid, it may be necessary for the 
interface to take a more active role. If anchoring and confirmation bias 
occur, it will be necessary for the interface to determine when the operator's 
hypothesis (expressed in the what—if model states) is no longer valid. When 
this occurs, the interface will step in to warn the user of his or her mis-
take. 
CONCLUSION 
An aid has been described for novel fault diagnosis in complex systems. 
To the best of our knowledge, this aid is unique in the following ways. 
First, the emphasis is on novel rather than routine faults. Second, it con-
tains a qualitative model that may correspond to the human's internal model of 
the system. This model represents knowledge only of how the system works. 
Many of the proposed aiding schemes are proceduralized fault finders: they 
tell the operator what action to take. Third, the qualitative model is the 
basis for much of the aiding that takes place. Fourth, the interface specifi-
cally attempts to mitigate some human decision—making suboptimalities during 
fault diagnosis. 
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The current status of this aid is as follows. The aiding software for 
topographic path displays, flow paths, and the what-if model have been imple-
mented. Hypothesis generation and the corresponding suboptimality detection 
have not. We feel it is premature to implement suboptimality detection (i.e., 
meta-aiding) without some experience with aiding by topographic displays and 
the what-if model. 
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Figure 2. The operator's display. 
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Exercise 1. 
Situation: 	P1 is found too low and still decreasing. 
Fault: 	V13 leak 
valves open: V3, V7, V10, V17 / V4, V14, V16, V9 
- 
Exercise 2. 
Situation: 	P2 appears to be too high. 
Fault: 	P2 high bias 
valves open: V1, V3, V10, V17 / V5, V15, V9 
Exercise 3. (confg-1) 
Situation: 	P1 is low and decreasing. 
Fault: 	pipe leak between V10 and V11 (c39) 
valves open: V3, V7, V13, V11, / V4, V14, V15, V9 
Problem 1. 
Situation: 	During a fuel transfer TK1L -> TK2L, 
P2 does not increase. 
Fault: 	V5 fail closed 
valves open: V3, V10, V11, V17 / V5, V14, V15, V16, V9 
Problem 2. 
Situation: 	P2 is too high. V11 was found leaking, but 
there is one more anomaly. 
Fault: V7 failed open 
valves open: V3, V13, V10 / V4, V14, V16, V9 
I 	C37 	I 	I 	 C34 	 '---V2--01-' 	I 
IC38 	 I @ P5 	 @ P6 
I 	 I 	 C39 	 C40 
pulinfluum\-@ m 	. V11 	V10 	 puunnumil\-@ P2  
I TK2G/L I 
<-VT----V17 	V13 	 RV 	 pliiIIIII\ 
	
I I . 	V1---. 	1 GTK 1 
.--V7----V3- 	 < CV < 	REG--05--: :---\-----/ 
I 	 I I 	 ,---u--01-' 	I 
I I 	@ P5 	 @ P6 
1 	 1 
plunnunun\-@ P1 	N 	 VII 	VIO 	 pulluflunil\-@ P2 
1 TR1G/L I 
\________J 
I 	 @ P3 	 @P7 	@P4 	I 
I I 	 i 	1 	 1 
1 	. - -- - -V4 - --. 	. - - - -V14 - --V15 - --V16 - ->TC< - - -- -. 	1 
• 	 : - - - - 1 	 1 - -- -V9 - -' 
' -03 - - - -V5 -" V8- 	04 	 . 
Problem 3. 
Situation: 	P2 is lower than it shoud be. 
Fault: 	V8 leak (while P2 > P1) 
valves open: V3, V7, V10, V17 / V4, V15, V16, V9 
Problem 4. (confg-2) 
Situation: 	During a fuel transfer TRU -> TK2L, 
P2 increases too slow. 
Fault: pipe between V3 and V7 (C37) leaks 
valves open: V3, V13, V11, V10 / V5, V14, V16, V8, V9 
Problem 5. 
Situation: 	a gas transfer GTK -> TK2G proceeds too slow. 
Fault: V15 leak 
valves open: V3, V17, V1, V11, V10 / V4, V14, V16, V9 
Problem 6. 
Situation: 	During a gas transfer from GTK to TK1G, 
P1 increases too slow. 
Fault: 	RV leak 
valves open: V1, V3, V7, V10, V13 / V4, V14, V9 
1 TK2G/L 1 
INSTRUCTIONS - Part 1. 
TIME( 
I. The Orbital Refueling System (ORS) 
The purpose of the ORS is to refuel orbiting satellites on their orbits. As 
shown in Figure 1 (in the separate sheet), the ORS fluid system contains various 
components such as tanks, valves, pipes, etc. Because this version of the ORS 
was for demonstration purposes, all transfers take place between the two tanks 
rather than to a satellite. 
Let's look at the components in the schematic. First, 'XX' and 	indicate 
closed and open valves respectively. The operator controls the ORS only by open- 
On. 
ing and closing valves. For example, You can open/close V3 by the commands DE yi 
and caL 21. 
There are 4 orifices: namely 01, 03, 04, and 05. Find them in the Figure. 
An orifice is a designed source of resistance. When there is a mass flow through 
an orifice, there is a pressure reduction across it. Dropping pressure through 
orifices is at times useful to control the flow rate. Also, 01 and 05 reduce 
pressure to the regulator. 
Now find GTR, which stands for the Gas TanK. This tank contains high pres-
sure nitrogen gas. Find Tankl (TK1G and TK1L) and Tank2 (TK2G and TK2L) too. 
They are the fuel tanks. TK1G is the gas part of Tankl, which is separated by a 
flexible diaphragm from the liquid part (TK1L) of the tank. The two parts always 
share the same pressure. 
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On the path from GTK to TRIG, you will find 'REG' (REGulator) and 'CV' 
(Check Valve). The regulator produces a constant output gas pressure even though 
the input pressure varies. The check valve allows the gas to flow forward only 
(i.e., right to left). 
Find 'RV'. It stands for a Relief Valve. If the pressure goes up beyond some 
dangerous level, the relief valve will automatically open to decrease the pres-
sure. The operator can also manually open/close the 'RV' as any ordinary valves 
by DE El or gjd. Ba. At the top left, you see 'VT', which stands for VenT. You may 
release pressurizing gas through the vent by opening V13 and (___) 
The lower half of the schematic (from 'TK1L' to 'TK2L') is the liquid (fuel) 
part. There, 'TC' is for Terminal Coupling and is assumed always being connected 
during our diagnostic missions. 
To transfer fuel from 'TK1L' to 'TK2L', Tankl needs to be first pressurized 
by opening valves betwen GTK and TK1G. In the above schematic, TK1G is being 
pressurized by the gas through the open valves (___), (-_-). and (___). Since 
TK1L has always the same pressure as TK1G, it is being pressurized too. Then, 
the gas flow may be stopped by Ia. The fuel may be transferred by opening 
valves between the two tanks. In the above, the operator would simply open 
(___), hence issue a command ( ) to do this. The tank of higher pressure 
will become the source and the other will receive the fuel. 
The following is important. There are seven pressure sensors (P1 to p7) in 
the ORS, (),(__),(__), and (__) in the gas part, and (__).(__), and (__) in the 
liquid part. To read them, you have only two commands: 
: to see the 'D'erivative of P1. 
Answer: + for P1 increasing, - decreasing, and = constant. 
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g Pa PA 
: to 'C'ompare P2 and P4. 
Answer: > when P2 > P4, < when P2 < P4, and ■ when equal. 
The command 2 is valid only for tank pressures, namely, P1, 	and 
In pipes, unlike the tanks which have considerable capacity, the pressure 
change is instantaneous so that you can't expect to see + or — as the answer to 2 
gi. 2 IS MOSTLY USED TO CHECK IF THERE IS A FLOW FROM/INTO A TANK. 
As the gas or liquid flows from one tank to another, its pressure decreases 
along the path. A pressure drop can only occur across a resistance. When the 
fluid passes an orifice, which has significant resistance, the pressure will 
decrease. An abrupt change in the conduit shape, such as from a pipe to a tank or 
vice versa, also produces resistance and results in a pressure drop. We will 
assume that pipes or valves normally have negligible resistance. is the com-
mand which is frequently used to check the pressure drop along the path. 
Another use of 	command is to check if two sensors, which are supposed to 
be equal, agree with each other. When two or more sensors are connected by an 
open path, and if there is no flow through the path between the sensors, they all 
should read the same pressure. Resistance doesn't matter when there is no flow. 
If the sensors read differently, either there actually is a flow in the path 
(e.g., due to a leaky valve or pipe) or at least one of the sensors is wrong. 
Keeping this in mind, you are now able to predict how the sensors will 
behave when you open or close valves. Three situations are summarized here. 
1. When a flow exists. 
a. The pressure decreases in the source and increases in the sink. 
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b. The pressure drops by resistance while the material travels 
along the path. This is shown in the following diagram. 
TANK 1 	 01 	-==12- 	 TANK 2 
(source) (sink) 
	
Flow 	  
In Figure 1, there is a gas flow from GTR to TK1G. 
Predict the results: 
D P6 --> 	(__) 
D P1 --> (__) 
C P6 P5 --> 	(__) 
C P5 P1 --> (__) 
Pressure 
Now, how about 
C P1 P3 	--> (__) 
Did you consider that an orifice reduces pressure only when 
there is a flow through it? If not, check your answer again. 
Now, suppose P2 > P1 and V8 is open. 
Then the fuel will flow from ( 	) to ( 	) and: 
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C P2 P4 --> (__) 
C P4 p7 --> (__) 
C P4 P3 - -> (__) 
C P3 P1 --> (__) 
2. In case that there is no flow (V8 is closed again). 
In Figure 1, there is no flow from or to 'TK2G - and 'TIC2L'. 
All the pipes around the tank will share the same pressure. 
Thus, 
C P2 ( ) 	--> = 
C P2 (__) --> = 
If you close V9, the pressures on both sides (will, will not) 
change. Therefore, 
C P2 P7 --> (__) 
On the other hand, when you close v3, you expect 
C P5 (__) --> = 
3. Special case of 2. 
In Figure 1, suppose V17 is leaking. 
It is open to the environment which has zero pressure. 
Even though the operator closes V3, the gas will continue 
to flow from ( 	) to 	the environment. Thus, 
D () 	--> - 
C P5 P6 	(__) 
C P5 0 	--> (__) 
If the operator closes V2, Since the pipes do not have 
significant capacity, the gas escapes right away. 
Therefore, immediately after closing V2, you get 
C P5 0 --> 
** We assume the capacity of components (except tanks) to be 
always negligible however small the size of a leak may be. 
The same will be (true, false) when V17 is closed but the pipe 
between V13 and V17 leaks. 
TIME ( 	: 	) 
BEFORE YOU START NEXT PART, RETURN THIS PART TO THE EXPERIMENTER. 
TIME ( 	: 	) 
II. Malfunctions 
We will now discuss possible malfunctions for each component. 
1. valve (including check valve and relief valve) 
a. leak - in spite of being commanded to be 'closed', it allows some, 
though not a full, flow. There is a resistance when commanded closed. 
When commanded open, it acts normally. 
b. fail gull - no matter what you command, it remains fully open. 
c. fail closed - no matter what you command, it remains closed. 
2. regulator 
a. fail oven - always remains fully open without reducing the pressure. 
b. fail closed - always remains closed whatever the input pressure is. (No 
gas passes through the regulator.) 
3. orifice 
a. fail open - fails to provide resistance or pressure drop, allowing the 
material to flow freely. 
b. fail closed - prohibits flow. 
4. conduit (including 'TC', the terminal coupling) 
a. leak - leaks gas or liquid to environmental space. (remember that a 
valve leak is THROUGH the valve, not to the environment) 
b. fail closed - completely prohibits flow. 
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5. vent 
Since the 'VT' is a simple opening to external space, its working and mal-
functioning is the same as a conduit. 
6. sensor 
a. biased high — reports a higher pressure than the actual one. 
b. biased lqg — reports a lower pressure than the actual one. 
c. dead — fails to follow the change of pressure, reading 0 or other fixed 
pressure. 
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TIME 	: 	) 
III. Commands 
We will summarize the commands you can use. There are only two commands 
for operation -- OP and CL. You can open or close only the valves. Examples are 
OP V3 
CL V17 
There are two commands, 'C' and 'D', to get information about pressure 
through the sensors. Followings are the examples. 
C P1 P3 
D P2 
C P5 0 
The last command compares P5 with 0, the environment pressure of outer 
space. 
** Now, call the experimenter. You may ask him any questions. 
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TIME ( 	: 	) 
IV. An example of ORS operation. 
** You need to use the terminal for this section. The experimenter will 
help you through this section. 
Now, you will undertake a very typical operation as an exercise. Also, 
through this example, you can become more familiar with the commands. Simply fol-
low the steps one by one with care. Don't open/close the valves otherwise, 
although you can freely read any sensors at any time. 
a. type: (EXERO) and hit 'return'. 
The familiar schematic now appears on the top half of the screen. 
Notice that the symbol 'XX' indicates a closed valve, and "==' an open 
valve. The symbol shows so—called 'commanded' position. The actual posi-
tion can be different from this switch position when a valve malfunctions. 
The fuel needs to be transferred from 'TK1L' to 'TK2L'. To achieve this 
transfer, the pressure in 'TK1L" should be higher than that of 'TK2L'. So, 
let's pressurize the source tank by providing high pressure from GTK 
Please write in your answers whenever you are asked. 
b. type: OP V1 
What happens? (When you are asked like this, write down your guess on the 
system behavior resulted by the command.) 
1 0 
Try to confirm the above answer by observing sensors. Then, give a set of 
commands (including at least a 'C' command) that are useful for this. 
c. type: CL V1 
What happens? 
How do you confirm it? (answer as in b.) 
d. type: OP V8 
What happens? 
How do you confirm it? (answer as in b.) 
Check 'C P3 P4', 'C P4 P7' and 'C P1 P5'. Can you explain them? 
e. type: CL V8 
1 1 
OP 1116 
Check 'C P3 P4'. Can you explain it? 
e. type: CL V4 
Give all the sets of equal pressure sensors. 
TIME ( 	) 
Congratulations! Your first mission has successfully been completed. 
INSTRUCTIONS — Part 2. 
Before you start, please review Part 1 again. Especially, you need to be 
familiar with sections II and III of Part 1. 
I. Diagnoses 
The followings are examples of typical diagnostic procedures. Following 
the reasoning, fill in the parentheses. 
a. To check a sensor 
See Figure 1. Suppose you want to check the sensor P3. You can close V3 
and expect (___) to read the same as P3. If not, P3 probably is bad. Of 
' course, the bad one may be (._—) rather than P3. To check further, you can 
close V9, open 	and compare P3 to P4 or 
b. To check a conduit leak (to environment) 
If there is a leak between V4 and V14, 11 El can either give — or + 
depending on whether the input flow rate to TRIG is greater than the output 
rate from TK1L. If you close V7, a leak between V4 and V14 will cause a 
decrease in the sensor (___). But, when the valve (__—) is closed, TK1L will 
stop loosing the pressure. This means that the leak is in the { left, right } 
hand side of the valve. Another evidence of a leak between V4 and V14 is that 
2.3. Q. ---> = 	before, after } you close V5. 
c. To check a valve leak 
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Suppose you found 11 ra gave +. This is possible if one of (_--) and 
is leaking. You may suspect that even two valves ( 	) and (___) failed 
together. If you close V10 and find the flow stopping, which makes ( 	) 
return =, you have the evidence that the flow was from ( 	) and the leaky 
valve was 
If closing V10 does not stop the flow, you will first suspect (___) since 
one valve failure is more likely than a two valve failure. If closing V5 or 
V9 results in 11 ZZ. ---> =, the problem is in the { gas, liquid part. Now, 
after you open V5 or V9 again, if closing V16 stops the flow, then the flow 
was through { V8, V14 and V15 }. 
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Now, let us consider several situations to see how you can test your 
hypotheses. You will be given a hypothesis for each problem. Each hypothesis 
implies that only one component is suspected. Prove or disprove the 
hypothesis. 
TIME: ( 
I. Hypothesis: the pipe between V13 and V17 leaks. 
Type (HYP01) and start when the diagram appears. 
2. Hypothesis: V11 leaks. 
Type (HYP02) and start when the diagram appears. 
3. Hypothesis: V2 failed closed. 
Type (H/P03) and start when the diagram appears. 
4. Hypothesis: CV failed open. 
(Hint: you can open/close RV as well as other Valves.) 
Type (HYPO4) and start when the diagram appears. 
5. Hypothesis: P2 is biased high. 




When you are diagnosing the ORS, you will be introduced to a malfunction 
situation and given the symptoms so far identified. The previous operation was 
being done by another personnel. Your mission is to diagnose the system and 
find out the anomaly AS PRECISELY AS POSSIBLE so that another crew could 
easily fix it. For example, if you suspect a valve leak, you have to continue 
until you can say which valve it is. A conduit malfunction can be traced down 
to 'between valve a and valve b', where valves include the check valve (CV). 
You have to THINK ALOUD during the diagnosis. That means, you should 
utter everything that arises in your mind or in action. DON'T try to EXPLAIN 
what you HAVE thought; speak out WHILE you are THINKING. Speaking must not be 
an extra work. You don't have to give complete or composed sentences. The 
components which have names on the schematic may best be called by the names. 
Others, mostly pipes, may easily be called 'right to' or 'left to' a named 
component. Again, please KEEP TALKING OUT. Speak everything that goes on in 
your mind regardless of its importance. Also, whatever you type in on the key-
board needs to be spoken out. If you stop speaking for any length of time, the 
experimenter will prompt you with "What are you thinking?" 
Your performance is measured by the sum of time you spend for the prob-
lems; solve the problems in as little time as possible. However, give your 
answer only when you are completely convinced it is correct. And, don't give 
up, at least easily. The penalty for a wrong answer is great; giving up, even 
greater. 
Now, proceed with exercises 1 and 2. 
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RETHINKING EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
Findings from the 1st Experiment (Testing N Feature) 
1. With enough training, the problem complexity becomes the biggest source 
of variation. 
2. Subject variation may be reduced as much as to a standard deviation of 
around 0.3 mean. 
3. The training effect was examined using Time/IGA. It was quite stable 
and showed similar pattern from problem to problem among subjects. 
4. No significant interaction between the training effect and the aiding 
effect or subject effect were indicated from the data. 
5. The "N" feature did not show positive effects. 
Refinement of the Training Procedure 
1. More exercise (2 -3) problems are needed for "warming-up" before the 
actual problems. 
2. Clearer statements and no question for the 1st session and "solve-it-
together" for the 2nd session. 
Experimental Design 
1. The constraint of having to give a problem to a subject only once res-
tricts the possibility of a factorial design. No replication in the S X 
P cells leaves the two following designs. 
2. Design 1 confounds Problem and Position. 
Design 2 is a Graeco-Latin design which separates Problem and Position. 
1 
PI 	P2 P3 1 2 3 
Si ua 	0 0-N Si Pl,ua P2,0 P3,0-N 
S2 0 	0-N ua S2 P3,0 P1,0-N P2,ua 
S3 0-N 	ua 0 S3 P2,0-N P3,ua P1,0 
Design 1. Design 2. 
3. Confounding Problem and Position 
- As long as the training effect is not correlated with the aiding 
effect, this design will not degrade the efficiency or validity of 
the experiment. (We try to minimize the training effect, anyway.) 
- Although the training effect is not measured separately, it is not 
an important purpose ofthis experiment. 
- This design allows freedom of replication and keeps the analysis 
relatively easy. 
4. Graeco-Latin Design 
- The main advantage is that we may estimate the training effect. 
However, the training effect is closely related to the problems. 
There would be more learning from a difficult, hence long, problem. 
If such a problem comes first, more improvement will occur after 
the first session. This violates the no-interaction assumption in a 
Graeco-Latin Design. Not only the training effect will not be prop-
erly estimated, but also the efficiency of test will be degraded 
since the actual interaction will be merged to the error term. 
- Design 1 allows more flexibility of replication. 9X6 or 12X6 are 




- If we are concerned with the Training effect, than we need to con-
found it with Problem since there may be a strong interaction 
between the two. If the Training effect is not so high (which is 
the likelier case as the data indicates), Design 1 is readily jus-
tified. 
- To estimate the interaction between Problem and Aiding, we need 
replication with subjects for each treatment combinations. This 
leads to the following design (Winer, "Statistical Principles in 
Experimental Design", 1962). 
	
P1 	P2 	P3 	P4 	P5 	P6 
G1 	- 	0 	0-N 	- 	0-N 	0 
G2 	0 	0 -N 	- 	0 	- 	0-N 
G3 	0-N 	- 	0 	0-N 	0 	- 
In this plan, Gl, G2, and G3 are groups of an equal number of subjects. 
If the interactions with the group factor are negligible (this 
assumption is reasonable if the groups represent random 
subsamples from a common population), 
the following model will be appropriate for the analysis (Winer, 1962). 
E [Y(ijkm)] = m + G(k) + S(klm) + P(i) + A(j) + P.A(i,j) 
where G(k) is the effects associated with groups and S(klm) effects 
associated with subjects within the groups. 
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EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
I. Purpose of the Experiment 
There are diagnostic situations in which causal reasoning about the phy-
sical system plays a central role. Such situations may be created by a system 
failure that the operator has not experienced. The irrelevancy of previous 
experience prohibits a direct mapping from symptoms to causes. Also, the base 
rates for hypotheses are normally not available due to the lack of experience. 
As a result, the diagnosis will primarily be based on causal reasoning about 
the system. 
Aiding based on a qualitative model of the system seems to deserve con-
sideration because the human's causal reasoning is also claimed to be qualita-
tive. The qualitative model will be able to predict and describe the system 
events which are believed to be important to human reasoning. This should 
cause the information produced by the model to be highly compatible with the 
human information processing. 
One purpose of this experiment is to test the validity of this aiding 
approach. More detailed interest is in the relative effectiveness of different 
aiding information that can be provided by the model. In the next section, 
the experiment planned for this purpose is described. The design of experiment 
and the analysis of results are discussed in the last section. 
II. The Experiment 
This section begins with a brief description of the Orbital Refueling 
System (ORS), which is the context of problem solving in the experiments, and 
the interface. A more detailed discussion may be found in the previous papers 
[Proceedings of the 1986 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and 
Cybernetics, pp.1222-1227; IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 
to appear] and the thesis proposal. Then, a description of the experiment in 
terms of problems, independent and dependent variables, subjects, and training 
will follow. 
Mn (IRE and. the Interface 
In the ORS as described in the thesis proposal, as in most plants, it is 
not possible to test each component directly. A diagnostic hypothesis can only 
be examined indirectly through testing operations. Because of this, the diag -
nosis of a novel failure in this system will more heavily rely on causal rea-
soning. This makes the ORS a good problem solving context for our experiment. 
The ORS is qualitatively simulated on the center's Vax 11/780 computer. 
The interface has four windows (Figure 1). The schematic window shows a 
schematic diagram of the ORS. The commanded positions of valves are shown on 
SCHEMATIC 
INTERACTION 
SENSORS 	1 HYPOTHESES 
Figure 1. The ORS Interface 
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the schematic. Below the schematic, the operator's commands are echoed in the 
interaction window. The operator can open/close valves, read the time deriva-
tive of a pressure sensor, and compare two pressure sensors. The output from 
the above sensor display commands is displayed in the sensor window. Under 
certain aiding conditions, suggested sensor readings will also be displayed in 
this window. The hypothesis window is used only with an aiding feature. It 
displays a set of hypotheses set by the operator. These hypotheses are simply 
state assignments to components. 
Problems  
For each problem, the subject is given a detected symptom and asked to 
diagnose the malfunction as precisely as possible. There may be one or two 
bad components. When two components are bad, the subject is told of one mal-
function and is asked to find the other. The problems include valve leaks, 
pipe leaks, blocked valves, a check valve failure, a relief vent leak, and 
sensor failures. 
Independent Variables  
The effects of different aiding information will be examined. Each type 
of information correspondents to a hypothesized, model-based processing that 
the operator does during diagnosis. The first processing is called N, which 
is to predict the normal system behavior after a given operation. The second 
is 0, which is to envision the actual system behavior from limited observa-
tion. The third is 0-N, the difference between 0 and N, which is often cru-
cial in an efficient search for the diagnosis. The last processing is called 
0-H, which calculates the discrepancies between the observed system response 
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and the operator's hypothesis. 
Dependent Variables  
Many different performance measures were tried with our data from the 
pilot experiment. The number of information gathering actions (#IGA) appears 
to be a clear alternative to the time to solve (TIME). An information gather-
ing action is judged to be effective when it reduces the size of feasible 
hypothesis set. To achieve this, an IGA should be able to remove at least one 
hypothesis from the feasible set. In addition, it must not be redundant with 
respect to the information so far collected. We have denoted the number of 
effective IGA's by #EIGA, and that of ineffective ones by #IIGA. 
The pilot experiment showed that #IIGA is a good predictor of TIME (r 
0.83; p < 0.01). Although several other measures were examined with the data, 
they either turned out to have insufficient resolution or showed high correla-
tions with the above measures. Thus, the aboves will be the most important 
measures in the main experiment. However, other measures will be collected for 
supplementary analysis. The measures are: 
Time : 	Time to solve the problem 
#IGA 	Total number of Information Gathering Actions 
#EIGA: Number of Effective IGA 
#IIGA: Number of Ineffective IGA 
#BT : 	Number of Bad Tests of Good Hypotheses 
#811 : 	Number of Good Tests of Bad Hypotheses 
#RT : Number of Redundant Tests 
Subiects  
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Eighteen to twenty four undergraduates in the ISyE 3010 class will serve 
as volunteer subjects. The subjects will receive extra credit for participat-
ing this experiment. They are motivated by giving different extra credit 
according to their performance: 7% for top one third of the subjects, 6% for 
the next one third, 5% for the rest. 
Training 
The goal of our training is to facilitate the subjects with correct 
causal reasoning about the ORS and reasonably stabilized diagnostic skills. 
However, if a subject is exposed to a kind of problem several times in a short 
period, the subject may develop diagnostic procedures that do not require 
causal reasoning. That means the problems become routine failures rather than 
novel ones to the subjects. 
Two training sessions will prepare the subjects for the final experiment. 
Training session 1 starts with basic principles derived from fluid dynamics. 
Then, possible malfunctions for each component are discussed. Finally, the 
subjects will undertake a simulated ORS mission, during which envisioning of 
normal system response is practised. Session 2 teaches elementary diagnostic 
procedures such as checking a sensor bias or a valve leak. The subject then is 
required to plan testing procedures for five typical hypotheses. Each pro-
cedure will be discussed with the experimenter until the subject develops (and 
understands) a correct procedure. The subject then solve three real problems 
as exercises. Session I usually takes 1 to 1.5 hours. Session 2 is normally 
takes 2 hours, but varies depending on the subject's pace. 
The performance of subject in the training sessions is closely monitored. 
The principles part contains many questions to ascertain proper understanding. 
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The answers are checked during the same session and, whenever necessary, dis-
cussed again. Problem solving exercises are also attended by the experimenter 
and necessary discussion or re-explanation is provided. The result is that 
initially poorer subjects will spend more time in training rather than end 
with poor understanding. Our experience is that by the end of the second ses-
sion, subjects performed satisfactorily and showed little additional improve-
ment in diagnostic skill. 
III. Experimental Design 
Rationale for , Thrpp Expprimpnts  
The features will be examined by three experiments. The display of aid-
ing information constrains those features that can be tested together. A sub-
ject should not be exposed to both N and 0 features since severe interference 
is expected. This is because 0 and N information is displayed identically but 
has different meaning. 
0-H and 0-N for the same reason should not be used together. When 0-H is 
used, it acts as 0-N until the subject expresses one or more hypotheses. This 
makes a direct comparison between 0-N and 0-H difficult. Even if 0-H really 
improves the performance, its contribution will be depend on the extent to 
which a subject uses it. Different performance criteria need to be used to 
evaluate the potential benefit of 0-H. (The frequency of bad hypothesis test-
ing (#BT) should be emphasized rather than time to solve (Time). The ratio of 
#EIGA and #IIGA with or without a hypothesis selected may also be compared. 
These comparisons need to be made against the 0-N aiding condition.) 
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The above considerations led to the following three separate experiments. 
1. Test of N against unaided situation 
2. Test of 0, 0-N, against unaided situation 
3. Test of 0-H against 0-N 
Differences in the complexity of problems and differences between users 
are expected to introduce large variation in the performance. To enhance the 
efficiency of the experiment, a Latin square design which uses problem and 
subject as two blocking variables is desirable. The treatment levels will be 
counterbalanced for practice effects. Also, the Latin square design may be 
replicated to attain enough data points. This design is used for all three 
experiments. The ANOVA table for this design is given in Appendix A. The 
first experiment to evaluate the N feature is shown in Figure 2. Figure 3 
shows the experiment for testing 0 and 0-N features. 
The above design does not estimate interactions because only first order 
effects are of interest. There is no hypothesis that corresponds to an 
PROBLEMS 
P1 	P2 	P3 	P4 	P5 	P6 
S1 	N 	- 	N 	- 	N 	- 
S2 - N - N - N 
SUBJECTS 	S3 	N 	- 	N 	- 	N 	- 
S4 - N - N - N 
S5 	N 	- 	N 	- 	N 	- 
S6 - N - N - N 




P1 	P2 	P3 	P4 	P5 	P6 
Si 	- 	0 	0-N 	- 	0-N 	0 
S2 0 0-N - 0 - 0-N 
SUBJECTS S3 	0-N 	- 	0 	0-N 	0 	- 
S4 - 0-N 0 - 0 0-N 
S5 	0 	- 	0-N 	0 	0-N 	- 
S6 0-N 0 0-N - 0 
Figure 3. 	Latin Square Design for 0 and 0-N in Experiment 2. 
interaction between 0 and 0-N. 
Pairwise comparisons will be executed using procedures by Tukey, Bonfer-
roni, and Scheffe [J. Neter and W. Wasserman, "Applied Linear Statistical 
Models", 1974, Irwinl. Since the sample size is balanced, the Tukey test can 
be used and is expected to be most sensitive. 
In the third and final experiment, the 0-H option in the 0-N feature will 
be tested against 0-N feature only. As in the test for N, 6 subjects will be 
used for this analysis. 
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Appendix A. 
Source 	 Sum of Square 	 d.o.f 
------____ 
Treatment 	 P-1 
Problems 	 n(p-1) 





p : Number of subjects, problems 
n : Number of replications 
ANOVA Table 
for Replicated Latin Square Design without Interaction 
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) 
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(cond (<expr>)) 
(eqns (sf-list <ar> <ar> <ar>)) 
1 	);sf-list 
; <expr> 
; an expr is either an ar (defined below) or the and of 
; a list of ars: 
<expr> ::= <ar> 
::= pand <ar> <ar> 	<ar> 
<ar> 
; an algebraic relationship, which could be an equation or an 
; inequality (possibly a constraint) 
1 examples: 
a = 1 	 (peq a 1) 
b < 3 (p< b 3) 
x+y=z-q 	(peq (p+ x y) (p- z q)) 
p in ports and parameters, there are slot names that are physical 
; dimensions (e.g., resistance, pressure, flow) 
p an example of a valve 
;(component 










































(cond ((peq v-in 'high))) 
(eqns 
(sf-list 




(cond ((pneq v-in 'high))) 
(eqns 
(sf-list 



















































(p< contents maximum-mass) 




(peq (pd/dt contents) (p- inflow out-flow)) 
(peg in-pressure (p* contents .31)) 





(peg contents maximum-mass) 
) 
(eqns 
(peg in-flow out-flow) 





(peg contents 0) 
) 
(eqns 






Syntax of slot-filler objects 
<sf> 	::= ( <header> ( <slot> ( <filler> )) ( <slot> ( <filler> )) 
<header> 	::= <symbol> 
<slot> ::= <symbol> 
<filler> 	::= <atom> 
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1:= <sf> 
; 	 ::= sf-list <sf> <sf> 	<sf> 
::= an expression to be eval-d (this is kludgy) 
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A DEEP—REASONING AID FOR DEEP—REASONING FAULT DIAGNOSIS 
Wan C. Yoon and John M. Hammer 
Center for Man—Machine Systems Research, Georgia Institute of Technology, 
Atlanta, Georgia 30332 
ABSTRACT 
-Wan C. Yoon and John M. Hammer, 1987. A deep reasoning aid for deep—reasoning 
fault diagnosis. Human—Computer Interaction, Vol 2 (G. Salvendy, ed.) 
The design and an experimental evaluation are presented for an intelligent 
aid for a human operator who must diagnose a novel fault in a physical system. 
A novel failure is defined as one that the operator has not experienced in 
either real system operation or training. When the operator must diagnose a 
novel fault, deep reasoning about the behavior of the system is required. The 
aid contains features that support such reasoning. One of these is a qualita-
tive, component—level model of the physical system. Both the aid and the 
human are able to reason causally about the system in a cooperative search for 
a diagnosis. The human diagnostic performance improved by almost a factor of 
two when the aid presented the information of observed system behavior or the 
difference between observed and normal behavior. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In highly automated systems, the human operator is primarily a monitor and 
supervisor [Rasmussen, 1983]. Aa important monitoring function is diagnosing 
equipment faults, a difficult task in automated systems. The current approach 
to fault diagnosis is to train the operator to deal with relatively common 
faults. The training might teach the operator to use symptoms to distinguish 
faults and to follow procedures to correct them. While this approach should 
be successful with common faults, it does not support diagnosis of novel 
faults. A common sense but unsuccessful approach to help operators diagnose 
novel fault is to teach them the principles of operation of the system. With 
this theoretical knowledge, the operators should be able, in principle, to 
diagnose any failure. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that theoreti-
cal knowledge helps operators diagnose failures [Morris and Rouse, 1985a,b]. 
A logical consequence of this observation might be to put theoretical 
knowledge into the aid rather than the operator. 
Our aid is based on deep, causal reasoning about the system.. There are 
several advantages to this approach. First, novel fault diagnosis is normally 
considered to be knowledge—based reasoning [Rasmussen, 1983]. Hence, it seems 
appropriate for an intelligent aid to reason causally. Second, this approach 
should be more reliable and robust. The system knowledge is represented at 
' the component level. Because components are small and comprehensible, it 
should be possible to create representations that are correct, perhaps even 
provably so. These points support the belief that causal reasoning can cover 
a wider range of faults [Davis, 1984]. 
In spite of the power of the intelligent aid, we believe there are several 
reasons to keep the human in command of the problem solving. First, diagnosing 
a novel failure may require the human to extend the aid's model. Second, when 
diagnosis involves operating the system (e.g., opening valves, starting 
motors), it would be better to leave these operations to the human. Third, 
causal reasoning is slow because the diagnosis problem is a combinatorial 
search. It may be that the human and the aid may be better able to find a 
solution cooperatively than either can alone. This is possible, even neces-
sary, for two reasons. The human has better pattern recognition capabilities 
and can make inductive leaps. Second, the human may need to resolve ambigui-
ties inherent in the aid's model. 
In the subsequent sections of this article, we will discuss the system and 
the experimental task, the interface, the model of human information process-
ing, the aids, and the experimental results. 
2 THE SYSTEM AND THE TASK 
2.1 	System 
The Orbital Refueling System (ORS), a NASA-designed payload on the Space 
Shuttle, was selected for study [NASA, 1985]. The function of the ORS is to 
refuel orbiting satellites with hydrazine, with the objective of extending 
their useful service life. As shown in Figure 1, the ORS fluid system con- 
, tains a variety of components such as tanks, valves, pipes, etc. The operator 
controls the simulated ORS by opening and closing valves. Transferring fuel 
from propellant tank 1 to propellant tank 2 might proceed as follows. First, 
tank 2 pressure is reduced . by momentarily opening valves 10, 11, 13, and 17. 
Second, tank 1 is pressurized by opening valves 1, 3, and 7. Gaseous nitrogen 
will flow out of the two small supply tanks, be pressure regulated, and fill 
tank 1 on one side of the bladder. To transfer fuel to tank 2, valves 5, 14, 
15, 16, and 9 would be opened. Because this version of the ORS was for 
demonstration purposes, all transfers take place between the two large tanks 
rather than to a satellite fuel tank. There are several assemblies whose pur-
pose was not explained in the above example. The relief valves RV1 and RV2 
serve as a safety pressure relief. Check valve CV1 prevents backflow into the 
gas system. The bladders in tank 1 and 2 serve to isolate the fuel from the 
propellant and also to contain the fuel in the weightlessness of space. Some 














for two failure tolerance. 
2.2 The Diagnosis Task 
The operator's task is to diagnose the failure in the system. This 
requires the operator to manipulate and observe the system, because a diag-
nosis cannot be determined uniquely from an observation of a state vector at a 
single point in time. The diagnosis task is difficult for the following rea-
sons. First, all component testing must be done in the context of the system. 
It is not possible to remove a component for isolated testing. Thus, every 
diagnostic test requires nontrivial interpretation. Second, the data are lim-
ited and may contain one or more errors. There are seven pressure sensor 
readings and fourteen commanded valve positions. Both can contain an error. A 
pressure sensor may report a false reading or a valve may disobey its command. 
The consequences are that an unaided diagnosis can easily require ten minutes. 
3 AIDING WITH A QUALITATIVE MODEL 
This section describes the interface, our model of operator information 
processing, and the aids. The interface has four windows: schematic, interac- 
Figure 1. The Orbital Refueling System (ORS). 
tion, sensor display, and hypotheses. 
The schematic window displays a schematic diagram of the ORS. The 
schematic always shows the commanded states of the valves. Certain forms of 
aiding (described below) change the display of paths along which mass may 
flow. The appearance of the schematic is similar to Figure 1. 
The interaction window is where the operator's commands appear. The com-
mands available to the operator include the following: 
1. Opening and closing valves. 
2. Comparing two pressures. On a real physical system, the numerical 
pressure could be displayed on the schematic. When a qualitative 
model is used, there is no scale in general to which a pressure can be 
referred. Instead, the subject may request the relationship (<, 's >) 
between two pressures or between a pressure and a nominal reference 
pressure such as absolute zero or the regulator's design set point. 
3. Display of the first derivative of pressure (positive, zero, or nega-
tive). 
4. Turning the what-if model aid (described below) on and off, and stat-
ing hypotheses to the what-if model aid. When the what-if model is 
on, the open, close, and comparison commands apply both to the system 
and the what-if model. 
The sensor display contains the output frvm the comparison command: the 
relationship between two pressures or the first derivative of a pressure. The 
what-if model, if activated, has its corresponding output displayed side-by-
side with the system model. 
The hypotheses window will display any hypotheses that the operator 
expresses through commands in the interaction window. 
4 A MODEL OF OPERATOR INFORMATION PROCESSING 
4.1 Observation Ad. Strategies  
Our model of operator information processing directly influenced the 
design of the aids. From the observation of diagnostic behavior, we had iden-
tified three strategies that subjects used: hypothesis-driven evaluation, 
data-driven evaluation, and topographic search [Yoon and Hammer, 19871. 
Hypothesis-driven evaluation starts with the planning of a test procedure for 
a given hypothesis. A test plan would be diagnostic if, given that the 
hypothesis is true, the response of the system to the test is unique to the 
hypothesis. When a sufficiently diagnostic test has been planned, the test is 
executed and its result evaluated. Because the hypothesis needs to be expli-
cit enough to enable the prediction of its resulting system behavior, this 
strategy is mostly used in the later phase of diagnosis. 
With data-driven evaluation, the subject first examines a piece of data to 
determine if it is worth closer attention. This examination is done by com-
paring the data to the expected system behavior. If the data turns out to be 
unexpected (i.e., not explained in terms of previously observed symptoms or 
normal behavior), then hypotheses are formulated to explain the data. Whether 
the formulation is successful, this piece of data is remembered as another 
symptom to be used later during diagnosis. Since this strategy does not • 
require a well-formed hypothesis, it was heavily employed in the initial phase 
of diagnosis. 
Topographic search follows the connections between components to track 
down the source of the malfunction. In contrast to hypothesis-driven and 
data-driven evaluation, it does not appear to require as deep a reasoning 
about device behavior., Thus, it is easier. 
4.2 Iyugs 	information processing 
As frequent parts of some of the above strategies, the operator needs 
presumably to do the following types of information processing. First, the 
operator must envision the normal behavior (i.e. no failures) of - the system. 
Second, the operator uses external, observable information (i.e., pressure 
information) to determine unobservable, internal behavior (i.e., -presence of a 
mass flow, a leak somewhere in a path). Third, the operator must form the 
difference between the observed and normal system behavior. These three forms 
of processing could be termed N (normal), 0 (observed), and 0-N (observed 
minus normal). 
The aids parallel the above three forms of processing. N and 0 aiding are 
intended to help the operator with N and 0 processing, respectively. Both are 
displayed in the same way. The schematic display is modified to show both mass 
flow paths (the movement of either gas or liquid) and equal pressure paths. 
The determination of these paths is from a system model (N) or pressure obser-
vations (0) available to the aid. The aid has exactly the same information as 
does the operator. 
0-N aiding is the difference between observed and normal behavior. This 
information is displayed in the sensor display window in the form of suggested 
data observation commands. This form of aiding was also predicted to be useful 
based on earlier observations [Yoon and Hammer, 1987]. Subjects appeared to 
have difficulty selecting effective data to observe. 
A fourth form of aiding, 0-H, is closely related to the third, 0-N. 0-H 
(observed minus hypothesized) aiding displays the difference (as described 
above) between the observed behavior and a system with one or more hypotheti- 
' cal failures. This aid allows the operator to set a hypothesis. . If the 
hypothesis is correct, there will be no difference between observed and 
hypothesized behavior. This aid gives the operator an unambiguous interpreta-
tion of the correctness of a hypothesis. It does not, however, tell the 
operator how to modify the hypothesis if it is incorrect. 
5 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
5.1 ?rocedure 
Two experiments were conducted to evaluate the aids. A comparison of N 
versus unaided performance was first tested since we had earlier observed that 
most subjects found it confusing or irrelevant. The more prospective aids, 0 
and 0—N, were evaluated in the second experiment. Six and nine engineering 
students participated in the first and the second experiment, respectively. 
Two training sessions preceded the experimental session. The first ses-
sion was self—paced instruction on basic fluid dynamics and the operation of 
the ORS. In the second session, the subjects practised testing various 
hypotheses and solved five diagnostic probleis both with and without the aids. 
The purpose of these experiments intentionally limited the useful range of 
diagnostic skill of subjects.. An overtrained subject tends to develop some 
mechanistic diagnosis procedures. These may replace the deep reasoning about 
the system and deal with the problems as routine failures rather than novel 
ones. With too little training, the subject's performance would reflect more 
of deficiency in knowledge than the difficulty of the problem solving. For 
these reasons, the experimenter interacted with the subjects in both training 
sessions to insure proper understanding of the material. 
The subjects started the experimental session with several additional, 
warm—up exercises and solved six main problems. Keystrokes and verbal proto-
cols were collected. The performance measures were the time to diagnose (TTD) 
and the number of information gathering actions (#IGA). Problem and subject 
were blocking variables. Each subject solved the problems with an equal 
number of different aiding levels. A replicated Latin square was used. Order 
effects were counterbalanced. Three subjects formed a group, which received 
the same order of aids, to serve as replications for the evaluation of 
interaction terms in both experiments [Winer, 1962, pp. 538-543]. 
5.2 Aesults  
The results of significance tests were same with TTD and RIGA. The effect 
of N aiding was somewhat negative, though not significant. Most subjects said 
after their sessions that the aid N was rather confusing or that it was not 
the information they were seeking during the diagnosis. Both 0 and 0—N aids 
showed a positive improvement in diagnostic performance at the 0.05 signifi- 
cance level. The effects of both blocking variables, subject and problem, were 
significant. But, there was no significant interaction between any two vari-
ables. Residual analysis revealed that logarithmically transformed data better 
satisfied the homogeneous variance assumption. No test results, however, were 
changed by the transformation. It was shown that 0-N and 0 shortened TTD on 
the average by 42% and 34%, respectively. The aiding effects appeared similar 
in #IGA: 44% decrease with 0-N, 402 with O. 
5.3 Additional observations  
The following observations, while not the result of hypothesis testing, 
were also made during the course of the experiment. The aids more benefited' 
the problem solving earlier in the diagnosis. This was expected because one of 
the effects of 0 and 0-N was to reveal abnormal system responses, and thus to 
stimulate the subject to launch a data-driven evaluation. In fact, 0-N aiding 
obviously encourages the subject to select meaningful data,. Toward the end 
of diagnosis, the subjects developed explicit hypotheses (i.e. hypothesis- 
. driven evaluation), and tended to be too heavily involved in their own testing 
procedure to pay attention to•the aid. In fact, the aiding information is usu-
ally no longer relevant to the subjects' highly detailed hypothesis testing. 
To aid the final phase of diagnosis, the -aid needs to know the operator's 
hypothesis. Then, the aid could run a modified qualitative model according to 
the hypothesis (H) and calculate its deviation from the observed behavior (0). 
The difference 0-H may be more relevant than 0-N to the later phase of diag-
nosis. 
6 CONCLUSION 
An aiding approach has been described and evaluated for novel fault diag-
nosis in complex systems. To the best of our knowledge, this approach is 
unique in the following ways. First, the emphasis is on novel rather than 
routine faults. Second, it contains a qualitative model that may correspond 
to the human's internal model of the system. This model represents knowledge 
only of how the system behaves. Therefore, this aiding approach does not rely' 
on proceduralized knowledge. Third, the qualitative model is the basis for 
much of the aiding that takes place. 
The qualitative model was used to help different tasks of human informa-
tion processing. Presentation of observed system behavior (0) improved the 
diagnostic performance of subjects, while that of normal system behavior (N) 
does not. One implication is that the prediction of current actual system 
behavior is a task that needs more help. Aiding of envisioning normal system 
behavior according to commanded physical configuration is less effective and, 
when emphasized saliently, seems to interfere with the diagnostic reasoning. 
Pointing out the abnormality in the observed system behavior (0-N) was at 
least as effective as O. 
More generally, the experiment confirmed that a deep reasoning diagnosis 
can be aided, without disturbing the human diagnostic procedure, by providing 
relevant information. It should be emphasized that this was possible through 
an understanding of the operator's information needs and that a qualitative 
model could be used to generate the information that seemed to be well 
accepted for augmenting the human's mental model. 
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This research investigated ways in which computers can aid the decision making of 
an human operator of an aerospace system. The approach taken is to aid rather than 
replace the human operator, because operational experience has shown that humans can 
enhance the effectiveness of systems. As systems become more automated, the role of the 
operator has shifted to that of a manager and problem solver. This shift has created the 
research area of how to aid the human in this role. 
The remainder of this report describes published research in four areas. It 
concludes with a discussion of the DC-8 flight simulator at Georgia Tech. 
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Model-Based Online Aidi g [5] 
This research addressed the feasibility of adapting an existing rule-based system as 
an online "coach" for controlling PLANT, a simulation of a generic process plant. KARL, 
a rule based model capable of controlling PLANT, was adapted to provide three types of 
information to subjects: 
1) situation assessment (i.e., which operational procedure, if any, was applicable for a 
given situation); 
2) guidance in following procedures (i.e., feedback whenever subjects' actions were 
inconsistent with available procedures); and 
3) performance feedback (based upon changes in the system's stability). 
Subjects received this information online while controlling PLANT. Compared to subjects 
in an earlier experiment who controlled PLANT without the benefit of the coach, these 
subjects maintained a generally more stable system, scored higher on a paper-and-pencil 
test of system knowledge, and were more successful in diagnosing an unfamiliar failure of 
the PLANT safety system. Careful analysis of these results in light of previous research 
with PLANT indicated that the reasons for these differences were not as straightforward as 
they might appear. This experiment is viewed as illustrating potential benefits and 
subtleties of using a rule-based model as an online coach. 
4 
Significance Testing of Rule-Based Models  [1] 
Many researchers have used rule-based systems to model human problem solving. 
Typically, the rule-based system has a large number of rules, each of which has several free 
variables that were adjusted during the modeling process. For the most part, significance 
testing of these rules has not been much of a consideration, although it should be. It is 
possible to describe N data perfectly with N rules using a trivial model that simply 
reproduces the data. While there is no evidence that this has happened in any of the 
research reported to date, there is a certain danger of overfitting a rule-based model. 
Three methods were developed for testing the statistical significance of rules and 
other components of rule-based models. It was assumed that the percentage of behavior 
matched (e.g., commands) was the performance measure of interest. Two of the testing 
approaches, however, were not limited to this measure. They may be used to study any 
performance measure, though it may be possible for a rule to produce a statistically 
significant effect on one performance measure but not another. Rule testing by analysis of 
variance, randomization, and contingency tables was studied, and comparisons between 
these methods were developed. 
Identification of Rule-Based Models of Problem Solving  [6, 7] 
Rule-based models have frequently been used to model human performance and 
behavior. A machine learning program was used to identify the rules employed by humans 
in two settings. The first setting was a collision avoidance maneuver for which the pilots 
had a cockpit display of traffic information (CDT!). This data was generated from an 
experiment to evaluate the effects of various CDT! displays on avoidance behavior. 
5 
The rules produced by the machine learning program can be combined in a decision 
sequence that accounts for a substantial portion of the maneuvers. When the intruder was 
maintaining a constant altitude, pilots executed vertical away maneuvers even for intruders 
posing no threat. This is the easiest of the maneuver decisions because it entails no 
geometric complications and was used whenever possible. For intruders changing altitude, 
a minority of pilots consistently checked for a threatening separation and remained on 
course if none existed. Another subgroup responded to horizontal threats by uniformly 
turning toward the intruder. This is a good decision if the intruder would have passed in 
front but aggravates the situation for intruders which would pass behind. The remainder of 
the pilots included this qualification in their decisions to turn toward the intruder. The 
mirror of this strategy, turning away from intruders which would pass behind was not 
observed. 
The second setting was PLANT [Morris, N.M., and Rouse, W.B. (1985). "The 
effects of type of knowledge upon human problem solving in a process control task." 
IEEE Transactions on Systems. Man. and Cybernetics,  SMC-15(6).], a simulated industrial 
process in which feedstock is pumped in at one end and the finished product is pumped out 
at the other. A three-by-three matrix of tanks connects PLANT input to output. Each tank 
is connected by valves to all tanks in adjacent columns. The operator controls valve 
positions and pumping rates for feedstock and product. Fluid dynamics are modeled 
within the system causing lags and oscillations to result when valves change state, as well as 
varying rates of flow due to relative tank heights. Valves trip closed when flow exceeds 
their setpoints. Failures of pumps and valves are also possible. The CRT system display 
shows tanks, their levels of fluid, open valves connecting the tanks, and numerical labels 
showing pumping rates and tank levels. 
6 
In concert these features produce a complex symbolic task in which conflicting goals 
relating production, system stability, long term trends, failures, and trips must be balanced 
to operate the system. At peak efficiency, all valves should be open, tank levels uniform 
across the system, and identically high pumping rates set for feedstock and product. 
PLANT is operated by subjects through a services of iterations which a control action is 
entered and the resultant updated system state displayed. The iterations from an 
experimental session (-500) provide a series of "snapshots" isolating specific system states 
and the responses subjects made to them. 
In an initial analysis of this data [8], small sets of high coverage rules were 
assembled. Cross-validation was used to assess the reliability of the selected rules. 
Identified rules correctly matched 51% of control decisions in the identification sample for 
subjects in the control group and 32% of the control decisions in the validation sample. 
For subjects using PLANT procedures, combining symbolic (rule-based) and signal 
(internal dynamic model of PLANT) processing fared better matching control decisions 
52% of the time. The generality of the well-performing rules obtained prohibited the 
detailed analysis of strategy possible in the CDTI case. 
Deep Reasoning Fault Diagnosis [Z 3, 4, 9,11] 
This research studied the design and evaluation of knowledge-based aiding for a 
human operator who must diagnose a novel fault in a dynamic, physical system. Since the 
operator must employ deep reasoning about system behavior to diagnose such a fault, his 
or her performance may be restricted by cognitive limitations and biases. A computer aid 
based on a qualitative model of the system was built to help the operator overcome some 
of these limitations. This aid differs from most expert systems in that it operates at several 
levels of interaction which are believed to be more suitable for deep reasoning. 
Four aiding approaches, each of which provided unique information to the 
operator, were evaluated. The aiding features were designed to help the human's causal 
reasoning about the system in predicting normal system behavior (N aiding), integrating 
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DC-8 Flight Simulator 
The failure to both complete and utilize the DC-8 flight simulator is a 
disappointment. An assessment of the cost of developing the simulation should have been 
prepared initially. The development breaks down into three categories: hardware, flight 
simulation, and display generation. The hardware category was completed at a cost of 
roughly $75,000. The flight simulation code is roughly one half done, and perhaps another 
10,000 lines of code need to be written and tested. This would require one programmer-
year to produce ($50,000). Display generation would require $15,000 in hardware and 
another programmer-year ($50,000). A total estimated cost of $190,000 compares 
favorably with the cost of a commercial product. However, the research funding needed to 
support such a facility must be larger than a single $100,000/year grant. 
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ABSTRACT 
The design and evaluation are presented for knowledge-based aiding for a 
human operator who must diagnose a novel fault in a dynamic, physical system. 
Since the operator must employ deep reasoning about system behavior to diag-
nose such a fault, the performance may be restricted by cognitive limitations 
and biases. A computer aid based on a qualitative model of the system was 
built to help the operator overcome some of his/her cognitive limitations. 
This aid differs from most expert systems in that it operates at several lev-
els of interaction which are believed to be more suitable for deep reasoning. 
Four aiding approaches, each of which provided unique information to the 
operator, were evaluated. The aiding features were designed to help the 
human's causal reasoning about the system in predicting normal system behavior 
(N aiding), integrating observations into actual system behavior (0 aiding), 
finding discrepancies between the two (0-N aiding), or finding discrepancies 
between observed behavior and hypothetical behavior (0-H aiding). Three 
experiments were conducted to evaluate the aiding approaches and to investi-
gate the nature of deep-reasoning diagnosis. Human diagnostic performance 
improved by almost a factor of two with 0 aiding and 0-N aiding. The results 
1 
from the experiments were integrated into a model of human information pro—
ceasing in causal reasoning diagnosis. 
INTRODUCTION 
Becoming more of a monitor and supervisor in today's highly automated 
systems [Rasmussen 19841, the human operator must at times be involved in 
the task of diagnosing system failures, which is increasingly difficult as 
the system becomes more complicated and automated. The prevalent approach 
to fault diagnosis is to train the operator to have better knowledge and 
experience with commonly expected faults. The training might teach the 
operator to use symptoms to distinguish faults and to follow procedures to 
correct them. While this approach should be successful with common faults, 
it does not support diagnosis of novel faults. 
Another, more recent approach is to support the human operator via 
expert systems for diagnosis. Those expert systems are typically based on a 
large collection of diagnostic rules, which associate symptoms to causes and 
generate tests. As for novel failures, many expert systems for diagnosis 
[Shortliffe 1976, Miller, Pople, and Myers 19841 are based on shallow rea-
soning: a set of symptoms suggests a diagnosis. This mapping is based on 
experience rather than a system model. Consequently, such systems are sub-
ject to the same limitations as training and procedures. The expert system 
designer has to anticipate the failure for the expert system to solve it 
correctly. 
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Aiding Anntd MIL A SYsteM Model 
To diagnose an unanticipated, unexperienced fault, the operator must 
rely on his/her understanding of causality of the system [Davis 19841. Such 
causal reasoning is usually a very demanding cognitive task when the system 
is complex. Therefore, an intelligent aid should be able to support the 
operator in causal reasoning about the system behavior. The most obvious way 
to achieve this is to let the aid run its own causal model of the system and 
provide the results to the human. A qualitative model of the system can be 
useful for this purpose. 
Another advantage of an aid based on a causal model is that it should 
be more reliable and robust. The system knowledge is represented at the com-
ponent level. Because components are small and comprehendable, it should be 
possible to create representations that are correct, perhaps even provably 
so. A system fault can be expressed as a combination of component faults 
which does not require a priori identification of the system fault itself. 
Thus, an aid based on a causal system model can cover a wider range of 
faults. 
In spite of the power of the intelligent aid, we believe there are 
several reasons to keep the human in command of the problem solving. First, 
the current trend of automatic diagnosis is based on large rule-bases which 
are less useful in novel fault diagnosis. Second, the human and the aid may 
be better able to find a solution cooperatively than either can alone. This 
is possible, even necessary, because the human has better pattern recogni-
tion capabilities and can make inductive leaps. Third, in many cases, diag-
nosis is one of the subgoals and may interfere with other subgoals. For 
example, when diagnosis involves operating the system (e.g., opening valves, 
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starting motors), it may interfere with the subgoal of system safety. The 
human is better suited for the responsibility of resolving tradeoffs in pur-
suit of an overall goal. Lastly, the human may need to resolve ambiguities 
inherent in the aid's model or even to extend the model. 
Suboptimalities 	Rum= Problem $olvine  
The aid is designed to mitigate human suboptimalities that occur during 
decision-making and troubleshooting [Wickens 19841. Two categories of 
suboptimalities used here are knowledge-limited and cognition-limited. The 
knowledge-limited suboptimality is simply that the operator does not fully 
understand the system. Obviously, the aid's model is a basis for compensat-
ing for this problem. 
Cognition-limited suboptimalities are of more interest when the system 
fault is novel rather than common. Novel fault diagnosis requires causal 
reasoning about the system, which is a cognitively very demanding task. The 
operator should repeatedly run a mental model of the system in multiple 
modes as well as maintain a diagnostic procedure. The required information 
processing can overload the operator's limited mental resources, especially 
attention and working memory. The results may be incorrect reasoning or 
inefficient use of information. 
To help, the computer aid can process and display useful information so 
that the operator can use it. This may improve the system performance in 
two ways. First, the operator can dynamically allocate some subtasks to the 
aid and concentrate on others. Tbis leads to lessened mental workload and 
improved performance on those subtasks undertaken by the operator. Second, 
since the aid reasons in parallel with the human, the human can confirm 
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his/her results against the aid's results. When the human overlooks some 
useful information or is affected by some biases, discrepancies would be 
noticed between the aid's results and the operator's own. The operator may 
then adopt the aid's result to be used in subsequent reasoning. For exam-
ple, when the human and the aid evaluate a hypothesis, the confirmation bias 
(i.e., the tendency to seek only confirming evidences) will be prevented 
since the aid, being not susceptible to this bias, would report disconfirm-
ing evidence. 
Research Questions  
It is likely that not every plausible form of aiding will improve 
operator performance. Some information which is both relevant and helpful 
may not be able to improve human performance because the human fails to 
incorporate the- information into his/her problem solving. This leads to 
another question: which types of information are easily usable by the human? 
Our approach to answering these questions was, first, to build an aid based 
on the best principles available to us, and let the aid supply prospective 
types of information in experimental settings to evaluate their actual aid-
ing effects. Successful and unsuccessful aiding may also provide insight on 
the architecture of human information processing. 
In the subsequent sections of this article, we will discuss the suit-
able form of interaction for a deep-reasoning aid, the system which served 
as the context of problem, qualitative modeling of the system, the features 
of the aid, the experiments and results, and a model of human information 
processing in causal reasoning diagnosis. Because a literature review was 
included in recently published, early report of this research [Moon and Ham-
mer 1987], no review appears here. 
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LEVELS OF INTERACTION 
In the design of interaction between the aid and the human, it is 
important to consider the nature of task to be aided. Deep-reasoning diag-
nosis has many subprocesses of which even the problem solver may not be 
aware. The aid should be able to help the human's processing without dis-
turbing or interfering with it. 
To discuss appropriate forms of interaction in this situation, we stra-
tify the ways in which the human and computer interact into five levels in 
terms of intrusiveness (Figure 1). The two extreme (i.e., the most 
intrusive) levels are the human-direct level and the computer-direct level. 
In the middle, the human-suggest and the computer-suggest levels allow a 
problem solver, the human or the aid, to be moderately intrusive. Finally, 
there is the independent level at which neither problem solver influences 
the other. This stratification is orthogonal to the levels of required 
intelligence or knowledge the aid should have [Greenstein 1980]. 
At the haman-direct level, the human assigns tasks to the computer. 
For example, the computer will respond to the operator's request to perform 
a subtask or to answer a question. The situation is opposite at the 
computer-direct level; the computer asks the human for some information or 
to perform some tasks. The human does not have a choice other than to follow 
the request. 
Typical expert systems use only these two levels of interaction; some 
systems use only one of the two, others use both. At either level, the 
overall processing is serial and requires explicit communication. Certainly, 
this property does not promote the human's deep reasoning. The difficulty 
of human-direct level interaction is that the effectiveness of the aid 
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depends upon the ability of the human to decompose the overall task into 
modular subtasks [Wickens 1984]. On the other hand, at the computer-direct 
level, the human does not have the freedom to pursue his/her own processing. 
This would reduce the benefit to the system of having the human whose flexi-
bility and inductive and pattern recognition capabilities are superior to 
those of automation. 
At the human-suggest level of interaction, the human may impose con-
straints on the computer's processing. Examples are adjusting weights of 
different criteria, modifying the computer's intermediate results, or res-
tricting the computer's attention to some area in the problem space. How-
ever, the computer will continue its tasks without explicit assignment by 
level allows the computer to provide 
human. The human is free to attend or 
situation. The operator may postpone 
are modified. The computer-suggest  
some information or warning to the 
not depending on his/her assessment of 
a response until finishing a current 
the human; only the data or criteria 
line of reasoning; or, the computer can be completely ignored. Thus, the 
communication is allowed to be less explicit and more abstract. What 
becomes a critical issue is that the suggestions by the computer need to be 
compatible with the human's reasoning process. 
At the independent level, both problem solvers pursue their own problem 
solving procedures without influencing each other. This level is almost 
non-existent in conventional expert systems which employ only the two 
extreme levels. When the interaction occurs at the suggest levels, however, 
the independent level fills the intermissions between suggestions. While 
there is no interaction, both problem solvers may be highly active in their 
problem solving. At times, the deep-reasoning process needs to be supported 
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by interruption-free independence. 
We believe that the three middle levels should facilitate more adequate 
aiding to deep-reasoning tasks. At those levels, the processing is more 
parallel and both problem solvers have more freedom. Two human problem 
solvers would interact mostly at those levels; they would suggest, take com-
ments and hints, or be silent. Using the three levels of interaction was 
one of our principles in building the aid for novel fault diagnosis. 
Another related principle was to consider compatibility of aiding informa-
tion with human information processing. 
THE SYSTEM AND THE TASK 
The Orbital Refueling System (ORS), a NASA-designed payload on the 
Space Shuttle, was selected for study [NASA 1985]. The function of the ORS 
is to refuel orbiting satellites with hydrazine, with the objective of 
extending their useful service life. As shown in Figure 2, the ORS fluid 
system contains a variety of components such as tanks, valves, pipes, etc. 
The operator controls the simulated ORS by opening and closing valves. 
Transferring fuel from propellant tank 1 to propellant tank 2 might proceed 
as follows. First, tank 2 pressure is reduced by momentarily opening valves 
10, 11, 13, and 17. Second, tank 1 is pressurized by opening valves 1, 3, 
and 7. Gaseous nitrogen will flow out of the two small supply tanks, be 
pressure regulated, and fill tank 1 on one side of the bladder. To transfer 
fuel to tank 2, valves 5, 14, 15, 16, and 9 would be opened. Because this 
version of the ORS was for demonstration purposes, all transfers take place 
between the two large tanks rather than to a satellite fuel tank. There are 
several assemblies whose purpose was not explained in the above example. 
The relief valves RV1 and RV2 serve as a safety pressure relief. Check 
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valve CV1 prevents backflow into the gas system. The bladders in tank 1 and 
2 serve to isolate the fuel from the propellant and also to contain the fuel 
in the weightlessness of space. Some components (e.g., valves 10 and 11) 
may seem redundant; they are so by design for two failure tolerance. 
Nomenclature 
In discussing the ORS and the operator's actions and diagnosis, we have 
found the following nomenclature useful. A component is the smallest unit of 
the ORS system that is modeled in isolation. Typical components include 
valves, tanks, pipes, regulators, sensors, etc. The entire set of com-
ponents, working together according to the qualitative dynamics, is a sys-
tem. A path is a connected set of components, which could be either a 
graph-theoretic path or tree. 
Components have states. For example, a valve may be open, closed, or 
leaking. The state is what the component is actually doing. A commanded 
state is the state to which a commandable component asked to assume. For 
example, a valve may be commanded open or closed. A component also has a 
behavior mode, such as fail-open or normal. The behavior mode describes the 
states which the component takes in response to commands and external condi-
tions. For example, a fail-open valve is always open, regardless of the 
command. 
113.e Diagnosis Task  
The operator's task is to diagnose the failure in the system. This 
requires the operator to manipulate and observe the system, because a diag-
nosis cannot be determined uniquely from an observation of a state vector at 
a single point in time. A solution is an assignment of states to components 
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such that the assignment's behavior is always identical to system behavior. 
For a single valve failure, the solution would be a normal state for all 
components save the failed valve, which might be jammed shut. The diagnosis 
problem can be viewed as a combinatorial search for a state assignment. The 
search is constrained by the laws of component physics. That is, a state 
assignment to a component imposes constraints on its neighboring components. 
For example, if a valve is opened and permits a flow down a pipe, the com-
ponent receiving the flow must be in a state to accept the flow. 
QUALITATIVE MODELS OF CONTINUOUS PHYSICAL PROCESSES 
This section describes qualitative models: representations, the compu-
tational problems solved, and the specific needs of our aid of the qualita-
tive model. 
A qualitative model is a symbolic representation of a system. Its most 
basic description is of a component. A component is described in terms of 
its connections to other components and its behavior. Behavior is described 
in terms of the physical variables which are present at its connections. 
The differentiation between the structural description (connections) and the 
behavioral description is particularly important for insuring the robustness 
of a qualitative model. The isolation of each component in the behavioral 
description has usually been emphasized by other qualitative modeling [De 
Rleer and Brown 1983]. Contrarily, our qualitative model represents the 
system at both the component level and at an aggregated level as paths. The 
motivation for this is the belief that a multi-level description is closer 
to the operator's internal model of the process. In fact, more effective 
communication between our model and the human operator was enabled by the 
use of the higher level description. 
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From a given state, the behavior of a component is described in terms 
of the physical variables present at its ports. A physical variable (and 
its time derivative) may take several values. The time derivative usually 
has only one of three possible values: negative, zero, or positive. The 
variable itself may take either nominal or ordinal values. The nominal 
values usually correspond to points at which behavior (component or 
material) changes. For example,. water temperature would have nominal values 
at freezing and boiling. Variables may also take on ordinal values (or 
relationships). For example, water temperature could be taken to be greater 
than freezing and less than boiling. 
The nominal and ordinal values taken by physical variables are said to 
occur in a quantity space. [Forbus 1984, Kuipers 1984]. The quantity space 
is a partial ordering on the physical variable values it contains. The par-
tial ordering occurs because not all comparisons are relevant to understand-
ing the physical system qualitatively. For example, consider a valve 
between two tanks, A and B. When the valve is opened, the resulting 
behavior is determined by the pressures in two tanks. The pressure at other 
unconnected points in the system is unrelated to the above behavior. 
AIDING WITH A QUALITATIVE MODEL 
This section describes how a qualitative model is used as a foundation 
for aiding. First, each window of the interface will be described. Four 
different aiding strategies and the motivation for each of them will then be 
presented. Each strategy emphasizes different type of aiding information. 
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DRI interface  
The interface has four windows: schematic, interaction, sensor display, 
and hypotheses (Figure 3). The schematic window displays a schematic 
diagram of the ORS. The schematic always shows the commanded state of the 
valves. The interaction window is where the operator's commands are echoed 
by the interface. The commands available to the operator include the fol-
lowing: 
(1) Opening and closing valves. 
(2) Comparing two pressures. On a real physical system, the numerical 
pressure could be displayed on the schematic. When a qualitative 
model is used to simulate the physical system, there is no absolute 
scale in general to which a pressure can be referred. Instead, a 
pressure can be compared to other pressures in the system by the 
relations less-than, equal-to, or greater-than. 
(3) Display of the first derivative of a pressure (positive, 'zero, or 
negative). 
And, when the corresponding aiding feature (it is described more fully in a 
later section) is available, 
(4) Turning the what-if model on and off. 
(5) Making state assumptions in the what-if model. 
The sensor display contains the output from the sensor display com-
mends: the relationship between two pressures or the first derivative of a 
pressure. When appropriate aiding features are activated, suggested sensor 
readings will also be displayed in this window. 
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`e hypotheses window displays a set of hypotheses that are set by the 
operator. These hypotheses are simply state assignments to components (e.g., 
valve 13: leaking). Pipes, which do not have names displayed in the 
schematic, are designated as left or right to named components such as 
valves and orifices. For example, the pipe between valve 8 and orifice 4 is 
designated either An or L Di. 
Aiding Approaches  
Based on observed human strategies of diagnosis, four aiding approaches 
seemed to deserve evaluation. Each approach emphasizes different informa-
tion and uses an appropriate communication mode for the kind of information. 
Topographic Aiding. The first and second aiding approaches are based 
on two presumed forms of operator cognitive processing. First, the operator 
must observe and infer what the system is actually doing. This processing 
is termed 0 (Observed) and is concerned with flows, leaks through valves, 
leaks out of pipes, and the general vicinity of the fault. Second, the 
operator needs to generate normal system behavior to compare with observed 
behavior. This processing is termed N (Normal). Two obvious forms of aiding 
are to generate 0 and N so that the operator does not have to devote cogni-
tive processing to generating them. To produce 0, the aid integrates the 
information from the pressure sensors to which it has continuous access. 
Like a human operator, the aid has to guess the actual behavior from the 
sensor information since it does not know the real system state. In con-
trast, N is generated by the qualitative model under the assumption that 
every component is in the normal behavior mode. 
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0 and N are displayed topographically. For both 0 and N, the aid 
displays two forms of system behavior: equal pressure paths and mass flow 
paths. The former is the set of components that should be at equal pressure 
given the commanded valve positions. Whenever the operator creates an equal 
pressure path by opening a valve, the path is highlighted. Similarly, a mass 
flow path created by an operation is highlighted as long as it exists. 
Figure 4 is an example of N display. Opening valve 9 was the latest 
change. This would make, if the system were fault-free, the pressure is 
equal through the highlighted path. 
Figure 5 shows the same configuration as Figure 4, except that the 0 
display (rather than N) is activated. Suppose that when valve 9 was opened, 
the pressure P2 began to decrease and PI increase. This leads the aid to 
believe there is a mass flow from tank 2. to tank 1 (the path is highlighted) 
in spite of the closed positions of valve 8 and valve 15. However, since the 
aid cannot be certain which valve is leaking, it highlights both paths. When 
a precise conjecture is not possible, the aid will take a conservative posi-
tion as in this example. Note that 0 and N aiding cannot be used simultane-
ously. 
Diagxenciag. Observed and Normal 3ehavior. The third aiding approach 
is to suggest observations that reveal the differences between the observed 
system behavior and the normal system behavior. This difference will be 
referred to as 0-N. The importance of 0-N in ORS diagnosis was discussed in 
connection with the results of our preliminary experiment (Yoon and Hammer 
1987]. Such a deviation from normal behavior, when observed and correctly 
interpreted, helped effectively reduce the size of the feasible hypothesis 
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set. Figure 6 shows an example of this feature's display in the same situa-
tion as of Figure 4 and 5. The aid suggests, for example, to issue a command 
D E., which is to inquire the first derivative of P1. When the operator fol-
lows this, he/she will find P1 is increasing, which is opposite to the com-
manded situation (no flow should be possible from either GTK or TK2G/L). 
What-il &del. The fourth, and the last, aiding feature is closely 
related to the above. This feature can use any hypothetical behavior 
(denoted by H), instead of the normal behavior, with which to difference the 
observed system behavior. The operator can freely set or remove hypotheses. 
Then, the aid will run a what-if model based on the hypotheses in place of 
the normal model. Any discrepancies (denoted by 0-H) will be reported in the 
same way. If the hypothesis is incorrect and the observed and hypothesized 
bevavior differ, the aid will recommend readings that indicate the differ-
ence. If the hypothesis is correct, the aid will produce no recommenda-
tions. For example, suppose valve 8 is leaking to allow a flow from tank 2 
to tank 1. If the operator's hypothesis is a leak in the pipe between valve 
10 and 11, the feature would present a display shown in Figure 7. If the 
hypothesis were right, P1 should not increase. In this example, P1 does 
increase, so the aid recommends a reading D EL. Also, the hypothesis does 
not explain the difference between P2 and P4. Note that if no hypothesis is 
stated, the recommendations would be the same as the previous example (i.e., 
0-H = 0-N if H = N). 
The common motivation for these aiding approaches is to perform compu-
tations that the operator is believed to do when diagnosing the system. As 
much as these computations are related to the human's mental model, the 
qualitative model in the aid may be an appropriate vehicle to help or 
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replace the computations. There are two ways this approach might help. 
First, the operator may have an incorrect or incomplete mental model. 
Second, the operator may have difficulty integrating correct component 
behavior into correct system behavior because of cognitive limitations. The 
aiding approaches support different uses of the mental model: to envision 
the normal or hypothetical behavior, to conjecture the actual behavior, and 
to describe the difference between behaviors of two (e.g., 0 and H) models. 
This does not mean the operator need not understand the system at all; he or 
she still needs to understand the meaning of aid's information and select 
the hypotheses. 
THE EXPERIMENTS 
Overview a. Uperimental Pesigu 
To evaluate the types of aiding information, three separate experiments 
were conducted. The first experiment tested the effects of N information. 
The next experiment compared the effects of 0 and 0-N against unaided diag-
nosis. The last experiment focused on hypothesis testing and evaluated the 
aiding effects of 0-N and 0-H. 
The display of aiding information prevented those features from being 
tested together. A subject must not be exposed to both N and 0 features 
since severe interference, perhaps in the form of a carry-over effect, was 
expected. This is because the display of 0 and N information is identical 
but each carries a different meaning. 0-H and 0-N for the same reason 
should not be used together. When 0-H is used, it acts as 0-N until the 
subject expresses one or more hypotheses. This makes a direct comparison 
between 0-N and 0-H difficult. Even if 0-H really improves the performance, 
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its contribution will be depend on the extent to which a subject uses it. 
Therefore, a different experimental setting needs to be employed to evaluate 
the potential benefit of 0-11. The above considerations led to the three 
separate experiments. 
In all three experiments, replicated Latin square designs were employed 
[Edwards 1972]. Differences in the complexity of problems and differences 
between users were expected to introduce large variation in the performance. 
It was therefore desirable, in order to enhance the efficiency of the exper-
iments, to select problem and subject as two blocking variables. Such 
designs are called within-subjects designs for each subject serves in more 
than one treatment level. 
A Latin square design, if its assumptions hold, should be more economi:- 
cal than a corresponding complete block design. Even without considering 
economy, our experiment does not allow a complete block design. Because a 
subject should not be given a same problem more than once, he/she can be 
assigned only one level of treatment for each problem. 
In a Latin square design, the positions of each treatment level are 
counterbalanced: namely, each treatment occurs at each test position with 
equal frequency. This prevents possible practice effects from being con-
founded with treatment effects. Instead, practice effects are then con-
founded with test positions (i.e., problem). However, the problem factor is 
merely a blocking variable and we were not interested in the significance of 
its effects. Also, the training was designed to stabilize the subject's 
performance and thus minimize learning effects. 
One possible problem with a within-subject design is that the value of 
an observation for one treatment may be influenced by the effects of 
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treatments applied during earlier periods. When this arises, the treatment 
is referred to as having carry—over effects. The influence of this effect, 
if any, may be partially compensated for by adopting a balanced Latin square 
design, in which each treatment follows every other treatment the same 
number of times. When the number of treatments is odd, then at least two 
Latin squares are required to achieve this. This replication also permits a 
larger number of data points. All our experiments were designed following 
the above principles. The resulting designs are presented in Figures 8, 9 
and 10. 
While the balanced Latin square designs may compensate for the above 
problems, they are based on several assumptions. A key question concerning 
the Latin square design model is whether the effects of blocking variables 
and treatments are additive: since there is only one observation per cell, a 
Latin square design model assumes additivity to estimate the error variance. 
If nonadditivity is present in the data, the use of a model assuming addi-
tivity will lower both the significance_ level and the power of the test for 
treatment effects. Thus, the Tukey test for additivity was conducted when-
ever we applied a model to the data [Neter and Wasserman 1974, pp.780]. 
While homogeneity and normality of error variance are the basic assump-
tions in an ANOVA model, it is known that the F test is not much affected by 
deviation from these conditions [Lee 1975, pp.284]. However, a residual 
plot of error terms against expected cell means can reveal the need for 
transformation of dependent variables. Since a transformation would affect 
the interpretation of treatment effects, residual plots were examined in 
every analysis. 
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periment  1. 
The purpose of this experiment was to compare N aided and unaided diag-
nosis. It is reasonable to expect diagnostic performance to be improved 
when the envisionment of normal system behavior is improved. In our pre-
experimental observations, however, we observed that most subjects found 
this aiding confusing or irrelevant. Since its effectiveness was doubtful 
based on this observation, it was evaluated first. 
Six industrial engineering students volunteered to serve as subjects. 
They were trained through two sessions (total 3.5 - 4.0 hours) to acquire 
enough knowledge of fluid dynamics and elements of diagnostic procedure. The 
goal of our training was to teach the subjects correct causal reasoning 
about the ORS and give them reasonably stabilized diagnostic skills. How-
ever, if a subject is exposed to a kind of problem several times in a short _ 
period, the subject may develop some mechanistic diagnosis procedures that 
do not require causal reasoning. When a similar problem is given, the sub-
jects may try to deal with it as a routine failure rather than a novel one. 
We felt that a longer training may increase this possibility since the com-
plexity of our version of ORS is only moderate. 
Training session 1 started with basic principles derived from fluid 
dynamics. Then, possible malfunctions for each component were discussed. 
Finally, the subjects undertook a simulated ORS mission, during which envi-
sioning of normal system response was practiced. Session 2 taught elemen-
tary diagnostic procedures such as checking a sensor bias or a valve leak. 
The subject then was required to plan testing procedures for five typical 
hypotheses. Each developed procedure was discussed by the experimenter 
until the subject developed (and understood) a correct procedure. Next, 
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three real problems were given as exercises. Sessions 1 and 2 took 1.5 
hours and 2 hours on the average, respectively. 
The performance of the subject in the entire training sessions was 
closely monitored. The first session contained many questions to ascertain 
if the subject achieved proper understanding. The answers were checked dur-
ing the same session and, whenever necessary, discussed again. Problem 
solving exercises were also attended by the experimenter and necessary dis-
cussion or re—explanation was provided. The result was that the initially 
poorer subjects would spend more time in training rather than end with poor 
understanding. By the end of the second session, all the subjects performed 
satisfactorily and showed little additional improvement in diagnostic skill. 
The considerations which led to the design of experiment has been dis-
cussed in the overview section. The design for experiment 1 is shown in 
Figure 8. Each group was composed of three subjects and the Latin square 
was replicated three times using different problems. 
Many different performance measures were tried with our data from the 
pilot experiment. The number of information gathering actions (#IGA) and 
the time to solve (Time) appeared to be appropriate performance measures. 
Although several other measures were examined with the data, they either 
turned out to have insufficient resolution or showed high correlations with 
the above measures. Thus, the above were the most important measures in this 
experiment. Time and #IGA showed virtually identical behavior both in the 
examination of aptness of the ANOVA model and tests of significance. 
The data collected from 36 subject—problems were first analyzed to 
determine if there were significant interactions between problems and aiding 
levels. The interactions were found insignificant both in time (p .409) 
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and #IGA (p = .534). This suggested that the interaction term can be 
excluded from the model and its sum of squares may be pooled with that of 
error term. 
The Tukey test uncovered nonadditivity in the data of both Time and 
#IGA. The residual plot indicated that the cell standard deviations were 
proportional to cell averages. As this is frequently the case when the cri-
terion is response time [Lee 1975, pp.291], a logarithmic transformation was 
suggested. After the transformation, the anomaly in the residual plot was 
fixed. The transformed data, both in Time and #IGA, appeared to adhere to 
the homogeneity and normality requirements for ANOVA better than the origi-
nal scores. The interactions between aiding levels and problems were still 
insignificant. The Tukey test was performed again with the new scores and 
showed no significant nonadditivity. 
The contribution of N aiding to both Time and #IGA was on the negative 
side, though not significant (p = .096 and .381, respectively). On the aver-
age, it corresponds to 31% increase in Time and 13% in #IGA. 
These results may not simply be interpreted that N feature did not help 
the envisionment of normal system behavior or that the role of such envi-
sionment in the diagnosis is unimportant. A proper interpretation may be 
that the normal envisionment could not be helped very well by providing 
external information because the process is too quick and deeply embedded in 
a larger cycle of human information processing. Another possibility is that 
envisioning normal system behavior was not a bottleneck in diagnostic per-
formance. 
We concluded the former interpretation was very likely considering the 
following. First, most subjects, after their main sessions, stated that the 
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aid was not only uninformative, but also somewhat distracting or confusing. 
A subject said he wished he could get 'real' system behavior rather than 
'normal' behavior. Second, the fairly strong negative aiding effects could 
not be explained if the aid helped only unimportant subtasks. Third, the 
negative aiding effect was notably stronger in Time than in #IGA. (This was 
the only occasion in which the two measures showed any notable difference in 
the analysis throughout experiment 1 and 2.) This implies that the aid 
forced the subjects to think for a longer time but did not greatly affect 
their diagnostic procedure. This result supported the subjects in reporting 
that the aid was confusing and distracting. Thus, we concluded that there 
was interference between N information and the operators' diagnostic infor-
mation processing. Certainly, they do predict normal system behavior as a 
subtask: it is obviously necessary. But, when they seek -information from the 
display, it was not of normal system behavior. This observation will be 
implemented in modeling of deep-reasoning diagnosis later in this paper. 
periment 2. 
The second experiment was to assess the aiding effects of 0 and 0-N 
features against unaided diagnosis. Nine new subjects, again industrial 
engineering students, were recruited as volunteers. Two training sessions 
which were virtually same as in the first experiment were given. In terms 
of content, the only difference was that the explanation of the new features 
replaced that of N feature. The design of experiment, shown in Figure 9, was 
also the same except for a different number of treatment levels and replica-
tion. 
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The procedure of statistical analysis was the same as in Experiment 1. 
First, the interactions between aiding levels and problems were found insig-
nificant. After pooling the sum of squares for interactions into error sum 
of squares, the Tukey test for additivity was performed. No significant 
nonadditivity either in Time or #IGA was found. When the residual plots 
were examined, however, it was indicated that both measures needed to be 
logarithmically transformed. After the transformation, the new residual 
plots showed stabilized error variance. Again, the interactions between aid-
ing levels and problems were insignificant. The Tukey test with the new 
scores yielded a much lower F value than before the transformation, confirm-
ing that the new scores fit the assumptions of the model better. 
As results of the analysis of variance, both Time (p s  .0302) and #IGA 
(p ■ .0005) showed significant effects of aiding. In Time, the improvement 
(i.e., decrease in Time) on the average was 34% by 0 aiding and 42% by 0-N 
aiding. In #IGA, 0 aiding permitted 40% decrease while 0-N aiding gave 44%. 
Neuman-Keuls tests were performed to determine if there were significant 
differences between pairs of aiding levels. Both 0 and 0-N aiding levels 
had significantly different means when compared to the unaided mean. This 
result was identical for both Time and #IGA. In any measure, there was no 
conspicuous difference between 0 and 0-N aiding. 
The obvious conclusion is that both aiding features were effective in 
both measures and permitted solid enhancement of human diagnostic perfor-
mance. In contrast to the N feature, these types of information appeared to 
be well accepted by the human process of diagnosis and helped the human in 
some important elements for his/her performance. 
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Experiment a 
The motivation for Experiment 3 was informal observation of subjects 
during Experiment 2. The effectiveness of 0-N aiding in Experiment 2 
appeared to decrease as the diagnosis proceeded. As is to be supported by 
more elaborate analysis later, this motivated us to investigate possible 
transitions between problem solving phases made by the diagnostician. Prob-
ably the most notable change in diagnosis as time passes was that the diag-
nostician began to deal with more explicit and individual hypotheses after 
the feasible hypothesis set size had been sufficiently reduced. In later 
phases with individual hypotheses, the characteristics of problem solving 
may be very different than the earlier phase of narrowing down the 
hypothesis set. Therefore, it was necessary to investigate the nature of 
diagnostic activity and proper form of aiding with such explicit hypotheses. 
Due to its unique purpose, this experiment had an important difference 
in its setting from the first two experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, the 
subjects solved whole diagnosis problems starting with primary symptoms. In 
the third experiment, the subjects determined whether a given hypothesis was 
true. At first, instead of being told of symptoms, the subject was allowed 
to perform some predetermined sensor readings which would indicate abnormal 
system behavior. Then, the subject was given a hypothesis to evaluate. 
Without needing to diagnose the real failure, the subject was to end the 
problem solving merely saying if he/she agreed at the hypothesis. 
The effects of 0-N aiding and 0-H aiding were evaluated against unaided 
situations in two separate Latin square designs, i.e., Experiments 3-a and 
3-b. They are shown in Figure 10. This was because, as mentioned earlier, it 
was not possible to assign both 0-N and 0-H aiding levels to the same 
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subject due to expected interference. Although both Time and #IGA were col-
lected, only Time was used in formal statistical analysis. Since the prob-
lems are much smaller in size than those of earlier experiments, #IGA is 
usually a small integer that would not easily lend itself to meaningful sta-
tistical analysis considering the vast difference in the subjects' diagnos-
tic procedures. Otherwise, the analysis proceeded in a similar procedure as 
that of previous experiments. 
In the analysis of the data from Experiment 3-a, the main question was 
what effects 0-N aiding will have on the performance of diagnosis with a 
given hypothesis. First, the interactions between aiding levels and problems 
were tested and found insignificant (p = .881). Thus, a pooled error sum of 
squares were used for subsequent analysis. The Tukey test for additivity 
revealed the data were indeed additive. The residual plot also confirmed 
the model fitted the data quite well. It may be noted that, unlike the 
former experiments, no transformation was found necessary. The reason 
perhaps lies in the nature of the problems; these problems are just elemen-
tary subtasks which the operator should do numerous times in a whole diag-
nosis. As for the whole diagnosis time, the standard deviations were pro-
portional to the means. That is, when a problem was more complex, the varia-
tion in the actual diagnosis time tended to be larger. This tendency most 
probably comes from the process of narrowing down the hypothesis set since 
the subtask of hypothesis testing did not show this property. 
The performance was somewhat worse with 0-N aiding than without it. 
Although not significant (p = .192), the difference on the average extended 
to 15.6 seconds (overall average was 67.4 seconds). The interpretation will 
be discussed with the evaluation of 0-H aiding. 
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Experiment 3-b proceeded the same way except 0-H aiding was tried in 
the place of 0-N aiding. The interactions between aiding levels and problems 
were negligible (p = .8593). The additivity test confirmed that the data 
were additive. As in Experiment 3-a, the residual plot indicated that no 
transformation was needed. surprisingly, the effects of aiding appeared to 
be completely negligible (around 1 second, p = .9546). 
The interpretation of these results is subtle. First, the 0-N informa-
tion was not relevant to the operator's activity to test a given hypothesis. 
The aid distracted the operator only to think about irrelevant information. 
This confirmed our earlier observation in Experiment 2 that the aiding 
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effects of 0-N information seemed to diminish as the diagnosis proceeds into 
its final .stage. This observation, too, became a basis of our modeling of 
deep-reasoning diagnosis which is discussed in a later section. 
Then, why was 0-H aiding, which must be relevant to the given 
hypothesis, not effective? Two possibilities occur. First, the 0-H informa-
tion was simply not relevant to the problem solving. Otherwise, the informa-
tion was relevant but trivial to the subjects. The first interpretation is 
not consistent with our previous results that, when irrelevant information 
was given to the subjects, the performance showed signs of degradation. The 
remaining choice is that the information, which is basically a set of 
suggestions for interesting observation, was already known to the subjects. 
That is they already knew what to see even without the aiding; the aid only 
confirms it. 
This interpretation could be further confirmed by a detailed process 
analysis. In Experiments 3-a and 3-b, 32 problems were solved without aid-
ing. If 0-H aiding had been provided with these problems, it would have 
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suggested useful sensor reading actions 39 times. In 38 out of the 39 times 
(97.4%), the subjects collected equivalent information without it being sug-
gested. Since they were ready to gather the 0-11 information whenever it was 
useful, the suggestions for this information by the computer were not able 
to improve the performance further. Because, unlike the 0-N suggestions, 0-11 
suggestions were just what the subjects were about to do, they were under-
stood as trivial so that no performance decrement was caused by interfer-
ence, either. 
There was also an indication that the subjects planned valve operations 
and sensor readings together ahead of the actual operations. The subjests' 
collecting of 0-H information was remarkably precise. There were 5 occa-
sions in which the 0-11 aiding, if had been given, would have suggested unin-
formative readings. Failing in only one case out of 39 to look at useful 
0-H information, the subjects did not waste their time to do the uninforma-
tive sensor readings in any of the 5 occasions. Such precision may not be 
possible if the subjects were simply hunting around for useful observations 
'by chance in scenes they just created. Most likely, the scenes were pur-
posely planned aiming at the useful information. It should be noted that 
this tendency was unique and appeared only when an explicit hypothesis was 
given. 
Summary 
To summarize, 0 aiding and 0-N aiding improved the diagnosis while N 
aiding did not. Actually, N aiding seemed to have negative effects. This 
suggests that the operator can effectively utilize 0 information, not N 
information, supplied from outside of his/her own information processing. 
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The usefulness of 0-N aiding seemed to decrease over time perhaps as expli-
cit hypotheses arose. In explicit hypothesis testing, 0-N aiding showed a 
weak negative contribution while 0-H aiding did not affect the performance 
at all. When weak negative effects were found, there seemed to be some 
interference caused by irrelevant information. On the other hand, 0-H aiding 
was trivial and innocuous. The precision with which the subjects collected 
0-H information indicated that, when a hypothesis was given, the operational 
actions and data collection were usually planned together before the opera-
tions. This is an important observation in how the operators used their 
mental models. 
A MODEL OF DEEP-REASONING DIAGNOSIS 
rethodology 
In this section, the experimental results will be integrated into a 
model of novel fault diagnosis. 
The overall diagnostic procedure can be viewed as a combination of two 
elements: information processing tasks and a control strategy. Information 
processing tasks are subprocedures of diagnosis which can be characterized 
by their input, output and processes which take the input to produce the 
output. The control strategy is the way in which information processing 
tasks are selected. 
The emphasis in this research has been on the information processing 
tasks, not the control strategy. There are several reasons for this. First, 
aiding novel fault diagnosis is the goal. Such diagnosis relies on causal 
reasoning about the system. To help causal reasoning, information processing 
tasks in which causal reasoning is embedded need to be understood. Second, 
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we wanted to evaluate an aid which would be able to help the human to over-
come cognitive limitations by some extent. While the aid would possess a 
similar causal reasoning capability to a human, it would not suffer the same 
cognitive limitations. This aid would be a more direct help to information 
processing tasks rather than the control strategy. Third, the findings from 
our research would permit insights to the structure of these information 
processes since our aiding approach was to provide various types of informa-
tion which would substitute for the operator's information processing. 
The emphasis on information processing led to a description of data 
flows rather than a flow chart. A flow chart would depict how the chronolog-
ical sequence of various processes is controlled. In contrast, a data flow 
diagram would describe the necessary information input to a process, the 
expected output from a process, and the organization of processes through 
the links of information. This diagram helps to identify necessary sub-
processes and alternative ways of automation. 
A basic assumption connects our aiding experiments and the human infor-
mation processing model: the human can better incorporate external informa-
tion into his/her processing when the information becomes an alternative 
input to one of the higher level processes. An information processing task 
can be broken into processes, each of which can be broken into subpropessen. 
 We assume that aiding information can be substituted for an entire process 
more effectively than for just an individual subprocess. There are several 
reasons to believe this assumption is reasonable. Because they are inner 
cycles in processes, subprocesses iterate and require input at higher rates. 
Also, the operator's working memory is more heavily loaded during a subpro-
cess since the status of the higher level process, as well as that of the 
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subprocess itself, should be retained. With the frequent cycles and heavy 
mental workload, it would be harder to perceive and apprehend externally 
supplied information [Wickens 1984, Rasmussen 1984]. 
As far as causal reasoning of the system operation is concerned, two 
directions of information processing should exist: observations to 
hypotheses and hypotheses to observations. The former task takes observa-
tions as input and produces hypotheses, while the latter starts from 
hypotheses and identifies necessary observations. Both tasks may be 
categorized as search by evaluation according to Rasmussen's classification 
[Rasmussen 1984]. 
Observations In Hypotheses 
This task is triggered by observations of system behavior and will be 
referred to as data-driven search. It occurs when the observations were 
collected without particular hypotheses or showed unexpected patterns that 
fell outside hypotheses of interest. It seemed therefore natural that the 
subjects performed this type of process more often in earlier phases of 
diagnosis. Since 0-N aiding was useful in earlier phases, the information 
it supplied must be closely related to this task. The poor performance of N 
aiding, however, indicates that the human's use of N information is in a 
lower level subprocess, very likely to produce 0-N information. Therefore, 
it is suggested that there is a process which filters the observations to 
pass only more interesting (i.e., unexpected) ones to the next process: N 
information is used for one of its subprocess. Obviously, there must be one 
more process to complete this task. In this second process, the human tries 
to come up with a set of plausible hypotheses that explain the observations. 
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Some of the interesting observations may be remembered to evaluate future 
hypotheses throughout the diagnosis. The above constraints allow one to 
conceive a model of the data-driven search a$ represented in Figure 11. 
Two processes were identified. The first process is filtering obsprva-
tions. Only the observations which passed this filtering are used in the 
following process of entertaininp, hypotheses. The filtering process con-
tains a reference mental model of the system. The reference model is a men-
tal model that produces standard behavior against which observed system 
behavior is continuously compared and judged as expected or unexpected. At 
first, the reference model behavior is that of normal system. As more 
observations are accumulated, however, some abnormal system behavior would 
also become expected even though the reason may not be understood. An 
expected observation does not carry additional information and should be 
filtered out as trivial. Thus, the reference model should evolve incorporat-
ing more and more observations of actual system behavior. Converging to the 
actual system in.its behavior, the reference model would lower the probabil-
ity of unexpected observations. Consequently, the efficiency of unplanned 
observations would decrease and the data-driven search would become less 
useful as the diagnosis proceeds. 
In earlier phases of diagnosis, when the reference model behavior is 
normal, 0-N aiding replaces the whole filtering process and provides input 
information to the hypotheses entertaining process. According to our basic 
principle, it should be easier for the human to incorporate such information 
into his information processing. This was supported by the experimental 
result that 0-N aiding improved the diagnostic performance. However, the 
gradual departure of the reference model from normal system behavior would 
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degrade the relevance of 0-N aiding in the filtering. It was supported by 
the observation that 0-N aiding was mostly useful in earlier phases of prob-
lem solving. 
0 aiding enhanced the observations which are input to the filtering 
process. The enhancement is in fact presentation of observed system behavior 
at a higher level of abstraction than the sensor displays [Rasmussen 1984). 
For example, while the operator would normally look at individual pressure 
points to check the system behavior, 0 aiding would display a mass flow 
which is not the behavior of a component, but of a path. Since this level, 
being more functional, allowed more appropriate information coding for the 
operator's use, it should improve the filtering process. The experimental 
results supported this. 
The prediction of normal system. behavior (N aiding) is at first 
equivalent to the subprocess of running the reference model. This activity 
is internal to the filtering process, neither replacing a process nor pro-
viding better information to a process. As a result, there may be little 
chance to improve human diagnosis by providing this information from out-
side. Actually, the experiment showed that N aiding had rather negative 
effects, though not significant, perhaps due to distraction. 
Bypothesea sja Observations  
When given hypotheses are to be evaluated, the operator would build a 
testing plan that may prove one hypothesis and disprove the rest. This task 
is called hypothesis-driven search. Experiment 3-a indicated that, by demon-
strating poor performance of 0-N aiding, this task was very different from 
data-driven search in its information processing. 
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This type of process tends to be employed more often toward the final 
stage of diagnosis as the data-driven search loses its efficiency. An impor-
tant restriction of this process is that the hypothesis should be suffi-
ciently explicit for the diagnostician to perform mental simulation based on 
it. There are usually too many explicit hypotheses that are feasible in 
earlier phases of diagnosis. Therefore, the data-driven search may be pre-
ferred in narrowing down the feasible hypothesis set. Toward the end of 
diagnosis, however, the number of feasible hypotheses would become smaller 
and the need of testing the remaining hypotheses individually would 
increase. Then, the hypothesis-driven search dominates the diagnosis. 
In Experiment 3-b, we forced the subject to perform this process by 
assigning a hypothesis to test. The experimental result that 0-H aiding did 
not improve the human diagnosis can -be explained in this model. 0-H aiding 
suggested sensor readings which would show the difference between actual and 
hypothetical system behavior. When the hypothesis is false, a right test 
would reveal the existence of 0-H behavior to disprove the hypothesis. 
Thus, 0-H information is certainly relevant to the hypothesis testing. It 
is reasonable to expect 0-H aiding to be helpful if the operator collects 
observations and filters them as in the data-driven search. If, however, 
the tests are planned by predicting observable differences (as in Figure 12) 
depending on whether the hypothesis is true, 0-H information is identified 
before the actual testing operation. In this case, externally suggested 0-H 
information would only be redundant and would not improve the performance. 
The latter case was supported by the experiment; the aid gave no per-
formance improvement; the operators collected 0-H information in an 
extremely efficient manner even in unaided diagnoses, in which they were not 
a 
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given the suggestions by the aid. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that 
the operator, when a hypothesis is given, runs his/her mental model to 
determine a test that would distinguish the given hypothesis from other 
hypotheses. Figure 12 describes the model of this task. 
Control Strategy 
The control strategy is both highly dynamic and individualistic. 
Operators switch frequently between information processing tasks. The 
selection of tasks depends on the assessment of relative efficiency and 
effectiveness of different tasks in different situations. For example, if 
the diagnostician is equipped with very inexpensive testing methods to check 
every component directly, the cost of hypothesis-driven search will be 
drastically reduced from what it is in the ORS diagnosis. This observation 
suggests the possibilty that the control strategy can be changed when aiding 
affects the efficiency of elementary tasks. 
Although the two information processing tasks are the most important 
elements, the strategy may involve other types of information processing. 
Topographic search [Rasmussen 1984] can be used either to entertain 
hypotheses or the necessary observations for a hypothesis. In fact, this is 
believed to be the frequent way in which the operator, when performing 
data-driven search, selected the data to begin with. 
Regarding the control strategy, the only observation we could be 
assured of was that the subjects gradually transitioned from data-driven to 
hypothesis-driven search as the diagnosis proceeded. This was perhaps 
because the reduction of the size of feasible hypothesis set changed the 
relative efficiency of two processes. For instance, with only one 
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hypothesis to deal with, explicit planning of test by hypothesis-driven 
search must be more efficient. It may also be partly because, as we have 
already discussed, the data-driven search lost its efficiency as observa-
tions were accumulated. 
As a conclusion, the detailed modeling of information processing tasks 
helped to integrate our findings and observations of human operator's novel 
fault diagnosis. The models of human information processing tasks were use-
ful in explaining the aiding effects of various types of information. It 
should also be useful to predict effects of aiding to be proposed in the 
future. Such predictions, in turn, may be tested in experiments to verify 
the model. 
CONCLUSION 
An aiding approach has been described and evaluated for novel fault 
diagnosis in complex systems. To the best of our knowledge, this approach 
is unique in the following ways. First, the emphasis is on novel rather 
than routine faults. Second, it contains a qualitative model that may 
correspond to the human's internal model of the system. This model 
represents knowledge only of how the system behaves. Therefore, this aiding 
approach does not rely on proceduralized knowledge. Third, the qualitative 
model is the basis for much of the aiding that takes place. 
The experimental results confirmed that a deep-reasoning diagnosis can 
be aided, without disturbing the human diagnostic procedure, by providing 
relevant information. However, the results also suggested that the aiding 
information should be compatible with the human information processing. 
This emphasizes the importance of understanding the human information pro- 
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cessing to build an effective aid. A principle of particular importance is 
that the information from/to higher-level processes is better incorporated 
into the human's information processing. The findings and observations were 
integrated into an effort to model the information processing tasks for 
deep-reasoning diagnosis. 
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Figure 3. The operator's display. 
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PROBLEMS 
PI 	P2 	P3 	P4 	P5 	P6 
GROUPS 	GI (S1-S3) 
G2 (S4-S6) 	N Meo 
where 	N: N-aided situation 
-: unaided situation 
Figure 8. Latin Square Design for N effects in Experiment 1. 
PROBLEMS 
P1 	P2 	P3 	P4 	P5 	P6 
GROUPS 	G1 (S1-S3) 	- 	0 	0-N 	- 	0-N 	0 
G2 (S4-S6) 	0 	0-N 	- 	0 	- 	0-N 
G3 (S7-S9) 	0-N 	- 	0 	0-N 	0 	- 
where 	0: 0-aided situation 
0-N: 0-N aided situation 
-: unaided situation 
Figure 9. Latin Square Design for 0 and 0-N in Experiment 2. 
PROBLEMS 
P1 	P2 	P3 	P4 	P5 	P6 	P7 	P8 
	
GROUPS Gl(S1,S2) 	— 	A 	— 	A 	— 	A 	— 	A 
G2(S3,S4) 	A 	— 	A 	— 	A 	— 	A 	— 
where A: aided situation (0—N or 0—H) 
—: unaided situation 
Figure 10. Latin Square Designs for 0—N and 0—H effects 

































Figure 12. Hypothesis-driven Search 
